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CHAPTER I
The Eﬀect of Lottery-Incentives on Labor Supply:
A Firm Experiment in Malawi
1.1 Introduction
The provision of incentives for workers is a central question for organizations. Employers
use and economists have studied a wide range of compensation mechanisms to induce
supply of the right amount and the right type of eﬀort. In this paper I consider a particular
incentive structure that is motivated by preferences for skewed payoﬀs that are observed in
a variety of settings. I study the introduction of temporary lottery bonuses for manual
workers of a large agricultural ﬁrm in Malawi to test how lottery incentives aﬀect labor
supply and how decisions evolve over time as workers gain experience with the outcomes of
the lotteries.
Empirical evidence both from lab studies and real world behavior suggests a pronounced
preference for positive skew for choices under uncertainty for many people. In the face
of long-odds gambles lab study participants often are no longer risk averse but become
risk-loving (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979a) even in the face of high stakes (Kachelmeier
and Shehata, 1992). This observation was one of the motivations for the development of
Prospect Theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1992) which is now well accepted as a description
of choices under uncertainty in the lab (Barberis, 2013).1
Outside the lab lotteries are popular and are a reliable source of government revenue;
in betting markets long-shots are overvalued (Snowberg and Wolfers, 2010); and private
households tend to under-diversify portfolios (Barberis and Huang, 2008). Lotteries are also
commonly used directly as incentives in a variety of contexts. Firms often use sweepstakes
for product promotions in order to incentivize attention; prize-linked savings accounts, in
1 More recent theory developments focus on the role of salience (Bordalo, Gennaioli and Shleifer, 2012)
to explain many of the same departures from Expected Utility Theory and more.
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which savers give up safe interest returns in exchange for a chance to win big, are a common
product in many countries and are used to incentivize savings (Guillen and Tschoegl, 2002);
surveys often use lotteries in order to incentivize participation.
Preferences for long-odds gambles may also play a role for incentives in the context
of labor markets. If such preferences are strong enough and persistent across time, then
similarly to the examples above, labor contracts with lottery payoﬀs could be used to improve
eﬀects of incentives on eﬀort in organizations. Workers may be more willing to provide eﬀort
under contracts with lottery elements compared to deterministic contracts valued at the same
expected value as the lottery contract. By taking into account these particular features of
workers' risk-preferences, ﬁrms could then increase proﬁts. Explicit lottery contracts may be
uncommon. But as Zabojnik (2002) points out, many real world contracts have skewed payoﬀ
structures which, according to standard theory for risk-averse expected utility maximizers,
they should not have; e.g. stock options are more popular than one would expect and bonuses
for sales staﬀ are commonly tied to discrete targets with large payouts instead of being paid
as a piece rate.
In contrast to many lab settings with one-shot decisions over gambles, if preferences for
skewed payoﬀs are to be taken into account successfully by organizations in the context
of labor contracts, then these preferences should not be one-oﬀ phenomena resulting from
temporary decision mistakes; rather, as workers are exposed to the outcomes of the lotteries,
eﬀects need to persist over time. In addition, in contrast to decisions with immediate eﬀects
such as lab choices or the ﬁlling of short surveys, preferences for lottery payoﬀs should only
aﬀect labor supply if preferences translate into relatively more sustained continued eﬀort,
e.g. higher weekly attendance or increased productivity.
There are many reasons that have been suggested for why people may exhibit preferences
for long-odd gambles. In this paper I will not attempt to distinguish between them in general,
but I aim to separate two sets of fundamentally distinct categories of theories by observing
how workers' choices in this experiments evolve over time. On the one hand, the observed
choices could be the result of mere mistakes based on temporarily biased beliefs. It is possible
that people place biased weights on the probability of a favorable  but very unlikely 
outcome that are not equivalent to the true probabilities; however, with suﬃcient information
and experience, in a repeated setting, the same people's beliefs may adjust and the preference
for long-odd gambles would disappear. In fact, recent work in psychology ﬁnds that people no
longer prefer lotteries over receiving the expected value for sure when small-stakes decisions
are made repeatedly and feedback on the outcomes of draws is provided (Hertwig and Erev,
2009; Erev et al., 2010).
On the other hand, people may overweigh small probabilities of very favorable events not
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because of a temporary mistake but because of a stable preference for such gambles. These
could have psychological foundations (see Barberis, 2013, p. 178 for a brief summary) or
they might arise indirectly for economic reasons that are especially relevant in the context of
this study, e.g. a combination of credit constraints and indivisibilities of expenditures such
as for durable goods (Kwang, 1965). Lotteries may also permanently provide direct utility
via general excitement or anticipation of winning something big (Conlisk, 1993) and regret
aversion could lead people to work harder after having been assigned to lottery incentives in
order to avoid regret over forgoing the chance to win big (Loomes and Sugden, 1982).
A number of studies test the eﬀect of lottery incentives on survey responses as well as on
health-related behavior. Volpp et al. (2008a) and Volpp et al. (2008b) ﬁnd positive eﬀects
for medication adherence and weight loss, respectively, compared to a no-incentive condition
 but not compared to a deterministic incentive The impact of lotteries on survey response
rate is mixed (see e.g. Singer and Ye (2013) which includes a review of lottery incentives for
web surveys). Most studies not only vary whether incentives are deterministic or lotteries
but also vary other features such as whether the incentive is conditional on completion
of the survey or not.This makes a clear interpretation diﬃcult, or omits a ﬁxed incentive
group for comparison. An exception are two recent studies that explicitly compare lottery
and ﬁxed incentives by randomizing assignment to each condition and otherwise keeping
requirements even. Gajic, Cameron and Hurley (2012) ﬁnd high lottery incentives to be
more cost-eﬀective than ﬁxed incentives for a sample of Ontario (Canada) residents. Halpern
et al. (2011) ﬁnd that lotteries did not improve response rates compared to no incentives at
all for a sample of US physicians, while expected-value equivalent ﬁxed incentives did.
In order to test how workers' labor supply responds to lottery incentives and to test if
these eﬀects endure over time, I partner with a large tea producer in Malawi to conduct
a ﬁeld experiment. I compare the incentive eﬀects of two temporary bonus schemes  a
ﬁxed scheme and a lottery scheme with the same expected value  for a total of over 1,600
piece-rate workers who harvest tea leaves. Bonus schemes were re-assigned weekly for a
period of up to 13 weeks and varied exogenously at the worker level. Eligibility requirements
to receive the bonus were a combination of full weekly attendance and conditions on weekly
total output. The requirements were identical for both bonus schemes. The (expected)
values of the bonuses increased over time and ranged from between about 5% to about 15%
of total weekly pay at the relevant margins for qualifying. Attendance and high productivity
are important for the ﬁrm in order to maintain harvesting cycles that inﬂuence quality of
the ﬁnal product and the total potential output of the tea ﬁelds. High attendance and
productivity also help with planning of production and reduce per-worker ﬁxed costs.
I ﬁnd that attendance at work was higher under both schemes and that the eﬀect of
3
the lottery bonus on the probability of full weekly attendance a requirement for bonus
eligibility and an explicit target variable of the incentive schemes was about twice as large
as the eﬀect of the ﬁxed bonus. The larger eﬀect on attendance persists over time as workers
gain experience with the lottery distribution. The bonus schemes aﬀected workers' output
only in the later stages of the experiment when bonus amounts and eligibility criteria were
changed. Consistent with the attendance eﬀects, the point estimate of the lottery bonus
eﬀect is larger than that of the ﬁxed bonus eﬀect during that part of the experiment, but I
the coeﬃcients are not statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent.
While the lottery bonus scheme did not have a strong diﬀerential eﬀect on output, the
results on attendance are signiﬁcant for the ﬁrm. Attendance is an important in the produc-
tion process. Tea ﬁelds need to be harvested in certain recurring intervals to ensure quality
and maximize plant growth and falling behind the optimal schedule can result in signiﬁcant
reductions in quality and can inhibit growth. Estimates by the ﬁrm's management place the
loss in sales prices in a typical main harvest season that are due to lower quality leaves from
harvesting ﬁelds oﬀ their optimal cycle in the range of 10-15% of average ﬁnal sales prices.
This paper is the ﬁrst to empirically test the predictions implied by preferences for skewed
payoﬀs in the context of compensation practices. In contrast to previous experiments with
lottery one-shot incentives or choices in the lab, subjects in this experiment make repeated
choices in the real world and face incentives of substantial value. The results suggests that at
least in this context proﬁt maximizing ﬁrms can improve worker compensation schemes by
taking into account the behavioral anomaly of workers' preference for long shots at large
gains.
1.2 Context and Field Experiment
1.2.1 Organization of production
This study was conducted in partnership with a large tea ﬁrm in Malawi.2 The ﬁeld
experiment was designed and implemented in close collaboration with the ﬁrm's management
in the second half of the 2012/2013 main season. The main season is characterized by more
favorable weather conditions with higher temperatures and suﬃcient rainfall, and typically
ranges from November through April. During oﬀ-season, plant growth is generally lower; in
addition, the time is used for cutting down the plants (pruning) and as a results about a
third of ﬁelds does not produce leaves for harvesting until the beginning of the next main
season.
2The partner ﬁrm wishes to stay anonymous due to business and political considerations.
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The ﬁrm's tea growing and harvesting operations are overseen by estate managers. Es-
tates are large (> 1000 workers) and are divided into divisions which are further divided
into so-called gangs. Each gang has at least one gang supervisor and several workers who
help with organization such as the leaf clerk who records the weight of tea collected for
each worker and a leaf inspector who performs quality control. Workers who hand pick or
pluck tea leaves from the bushes are referred to as pluckers. Gang sizes ranged in size
from 30 to 100 pluckers.
This study was carried out with tea pluckers. Pluckers temporarily store the plucked
tea leaves in baskets that are carried on their backs. Leaves are dropped oﬀ at the gang's
weighing station where individual output is recorded several times per day. At the end of
the work day the gang's harvested leaves are transported to the factory. There is no explicit
teamwork involved in plucking tea. However, output of one worker is related to the output
of another worker in the same gang, since on a given day in a given location the total amount
of leaf that a gang can plucked is essentially ﬁxed.
In contrast to crops that are harvested once or a few times per year, tea bushes grow
continuously throughout the season and gangs of pluckers return to a ﬁxed set of ﬁelds in
regular intervals. A ﬁeld is usually harvested for one or two days. Fields are scheduled to be
visited in pre-set intervals (either 7 days or alternating 10/11 days depending on the pruning
cycle of the ﬁeld's tea bushes). Plucking tea on the correct schedule is essential for quality of
output as leaves plucked too early or too late have undesirable characteristics that decrease
the value of the ﬁnal product. Plucking on the optimal cycle is also important for increasing
total growth of the bushes of a ﬁeld over time. Irregular attendance can disrupt the optimal
plucking schedule, and managing plucking cycles is an important ongoing task for managers
and gang supervisors who adjust working hours and the number of workers (temporarily)
assigned to gangs to stay on schedule.
The schedule for each gang is set at the beginning of the main season between October
or November and remains ﬁxed until the end of the main season in April or May. The
composition of each gang is also set at the beginning of the season and remains stable over
time for the most part. A set of core workers is assigned to plots in each ﬁeld for the rest of
the season, and workers are at times temporarily added to cope with higher leaf growth. At
the end of the season most workers are assigned to non-harvesting tasks for a transitional
period as the the season winds down. After that a subset of workers is employed throughout
the oﬀ-season, typically only for two or three days per week.
In the majority of gangs in this study tea pluckers are assigned plots at the beginning of
the season to which they return when the gang returns on the same ﬁeld in the next plucking
interval. While pluckers are expected to ﬁnish their plots, assignments are in general not
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entirely rigid: pluckers who are ﬁnished with their plots can pluck in other plots; if a plucker
falls behind, the supervisor will assign others to help ﬁnish the plot; and if a worker is absent
on a given day, the supervisor will assign the plot to other workers for the day. In some
divisions pluckers are not assigned ﬁxed plots but pluck in rows, as supervisors coordinate
the group. Both under the row organization and under the plot assignment workers have a
daily minimum weight of 44kg that they are required to pluck. Repeated failure to do so will
result in employment termination, but the handling is situation speciﬁc and depends on the
supervisors. On the other hand, once a worker has completed the 44kg requirement, there is
some pressure by supervisors to ﬁnish the assigned plots, but workers can in principle leave
work. Workers have incentives to care about supervisors' assessment, beyond being good
in relations with their superiors, because on average the more productive pluckers will be
selected for oﬀ-season work and will more likely be employed for high-value tasks during the
transitional period at the end of the season.
Workers usually arrive between 6.30am and 7.30am and typically work until between
2pm and 3.30pm in the main season. Workers arriving later than 7.30am are ineligible to
work on the same day and are considered absent. The gang's end time of a given day is
determined by the gang supervisor and depends on the crop that is available on a given
day in the scheduled ﬁeld. Usually the day ends when all tea bushes of the day's scheduled
ﬁeld have been plucked. Workers mostly arrive around the same time as the supervisor,
but sometimes, e.g. when the leaf growth is high, workers start early to increase their day's
output or to avoid daytime heat. Regular work days are Monday through Saturday. On
Saturdays work ends earlier, usually by 12, and no later than 2.30pm, especially on paydays
which are every second Saturday in the afternoon.
Tea pluckers are paid a constant piece rate for each kg of tea plucked.3,4 Measurements
are taken and announced every time a plucker drops oﬀ tea at the weighing station during
the day. Most workers know the past daily total kg plucked for the current pay period;
though many do not know the period's cumulative total. This aspect of worker's knowledge
becomes important when discussing how workers' weekly output responded to the bonus
incentives.
3 The rate was MK 7.95 per kg since the 2011/2012 season and was increased to MK 9.77 per kg mid-season
to keep up with substantial cost of living increases in the country. The average exchange rate during the
time of the experiment was about MK 380 to US$1.
4 As an additional incentive for attendance, during the months of February and March, workers who are
not absent without permission for an entire week qualify for a 25kg of maize the local staple food to be
purchased at reduced prices.
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1.2.2 Data and sample characteristics
1.2.2.1 Data
This study uses administrative data provided by the tea ﬁrm that includes daily infor-
mation about attendance, nature of task performed and daily total output. The data covers
the 2012/2013 main season including the transition in and out of it, and ranges from calen-
dar week 43 in Oct 2012 to calendar week 21 in May 2013. The experiment was phased in
starting week 5 in February (a pilot took place with one gang in weeks 3 & 4) and ended
uniformly in calendar week 17 in April of 2013. Details of the phase-in are discussed in the
next section.
While in general workers are assigned to certain classes of jobs for the entire season, e.g.
tea plucking or general duty, there can be temporary assignments to other classes of jobs;
e.g. non-regular pluckers can help with plucking, or regular pluckers could be assigned, for
example, to weeding. Since the bonus incentives introduced as part of this study only applied
to pluckers, and since workers cannot choose which tasks they are assigned to, I work only
with a worker's observations from weeks in which the worker was plucking on at least one
day of the week or weeks in which a worker was absent the entire week but had worked as
a plucker at least one day in the previous week. The analysis in this paper focuses on data
associated with all of the 1,678 workers that have worked as pluckers at least once during
the time of the experiment. Collapsed to the week level, the individual worker data covers
a total of 38,295 worker-weeks of which 15,603 fall into weeks when the respective workers'
gangs were part of the bonus experiment.
Table 1.1 presents summary statistics of key administrative variables. For selected vari-
ables the statistics are presented separately for the duration of the bonus experiment and
for the time before and after the experiment that is covered by the data. While the entire
data set is used during the analysis, identiﬁcation of the bonus scheme eﬀects comes from
the periods in which gangs were part of the bonus experiment, i.e. from periods in which
bonus assignment varied between workers of a given gang; the remaining observations are
used to reduce residual variance and improve estimation precision.
The empirical analysis in this paper relies on exogenous variation in assignments of
workers to bonus schemes within gangs for a given week. Since overall variation in the
administrative individual level outcomes is large across gangs and over time, diﬀerences
in aggregate measures of the outcome variables across periods during the experiment and
periods outside of the experiment are not necessarily indicative of the eﬀect of the bonus
schemes. Thus, for comparability, individual-level statistics reported in Table 1.1 for the
period of the experiment are computed only among those workers who in a given week were
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Table 1.1: Summary statistics
A. Worker-week level observations
Number of observations
Total in data 38,295
During bonus experiment
All worker-weeks 15,603
No-bonus condition worker-weeks only 3,642
Outside of bonus experiment 22,692
Variable mean sd min p25 p50 p75 max N
Individual-week level --- during bonus experiment for workers under no-bonus scheme
Full weekly attendance [0/1] 0.555 0.497 3,642
Weekly attendance [days] 5.29 1.04 0.00 5.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 3,642
Total weekly output [kg] 384.5 196.4 0.0 248.0 360.0 504.0 1387.0 3,642
Average daily productivity if plucking [kg/day] 81.0 29.5 11.0 58.7 76.6 99.2 232.4 3,614
Regular income [MK] 3,360 1,723 0 2,150 3,142 4,415 11,033 3,642
Individual week-level --- outside of bonus experiment
Full attendance [0/1] 0.640 0.480 22,692
Weekly attendance [days] 5.46 0.89 0.00 5.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 22,692
Total weekly output [kg] 284.3 199.7 0.0 126.0 257.0 404.0 1711.0 22,692
Average daily productivity if plucking [kg/day] 65.0 32.5 2.0 43.3 62.0 84.7 285.2 22,692
Regular income [MK] 2,366 1,652 0 1,046 2,160 3,362 13,610 22,692
B. Gang level observations
Variable mean sd min p25 p50 p75 max N
Gang size --- over-time average of daily number of pluckers
During bonus experiment 60.8 19.9 32.2 45.4 57.2 71.7 106.3 25
Outside of bonus experiment 50.7 17.3 28.4 37.1 46.9 63.2 90.6 25
Notes: Calculations based on administrative data of tea firm for the 2012/2013 main season. Data "during bonus experiment" refers to data points from 
weeks in which gangs were part of the bonus experiment; "outside of bonus experiment" refers to data points before or after observations during the 
experiment; see text for details. Exchage rate during the time of the experiment was ca. MK360 per US$1. 
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in the no-bonus condition and did not receive additional incentives beyond the regular wage
(i.e. their regular piece rate pay on most days; and ﬁxed daily wage on days in which they
did not work as pluckers).
Table 1.1 describes key outcomes for the analysis. The average number of days per week
in attendance is 5.29. The six-day work week therefore implies an average daily attendance
of 88.1%. On average nearly half of workers5 miss at least one day: the share of pluckers
who work all days of the week those with full attendance is 55.5% on average. When
plucking tea, pluckers pluck an average of 81.0kg per day and the average total weekly output
is 384.5kg, with a standard deviation of 196.4kg (51% of the average). Average weekly regular
income is MK3,360 about US$9 (not considering payments for bonus scheme payments and
not including the value of at-work beneﬁts like lunch or food subsidies). Output levels and,
accordingly, income from tea plucking are on average lower during the period that is outside
of the experiment since it includes pre-season weeks in which growth is slower. Attendance
during that period is slightly higher both in days per week and share of full attendance.
Table 1.1, panel B shows the size distribution for plucking gangs. For the 25 gangs that
were part of this study, gang size measured as the across-time average per gang of the daily
number of pluckers assigned to a gang ranged from about 32 to about 106 tea pluckers
during period of the bonus experiment, with a mean of 60.8 pluckers. The same numbers
for the period outside of the bonus experiment are somewhat lower (mean of 50.7).
1.2.3 The Field Experiment
The experiment was designed to generate exogenous variation in the payoﬀ structure of
incentives for attendance and weekly output of tea pluckers. Temporary bonus incentives
were phased-in over a span of three weeks starting February 2013 in calendar week 5 after a
pilot in January in one of the gangs in weeks 3 and 4.6 Table 1.2 summarizes the timeline
of the experiment and shows the phase-in of gangs into the bonus schemes. A week prior
to the start of the experiment each gang was visited by research assistants to explain how
the bonus scheme worked. Workers were informed that the bonus incentives  which were
paid in addition to their usual piece-rate compensation  would end at the end of the main
5More precisely, half of worker-weeks since the data is pooled across workers and periods; but for
simplicity I refer to workers only.
6 The pilot diﬀered from the main experiment only in two ways: a) bonus group assignment was explicitly
randomized, by workers' drawing from a bag (instead of by last digit of workers' employee numbers), for
everyone in week 3 and for everyone in week 4 who was in the no-bonus group in week 3; everyone who was
in bonus group in week 3 was assigned to the no-bonus condition in week 4; b) the value of the bonus was
half of that of the initial value in the main experiment. The two weeks of the one-gang pilot are included in
the analysis and are counted as part of the ﬁrst phase of the experiment. In the empirical analysis I include
the pilot observations but results are robust to excluding them and are available on request.
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season. The bonus incentives lasted until calendar week 17, so the total time under the
bonus ranged from 9 - 13 weeks depending on when the bonus was ﬁrst introduced in a gang
(15 weeks for one gang in which the pilot took place in weeks 3 and 4).
The study was conducted with two adjacent tea estates of the ﬁrm. In one of the estates all
ﬁve divisions participated; in the second estate only two out of four divisions were included.7
A total of 1,678 pluckers worked in one of the included seven divisions at any point during
the experiment.
During each week of the experiment workers were assigned to one of two bonus incentive
conditions  either to a lottery bonus condition or a ﬁxed bonus condition  or a no-
bonus condition. The assignment of workers to experimental conditions was quasi-random
and was done at the individual level, not at the gang level. Assignment was determined by
the last digit of a worker's employee number. Each of the ten possible digits was assigned to
one of the three bonus conditions. Workers originally receive these numbers when they are
ﬁrst employed with the ﬁrm. The numbers are given out in the order workers arrive during
initial recruitment. Workers know their number well, since they regularly use it for identiﬁ-
cation on paydays. The assignment of digits to the experimental conditions was randomized
in week 5, and in all weeks after that, it was set by a pre-determined 10-week cycle (the
estimated length of the remainder of the main season) with diﬀerent starting points for each
digit. In a given week the assignment by digit was the same across all workers; i.e. a 1 in
one gang is under the same bonus scheme as a 1 in another gang. The exact sequence for
each last digit is shown in Table 1.3. The schedule was generated by imposing a number of
restrictions to generate desirable patterns, mainly to avoid extreme constellations, to ensure
week-to-week variation for each worker, and to keep a constant ratio of experimental condi-
tions (set initially to 2:2:1 for the lottery bonus, the ﬁxed bonus and the no-bonus conditions
respectively, and changed to 4:4:3 in the last two periods).8
The actual distribution of experimental conditions in given gang and week varied depend-
ing on the employee numbers of the workers assigned to the diﬀerent gangs. The resulting
7 The partial selection was done to limit organizational and ﬁnancial burden. The two included divisions
were selected over the non-included because of historically higher rates of absenteeism which the ﬁrm con-
sidered a problem. Variation of absenteeism across divisions is strongly correlated with geography: division
in locations with more diverse economic activity tend to have higher rates of absenteeism across all of the
ﬁrm's estates.
8 The following restrictions applied to each cycle for each digit: Neither of the bonus conditions should
occur three times in row; the no-bonus condition should not occur twice in a row; there should be at one
tuple of (lottery bonus, lottery bonus) for consecutive weeks. Each four consecutive weeks should have at
least one lottery bonus. There should be at least one tuple of (lottery, ﬁxed) and (ﬁxed, lottery) for two
consecutive weeks during the cycle. There should be at most two lottery bonus weeks in each set of four
consecutive weeks. There should be not be two consecutive weeks of bonuses of one type followed by two
consecutive weeks of another bonus. The actual sequence was then chosen randomly from the set of all
possible sequences.
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Table 1.2: Timeline of incentive experiment
Month
Calendar week 
2012/2013 Period
Gangs (divisions) 
included in bonus 
schemes 
Expected value of additional 
bonus pay at low / high kg 
threshold [MK]
Oct '12 43 0 (0) (beginning of data set)
…
Jan 2 0 (0)
Jan 3 1 (1) 100 / 100
Jan 4 1 (1) 100 / 100
Jan / Feb 5 1 (1) 200 / 200
Feb 6 4 (1) 200 / 200
Feb 7 19 (5) 200 / 200
Feb 8 22 (6) 200 / 200
Feb / Mar 9 25 (7) 200 / 200
Mar 10 25 (7) 200 / 200
Mar 11 25 (7) 350 / 350
Mar 12 25 (7) 350 / 350
Mar 13 25 (7) 350 / 350
Apr 14 25 (7) 430 / 870
Apr 15 25 (7) 430 / 870
Apr 16 25 (7) 430 / 870
Apr 17 25 (7) 430 / 870
Apr/May 18 0 (0)
…
May 21 0 (0) (end of data set)
Note: Average exchange rate during experiment was about MK 360 per US$1.
3
2
1
(pilot)
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Table 1.3: Schedule of assignment of workers to experimental conditions
Calendar week: 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
Last digit of emloyee 
number
1 Fix Lot Fix Lot Fix Fix 0 Lot Lot 0 Fix 0 Fix
2 Fix Lot Fix Fix 0 Lot Lot 0 Fix Lot Fix Lot Fix
3 0 Lot Lot 0 Fix Lot Fix Lot Fix Fix 0 Lot Lot
4 Lot Lot 0 Fix Lot Fix Lot Fix Fix 0 Lot Lot 0
5 Fix Fix Fix 0 Lot Lot 0 Fix Lot Fix Lot Fix 0
6 Fix Fix Lot Fix Fix 0 Lot Lot 0 Fix Lot 0 0
7 Lot Fix 0 Lot Lot 0 Fix Lot Fix Lot Fix Fix 0
8 0 Fix Lot Fix Lot Fix Fix 0 Lot Lot 0 Fix Lot
9 Lot 0 Fix Lot Fix Lot Fix Fix 0 Lot Lot 0 Fix
0 Lot 0 Lot Lot 0 Fix Lot Fix Lot Fix Fix 0 Lot
Number of digits 
assinged to
lottery bonus 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 3
fixed bonus 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 3
no-bonus 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 4 4
Notes: "Lot" = lottery bonus condition; "Fix" = fixed bonus condition; "0" = no-bonus condition
Period 3Period 2Period 1
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distribution is shown in Table 1.4. Across all gangs the distribution of within-gang shares
average out to values close to the ratios of the last digits. The shares vary by gang over time
as well as across gangs at any given time.
At the end of each week, either Friday or Saturday, pluckers were informed by their su-
pervisors about their assignment to the following week's experimental conditions (see Figure
1.1). In addition, to remind workers of their groups, starting in calendar week 8 the weigh-
ment clerks informed each worker during each of the tea leaf weighing in the ﬁrst couple of
days of the week. At the end of each week the supervisor also announced the details of the
requirements to qualify for the upcoming week's bonus, which varied from week to week.
1.2.3.1 The bonus schemes
I cooperated with the tea ﬁrm to introduce two bonus schemes for tea pluckers. The
ﬁrm's goal with the introduction of these bonuses was to increase worker attendance and to
increase plucking productivity. Therefore, bonus qualiﬁcation was based both on attendance
and total weekly output (as measured in kg of tea leaves plucked). The ﬁrm values high levels
of attendance in order to maintain optimal plucking cycles that matter for quality of the ﬁnal
product and for total quantity of plucked leaves. The regular, non-experiment labor contract
does not strongly incentivize attendance. Simultaneous incentivizing of both attendance and
productivity ensures that workers do not just show up and pluck the daily minimum; it also
dis-incentivizes plucking high numbers conditional on attending and not attending on other
days in return. In general, higher attendance is more valuable with respect to maintaining
optimal plucking cycles if productivity is also high.
I divide the experiment into three separate periods based on the bonus amounts (see Table
1.2 again) and based on eligibility criteria. Over time, the bonus amounts were successively
increased. The output eligibility criteria in ﬁrst two periods were ex-ante announced absolute
weekly output thresholds, whereas in the third period output eligibility partially took the
form of a relative threshold.
In order to qualify for a bonus in a given week, workers that were assigned to one of the
two bonus conditions had to have full attendance whenever work was oﬀered. Usually this
meant showing up for work all six working days of the week. In some instances, when leaf
growth was unexpectedly low compared to a gang's available manpower, a gang, or a subset
of it, could not be oﬀered work on a given day. In some instances the work oﬀered was an
activity diﬀerent from plucking. In those cases, the attendance requirement still applied.
Oﬃcial sick days, however, did not count against the attendance requirement.9
9 When a worker was sick and wanted to register a sick day he or she ﬁrst needed to stop by the division's
oﬃce to get a sick-leave form, needed to be seen in the estate's free clinic and needed to take the form,
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Table 1.4: Means of per-gang shares of tea pluckers in experimental conditions by week
(standard deviations in parentheses)
Calendar week Lottery bonus Fixed bonus No-bonus
5 0.463 0.341 0.195
6 0.375 0.389 0.236
(0.034) (0.048) (0.032)
7 0.398 0.396 0.206
(0.056) (0.062) (0.053)
8 0.392 0.417 0.191
(0.086) (0.082) (0.051)
9 0.408 0.391 0.201
(0.079) (0.067) (0.056)
10 0.393 0.417 0.190
(0.054) (0.053) (0.047)
11 0.396 0.409 0.194
(0.059) (0.065) (0.042)
12 0.394 0.396 0.210
(0.062) (0.065) (0.052)
13 0.412 0.402 0.186
(0.036) (0.044) (0.037)
14 0.402 0.387 0.211
(0.066) (0.054) (0.054)
15 0.392 0.403 0.204
(0.084) (0.075) (0.050)
16 0.301 0.313 0.387
(0.049) (0.066) (0.067)
17 0.304 0.296 0.401
(0.076) (0.055) (0.092)
Notes: Assingment was based on last digit of employee number as shown in Table 3. 
Calculations based on gang-week level observations. In week 5 only one gang was included in 
the experiment so there is only one gang level observation.
14
Figure 1.1: Relative timing of bonus group announcements and bonus receipts
week t-1
- Assignment to 
experimental 
conditions for 
week t
- Bonus receipts 
and lotteries 
for week t-2
week t
- Assignment to 
experimental 
conditions for 
week t+1
- Bonus receipts 
and lotteries 
for week t-1
week t+1
- Assignment to 
experimental 
conditions for 
week t+2
- Bonus receipts 
and lotteries 
for week t
Payday for work from weeks t-1 and t
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In addition to the attendance requirement, qualifying for a bonus required meeting two
weekly output thresholds  a lower threshold resulting in a lower bonus or a higher threshold
resulting in a higher bonus (conditional on meeting the attendance requirement and being
assigned to the bonus condition in a given week). Columns 1 and 2 of Table 1.5 list the
average kg thresholds for each week. For a large part of the experiment, until including
calendar week 13, bonus thresholds were absolute weekly kg thresholds that were announced
ahead of time: for each week they were announced at the end of the prior week. The
thresholds were set at the division level and, thus, were constant across gangs in a given
division for a given week. The thresholds were based on a moving average of the kg of
tea-plucked per man-day in the latest two weeks for which data was available. In the ﬁrst
weeks, the lower threshold was set to the average and the higher threshold was set to 20%
above the lower threshold. Since the thresholds were deemed relatively high, partially due
to a slump in plant growth, the low thresholds were set to lower levels in week 13, and the
higher thresholds were set 35% above the low threshold for the same week.
Table 1.5 columns 3 and 4 list the per-gang shares of pluckers who were above the
respective kg thresholds separately for each week. Note that in a given week, across-gang
variation in these measures is substantial. This variation highlights that ﬁeld conditions vary
between gangs, and while in the ﬁrst two periods of the experiment kg thresholds varied at
the level of the division, the implied relative diﬃculty of achieving the output targets varied
a lot.
The ﬁxed bonus worked as follows: If a plucker was under the ﬁxed bonus scheme in
a given week and met the attendance requirement, then if his/her weekly total output was
above the ﬁrst threshold he/she received bonus of a known amount (MK 200 ca. $.56 until
week 10, MK 350 ca. $.97 until week 11; after that the system changed as described below).
If the worker also exceeded the second threshold he/she received another bonus of the same
amount. So during this part of the experiment the total bonus at the high threshold, the
high bonus, was twice the amount of the low bonus. Each week each gang was visited
by a research assistant (RA) to inform workers if they had qualiﬁed for the bonus and to
hand out paper receipts indicating the amounts and at which payday they would receive the
bonus (either the upcoming one or the one after that).
Table 1.5 columns 5 and 6 provide a sense of the magnitude of the bonus amounts relative
to regular income. Especially in the ﬁrst few weeks before the amounts were increased, the
bonus amounts were relatively small with the bonus set at around 5% of the regular weekly
signed by the clinic's physician, back to the division's oﬃce. Since this procedure usually takes several hours
including travel and wait times management was not concerned with fraudulent sick pay claims to meet the
bonus incentive requirement.
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Table 1.5: Characteristics of bonus output thresholds by week, means (standard deviation in parentheses)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (4) (5)
low high low high low high
5 222.0 266.0 0.854 0.756 0.113 0.095
(0.0) (0.0) (0.000) (0.000)
6 501.0 601.0 0.416 0.281 0.050 0.042
(0.0) (0.0) (0.248) (0.176) (0.000) (0.000)
7 484.1 580.9 0.367 0.242 0.053 0.044
(67.5) (80.8) (0.254) (0.224) (0.008) (0.007)
8 490.1 588.3 0.195 0.084 0.052 0.043
(57.1) (68.6) (0.133) (0.075) (0.007) (0.005)
9 489.6 587.7 0.303 0.173 0.052 0.044
(68.6) (82.1) (0.228) (0.165) (0.007) (0.006)
10 472.5 566.9 0.337 0.218 0.054 0.045
(58.8) (70.7) (0.240) (0.202) (0.007) (0.006)
11 465.5 558.3 0.341 0.199 0.097 0.081
(67.9) (81.5) (0.222) (0.173) (0.015) (0.012)
12 450.4 540.3 0.306 0.168 0.100 0.083
(65.5) (78.8) (0.217) (0.164) (0.015) (0.013)
13 359.7 486.5 0.609 0.339 0.125 0.093
(49.1) (81.4) (0.189) (0.204) (0.018) (0.018)
14 264.0 428.1 0.794 0.347 0.167 0.208
(0.0) (147.6) (0.167) (0.087) (0.000) (0.051)
15 264.0 393.4 0.744 0.330 0.167 0.226
(0.0) (156.5) (0.192) (0.076) (0.000) (0.108)
16 264.0 452.1 0.773 0.326 0.167 0.197
(0.0) (110.1) (0.192) (0.058) (0.000) (0.081)
17 264.0 475.3 0.827 0.327 0.167 0.187
(0.0) (126.1) (0.183) (0.071) (0.000) (0.089)
Average output thresholds [kg] Average of per-gang share of 
workers above output thresholds
Average size of expected bonus as share 
of regular piece-rate pay at respective 
thresholds
Note: Calculations in columsn 1, 2 and 5, 6 are based on worker-week level observations; in columns 3, 4 on gang-week level observations. *) In 
weeks 14-17 the low thresholds were not weekly but daily thresholds of 44kg and the high bonus kg threshold was determined by relative 
within-gang ranking and so thresholds were not announced ex-ante and only computed ex-post for this table. 
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pay at the low thresholds. The bonus amounts increased substantially in the last period of
the experiment, which is described further below.
The lottery bonus worked very similarly to the ﬁxed bonus. But instead of receiving a
set bonus amount workers would draw in a lottery during the weekly RA visit to determine
the amount of the bonus. During this period of the experiment the worker would either
draw once in the lottery or twice (with replacement) depending on whether he/she had
exceeded the ﬁrst output threshold only or both thresholds. The lottery draw was carried
out as follows: An RA would hold up a black plastic bag with 100 plastic tokens inside and
the eligible worker would draw once. The plastic tokens were labeled with the money prize
amounts. Prizes were revealed only privately; but virtually all respondents chose to share
the results with fellow workers who were standing by.
The distribution and amounts of the lotteries are shown in Table 1.6. The expected
values of the lottery draws are equal to the corresponding bonus amounts under the ﬁxed
scheme. The distributions were modeled after common lottery structures but included a
non-trivial lower bound instead of a zero in case of not winning a high prize.10 Importantly,
the probabilities of getting each of the 4 prizes in a given lottery draw stay constant, even
if the amounts changed over the course of the experiment. This helped people remember
the lottery details and also meant that whenever the bonus amounts were changed, the
probabilities were not new.
The weekly RA visits to notify bonus winners and conduct lotteries took place between
Tuesday and Thursday, usually Tuesday and Wednesday, in exceptional cases on Friday, and
tended to take place on the same day of the week for a given gang.
Starting in week 14 the output portion of the bonus criteria was changed from an absolute
threshold set at the division level to relative, gang-level speciﬁc output criteria for the high
threshold combined with a low absolute daily threshold equal to the standard daily minimum
requirement of 44kg for the low bonus. The bonus at the low end essentially meant that
the low bonus was a bonus for attendance only, whereas the high bonus was a bonus for
attendance and high output. The relative threshold was introduced to accommodate large
diﬀerences in output potential both across gangs within the same division and over time.
Using a division-level threshold had lead to large variations in bonus qualiﬁcations across
gangs in the beginning of the experiment. These diﬀerences were driven, by and large, by
variations in ﬁeld conditions and not by variations in group eﬀort.
The lottery bonus was also modiﬁed in period 3. Instead of drawing in the lottery once
10 Quiggin (1991) derives some results for the design of an optimal lottery given rank-dependent prefer-
ences with overweighting of extreme positive; the results are broadly similar to the structure used in this
experiment.
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Table 1.6: Prize distributions under lottery bonus scheme
Period 1
Prize rank Number of tokens Prize amount (MK)
Calendar weeks: 6-10 4th                   89                   100 
Expected value: MK 200 3rd                     7                   500 
2nd                     3                1,200 
1st                     1                4,000 
 Σ=100  EV = 200 
Period 2
Prize rank Number of tokens Prize amount (MK)
Calendar weeks: 11-13 4th                   89                   200 
Expected value: MK 350 3rd                     7                   600 
2nd                     3                2,000 
1st                     1                7,000 
 Σ=100  EV = 350 
Period 3 - LOW BONUS
Prize rank Number of tokens Prize amount (MK)
Calendar weeks: 6-10 4th                   89                   250 
Expected value: MK 430 3rd                     7                1,000 
2nd                     3                2,250 
1st                     1                7,000 
 Σ=100  EV = 430 
Period 3 - HIGH BONUS
Prize rank Number of tokens Prize amount (MK)
Calendar weeks: 6-10 4th                   89                   750 
Expected value: MK 1,300 3rd                     7                2,500 
2nd                     3                6,750 
1st                     1              25,500 
 Σ=100  EV = 1,300 
One draw if exceeded low threshold 
but not high threshold; low threshold 
is daily (44kg) not weekly
One draw if exceeded high threshold; 
high threshold set as being in top 1/3 
of gang in given week 
One draw if exceeded low threshold; 
two draws if exceeded high threshold
One draw if exceeded low threshold; 
two draws if exceeded high threshold
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for each threshold crossed, pluckers would now either draw in a small lottery or in a large
lottery depending on which of the kg thresholds was crossed. The values are provided in the
second half of Table 1.6. The sizes relative to regular income are shown in Table 1.5 columns
5 and 6; they sizes increased from around 5% initially to around 15%-20% of weekly pay at
the two kg thresholds.
As for the timing of actual payments all earned bonuses were paid together with the
paydays associated with the regular income from work during the week when bonus receipts
were given out, i.e. together with the pay for regular income earned one week after being
under a bonus incentive.
1.3 Eﬀort under stochastic incentives
This section presents a simple illustration of labor supply under stochastic incentives for
an agent whose behavior is described by Prospect Theory instead of Expected Utility.11 I
model a worker's decision to provide binary eﬀort in the face of a simple form of stochastic
incentives. The worker's evaluation of his options follows Prospect Theory (Kahneman and
Tversky, 1992) and nests the standard Expected Utility (EU) case as a special case. The bi-
nary eﬀort matches the experimental setup in that the bonus scheme has discrete attendance
and output thresholds that can be either achieved or not. The stochastic incentives mimic
the bonus schemes of this study which are either a lottery bonus under which, conditional
on meeting the attendance and output requirements, a large prize is paid out with known,
small probability.
Consider the one-time labor supply of an agent that can decide whether to provide a
unit of (one-dimensional) eﬀort or not. The worker has utility cost of eﬀort of c and faces
the following incentives: the worker receives compensation of x with probability p, if eﬀort
is provided, and 0 otherwise. The probability of receiving compensation is strictly positive
and possibly equal to one, 0 < p ≤ 1. In case no eﬀort is provided, the agent receives
his reservation utility u. The experiment is about non-negative bonuses and therefore we
restricted to the gains domain (as opposed to both gains and losses). The worker derives
v(x) from compensation x. The compensation valuation is normalized to zero: v(0) = 0.
The value associated with the compensation prospect (p, x) is the weighted sum of the value
of the compensation for eﬀort weighted with weights w(p), which are not necessarily equal
to the objective probabilities.
The worker's value function is written as:
11 Models with alternative mechanisms such as excitement, regret or salience would produce identical
predictions. But since distinguishing between models or underlying mechanisms is not the goal of this paper
I focus on an illustration with a commonly accepted descriptive theory.
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V (p, x) =
V1(p, x) ≡ w(p)v(x)− c, if e = 1V0(p, x) ≡ u, if e = 0
The worker decides to provide eﬀort iﬀ V1(p, x) ≥ V0(p, x) ⇐⇒ w(p)v(x) ≥ u+ c. The
higher the value of the compensation prospect w(p)v(x), the larger the region u+c for which
eﬀort is provided. In an environment with heterogeneous workers that have diﬀerent levels
of reservation utility and vary in their disutility from eﬀort, the larger compensation x is
and the larger the weight w(p) associated with that compensation is, the larger the share of
workers that decides to provide eﬀort.
In the case of a deterministic bonus incentive with payoﬀ B, i.e. p = 1 and x = B, a
worker provides eﬀort iﬀ B ≥ u + c. In comparison, for a stochastic incentive with the
same expected value B, i.e. a compensation prospect of (p, x = B/p), eﬀort is provided iﬀ
w(p)v(B/p) ≥ u+ c.
In the case of standard Expected Utility (EU), the probability weights and objective
probabilities coincide, i.e. w(p) = p. Assuming decreasing marginal utility and standard
risk-aversion under EU, v(·) is concave. Since now B > pv(B/p) for p < 1, there is a larger
region u+ c for which workers will choose to provide eﬀort under the deterministic incentive
relative to the stochastic incentive.
In contrast, the reverse statement is true if probabilities are over-weighted suﬃciently,
i.e. if w(p) >> p so that the the overweighting of p dominates the concavity of v(·), then
eﬀort provision would occur over a larger range of u+ c.
In this model, to what extent the ﬁrm can motivate workers to provide eﬀort under the
two incentive schemes deterministic incentives on the one hand and stochastic incentives
with the same expected payoﬀ on the other hand depends the degree of overweighting in
the population and the curvature of the utility for money. The more over-weighting and the
less risk aversion, the greater the diﬀerence will be between labor supply under the stochastic
incentive relative to the deterministic incentive.
1.4 Eﬀects of the bonus schemes on worker behavior
1.4.1 Graphical analysis
I investigate the eﬀect of the bonus schemes on key administrative variables, in particular
on the two dimensions of eﬀort that were incentivized by the bonus schemes: attendance and
output per worker. I begin with a simple graphical comparison of outcomes by bonus assign-
ment, without any additional controls or structure imposed, before presenting regressions
21
estimates in the next section. The experiment was carried out over several weeks and can be
divided into three `periods' according to the value of the bonus and the output requirements
for eligibility (see description in section 1.2.3.1). I ﬁrst present eﬀects averaged across the
entire duration of the experiment before disaggregating results by time.
Figure 1.2 shows the distribution of one set of measures of the two dimensions that were
incentivized by the bonus schemes: weekly attendance and total weekly output. The ﬁrst
part of Figure 1.2 shows the pdf of number of days worked per week and suggests that both
bonuses did have an eﬀect on attendance. The positive eﬀect of the bonus is concentrated
at the top end of the distribution, with the probability mass moving from four and, more so,
ﬁve to six days which was the was the attendance requirement of the bonus scheme. Eﬀects
appear to be stronger for the lottery bonus than for the ﬁxed bonus. The second part of
Figure 1.2 shows a cdf of individual workers' total weekly output, averaged across the entire
duration of the experiment. The bonus incentives seem to have had no substantial eﬀect on
output on average across weeks.
Figures 1.3 and 1.4 disaggregate the distributions of Figure 1.2 by period of the experi-
ment. Figure 1.3 documents that the higher overall full weekly attendance compared to no
bonus documented in Figure 1.2, is due to the higher rates of full attendance periods 1 and
3, with eﬀects relatively larger in period 3. In period 2, rates of full attendance are very
similar across all groups. 1.4 suggests the absence of large eﬀects of either bonus scheme on
output compared to the no-bonus condition, especially for periods 1 and 2. In period 3, the
cdfs of total weekly output are weakly separated between the no-bonus condition and the
two bonus schemes over some parts of the graph, indicating that the bonuses may have had
positive eﬀects at that stage of the experiment.
1.4.2 Empirical model
In order to formally estimate the eﬀects the bonus incentives on labor supply and related
outcomes I estimate a linear panel model of the following form. For a worker i in gang j
at time t, let the dependent variable of interest yijt be a linear function of current and past
bonus assignments, conditions in a given gang at a given time, individual time-invariant
component and an idiosyncratic error:
yijt = (bonusi,t, bonusi,t−1, . . . )β + γjt + ci + uijt. (1.1)
(bonusi,t, bonusi,t−1, . . . ) are a set of 1 x 2 vectors that indicate assignments to the
two diﬀerent bonus schemes and varies both across i and across t. The vector bonusis
indicates bonus assignment in s and includes two indicators: lotteryis is equal to 1 if worker
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Figure 1.2: Distribution of attendance and output by bonus assignment
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Figure 1.3: PDF of weekly attendance by bonus assignment, by period
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Figure 1.4: CDF of total weekly output by bonus assignment, by period
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i at time s is assigned to the Lottery Bonus and 0 otherwise; fixedis is equal to 1 if i is
assigned to the Fixed Bonus. The omitted category is no-bonus group and so the elements
of β corresponding to lotteryis and fixedis give the diﬀerences in outcome yijt between the
respective bonus types and the no-bonus group.
γjt are a full set a of of coeﬃcients for each gang-week combination. ci are time-invariant
unobserved individual eﬀects. uijt are idiosyncratic errors with mean zero.
Given the exogenous assignment of bonus schemes, a natural starting point for esti-
mation of the model above would be to ignore the unobserved individual eﬀect in (1.1),
subsume ci under the idiosyncratic error and consistently estimate β by running OLS on
the data set that pools all weeks for each worker. However, pooled OLS does not make use
of between- and within-worker variation over time eﬃciently. Pooled OLS weights between-
and within-worker variation equally, irrespective of the relative precision with with each
source of variation is contributing to the estimation. In contrast, a random eﬀects estimator
weights the two dimensions optimally and thus potentially increases estimation precision. In
many applications, random eﬀects models suﬀer from unobserved individual heterogeneity
that bias the estimator of the parameters of interest, and individual ﬁxed eﬀects models
are employed to re-gain consistency. In this case, however, the exogeneity assumptions that
are natural for pooled OLS estimation also imply the required exogeneity assumption for
random eﬀects.
I include lagged values of the bonus assignment indicators and the reasoning for that is
as follows. First, in this experiment's schedule of bonus condition assignments bonusi,t was
correlated with bonusi,t−1. Secondly, in addition, as I argue below, it is reasonable in the
setting of this experiment that workers behavior in t is inﬂuenced by their assignment in t−1
(bonusi,t−1). As a result, not including lagged values of bonus assignments on the right
hand side of (1.1) would lead to omitted variable bias and the estimator of the coeﬃcients
on contemporaneous bonus assignments, bonusi,t, would be inconsistent.
Contemporaneous bonus condition assignments were correlated with past assignments by
construction of the weekly shifting last-digit schedule. Weekly assignments were not strat-
iﬁed on past assignments as this was technically infeasible in this setting: the 10 diﬀerent
digits were assigned to three bonus conditions, and the no-bonus group was underrepre-
sented to maximize power for tests between lottery and ﬁxed bonus (see Table 1.3 on page
12 for reference). In addition, the schedule was chosen to increase over-time variation in
assignments for individual workers (see the discussion in section 1.2.3 on page 9 for details).
Table 1.7 shows current weeks' assignment probabilities relative to prior weeks' assignments
to illustrate the in-built asymmetries. As an example, if a worker was assigned to the lottery
bonus last week then 47% of the time he was assigned to the ﬁxed bonus in the current week
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and was assigned to the lottery bonus or no bonus only 25% and 28%, respectively, of the
time.
The correlations of current and past assignments discussed above are problematic for
consistent estimation of contemporaneous eﬀects if past assignments have an eﬀect on the
value of contemporaneous outcomes. There are variety of potential mechanisms for such an
eﬀect. I outline two examples for illustration: lack of time-separability of utility between
one week and the next, and attention eﬀects.
1) Non-time-separable utility. Consider a simple model with an agent that faces convex
costs of eﬀort and thus wants to smooth eﬀort over time; assume no borrowing or saving.
Over the short horizon of a two-week period, it is reasonable to assume that disutility from
physical eﬀort is not time-separable and that high eﬀort now leads to both disutility now
as well as next week  an exhaustion eﬀect. Faced with time varying shocks to his wage
schedule, an agent would decide to both work more than when the wage is high and to work
less in the following week to smooth eﬀort costs across weeks.
2) Attention eﬀects. If being in the lottery group this week leads a worker to pay more
attention to the bonus scheme overall in this and the following week, for example because
lotteries are diﬀerent and exciting, then next week the same worker might react more strongly
to the bonus schemes, either lottery or ﬁxed, and this week's assignment would have a direct
aﬀect on next week's eﬀort.
In theory several lags of bonus assignments could included in the speciﬁcation and it is
an empirical question whether lags of bonus assignments do aﬀect current outcomes. Note
that no observations are dropped by included lags of the bonus assignment. For data points
outside of the experiment, group assignment is by default set to the no-bonus group, and so
in all weeks lagged assignments are deﬁned.
In theory all past lags of bonus assignments could be correlated with current outcomes,
even after conditioning on all other weeks' bonus assignments. The number of available
empirical variation in assignment histories is limited, however (not least because the assign-
ments follow a ﬁxed ten-week schedule). In practice, while I reject that one-week lags have no
eﬀect for outcomes for which the bonuses had an eﬀect, I cannot reject that lags beyond the
ﬁrst week have no impact. Therefore, the main speciﬁcation I estimate includes only current
week's bonus assignment and one-week lags of bonus assignment (alternative speciﬁcations
with further lags produce very similar results). I estimate:
yijt = (bonusi,t, bonusi,t−1)β + γjt + ci + uijt (1.2)
= (lotteryit, f ixedit, lotteryi,t−1, f ixedi,t−1)β + γjt + ci + uijt. (1.3)
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Table 1.7: Distribution of bonus assignment in current and relative to prior week
Assignment in …
...current week:
Lottery bonus 25% 47% 43% 38%
Fixed Bonus 47% 23% 47% 38%
No bonus 28% 30% 9% 23%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100%
Total
...prior week:
Lottery bonus Fixed bonus No bonus
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The exogenously determined bonus assignment schedule justiﬁes a strict exogeneity as-
sumption in the sense of Wooldridge (2001, p. 257, RE.1b): For all i and j
E(ci|bonusi1, . . . , bonusiT ) = E(ci) = 0 (1.4)
The assumption implies that the individual eﬀect can be treated as an unobserved ran-
dom eﬀect and allows for consistent estimation of β in a random eﬀects model. To check
if in fact weekly assignment to the diﬀerent groups across all weeks of the experiment is
uncorrelated with ci, I proxy for ci with pre-experimental averages of weekly output and
weekly attendance, respectively, and run a pooled OLS estimation of these averages on a
full set of interactions of week dummies and bonus group assignments. F-tests of the joint
null hypothesis that bonus groups indicators are equal to zero in every week of the bonus
experiment reveal no overall balance across the experiment. Empirically, I can cannot reject
balance for either weekly output or number of days in attendance (p-values of 0.265 and
0.739, respectively).
By design of the bonus experiment there are two sources of variation for the assignment
of workers to bonus schemes: assignment varies between workers at a given point in time
and within workers, i.e. for a given worker across time. Under the exogeneity assumption
above (and further standard regularity assumptions), β can be estimated as pooled OLS,
using between and within variation in equal proportion; with an individual ﬁxed eﬀect
(FE) estimator, using only within variation only; or as a random eﬀects (RE) model,
using Feasible GLS. The RE estimator optimally weights between- and within-individual
variation according to the sampling variance in either component and is the most eﬃcient of
the three estimators. Therefore I use RE speciﬁcations as the main method of estimation.
Results from pooled OLS estimation and ﬁxed eﬀects are shown in the appendix and give
essentially identical results for the eﬀects of interest albeit with lower precision.
Tea pluckers work together in gangs. This can lead to statistical dependence of obser-
vations within the same gang in a given week for two reasons: gang(-week) level shocks
and peer eﬀects. Correlations induced by gang-week eﬀects (γjt) can be controlled for by
including the according set of dummies in the regression. However, even conditional on γjt
observations can be expected to be correlated within gangs in the presence of peer eﬀects.
To allow for this possibility, standard errors are clustered at the gang level and as such in-
ference is robust to arbitrary correlation within gangs at a given moment in time and across
time. The gang level clustered are also valid under the likely individual worker outcomes
auto-correlation.
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1.4.3 Regression results  overall eﬀects
Table 1.8 presents the overall eﬀects across all weeks of the experiment of the two
bonus schemes vis-a-vis the no-bonus condition on key outcome variables using individual
random eﬀects regressions. Columns 1 and 2 show that the bonus incentives lead to higher
attendance compared to the no-bonus condition: the probability of a worker attending all
days of the week, which was an explicit target variable of the bonus scheme, and the number
of days in attendance increased for both bonus bonus groups (the p-value of a joint test of
the two bonus conditions being equal to zero is 0.0032 in column 1 and 0.0052 in column
2). The eﬀect was more pronounced for the lottery bonus scheme. Full weekly attendance
increased by 3.73 percentage points when a plucker was under the lottery bonus relative
to the no-bonus condition. Full attendance was about 7% higher under the lottery bonus
relative to the mean of 55.5% under no bonus. The diﬀerence between lottery and no-bonus
conditions is more than twice as large as the diﬀerence between the ﬁxed bonus and no
bonus, and the diﬀerence in eﬀects is statistically signiﬁcant (p-value 0.0437). The eﬀect on
the number of days is also larger for the lottery bonus and the diﬀerence is weakly signiﬁcant
(p-value 0.0758). The relative eﬀect of the lottery bonus vis-a-vis the no-bonus condition
is lower for the number of days in attendance than for full attendance: 0.0654 days over a
mean of 5.29 days, or about 1.2%. This is consistent with the graphical analysis in section
1.4.1, which indicates that attendance shifts are taking place at the top of distribution, with
some people not missing that one additional day that they might have otherwise missed.
Along the dimension of weekly output, the bonus schemes had two weekly-varying thresh-
olds that qualiﬁed workers for a small(er) or a larg(er) bonus. On average across all weeks,
the probability of reaching the low or the high threshold were unaﬀected by either bonus
scheme (Table 1.8, columns 3 and 4). Similarly, productivity per day of plucking (column
6) was not statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent in either group, and the diﬀerences were small
(but negative according to the point estimates). For total weekly output, the bonus schemes
coeﬃcients are not jointly signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the no-bonus condition (p-value 0.210)
and the point estimates are small. However, in this speciﬁcation the diﬀerence of lottery
bonus vis-a-vis no bonus is marginally statistically signiﬁcant, and the diﬀerence is larger
than for the ﬁxed bonus for which the diﬀerence vis-a-vis the no-bonus condition is not
signiﬁcant.
In order to demonstrate the robustness of these key results, I discuss results from pooled
OLS and individual ﬁxed eﬀects estimation.12 The discussion focuses on the attendance
12 Results in analogue to Table 1.8 from a speciﬁcation that does not include gang-week dummies but only
week dummies are very similar (results not shown): the diﬀerences of the two bonus schemes compared to
the no-bonus condition are marginally larger, but the diﬀerence between lottery and ﬁxed bonus are identical
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Table 1.8: Eﬀects of bonus incentives on attendance and output of tea pluckers (individual random eﬀects estimations)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Full attendance 
[0/1]
Weekly 
attendance 
[days]
Met low output 
threshold for 
weekly total 
output [0/1]
Met high 
output 
threshold for 
weekly total 
output [0/1]
Total weekly 
output [kg]
Weekly 
average of 
daily 
productivity if 
plucking 
[kg/day]
Lottery Bonus 0.0373*** 0.0654*** -0.00559 0.00916 4.025* -0.108
(0.0111) (0.0204) (0.00959) (0.00774) (2.289) (0.264)
Fixed Bonus 0.0177* 0.0324 -0.000203 -0.000325 2.127 -0.305
(0.0107) (0.0212) (0.00754) (0.00652) (2.510) (0.243)
L1.Lottery Bonus 0.00333 -0.0134 -0.00225 -0.00335 -0.168 -0.284
(0.0122) (0.0198) (0.00761) (0.00784) (2.317) (0.328)
L1.Fixed Bonus -0.0178 -0.0453*** -0.00116 -0.00877 -2.918 -0.510
(0.0122) (0.0168) (0.00973) (0.00843) (2.600) (0.331)
P.-val. of Wald tests: 
Lottery Bonus = Fixed Bonus 0.0437 0.0758 0.479 0.201 0.472 0.412
Joint: Lottery Bonus = 0 and Fixed Bonus = 0 0.00318 0.00520 0.767 0.393 0.210 0.429
Joint: L1.Lottery Bonus = 0 
and L1.Fixed Bonus = 0 0.0391 0.0223 0.942 0.524 0.363 0.296
Mean of dep. variable in no-bonus condition during experiment 0.555 5.290 0.533 0.250 384.5 81.02
Number of gang-week observations during experiment 15603 15603 15603 15603 15603 15490
Number of gang-week observations in total 38,295 38,295 38,295 38,295 38,295 38,117
Number of workers 1,678 1,678 1,678 1,678 1,678 1,678
Notes: Stars indicate significance at 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***) levels. Standard errors are clustered at the gang level. Estimated results are from a worker-level random 
effect model with a full set of gang-week dummies. Wald-tests: “Lottery Bonus = Fixed Bonus” tests the equality of the two coefficients; “Joint: Lottery Bonus = 0 and Fixed 
Bonus = 0” and “Joint: L1.Lottery Bonus = 0 and L1.Fixed Bonus = 0” test the joint equality of the two pairs of coefficients. 
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results in more detail, but along both dimensions of speciﬁcation changes the results can
be considered to be the same as in the main speciﬁcation. Appendix Tables A.1 and A.2
present the same coeﬃcients as in Table 1.8 estimated from pooled OLS and individual ﬁxed
eﬀects regressions, respectively. The estimates are very similar and especially the diﬀerence
between lottery and ﬁxed bonus eﬀects is nearly identical for the attendance outcomes (e.g.
the diﬀerences are 0.0196 and 0.0330 for columns 1 and 2 in Table 1.8 compared to 0.0193
and 0.0339 in Appendix Table A.1; similarly for comparisons of Table 1.8 vs. Appendix
Table A.2). The p-values on these diﬀerences are generally lower in Table 1.8 as the random
eﬀects model combines eﬃciently both between and within variation.
Table 1.9 presents the overall eﬀects of the two bonus schemes vis-a-vis the no-bonus
condition on meeting the criteria for receiving a low and high bonus, respectively, and on
income. The bonus qualiﬁcation requirements were a combination of full attendance and
total weekly output being above the thresholds. Given the lack of substantial overall eﬀects
on output, it is the eﬀects on attendance that leads both types of bonus to have an eﬀect
on meeting the bonus qualiﬁcation requirements, compared to the no-bonus group (columns
1 and 2). The diﬀerence in eﬀects between lottery and ﬁxed bonus are smaller (and not
statistically signiﬁcant) relative to the diﬀerence in eﬀects on full attendance only (column 1
of Table 1.8). Only a fraction of workers did meet the output thresholds even among those
that had full attendance and so these eﬀects are expected to be smaller. Note, however,
that the smaller diﬀerences between lottery and ﬁxed bonus coeﬃcients in columns 1 and
2 of Table 1.9 compared to column 1 and 2 of Table 1.8 are not fully accounted for by the
share of workers meeting the kg thresholds (columns 3 and 4 of Table 1.8). For example, the
diﬀerence between bonus coeﬃcients in column 1 of Table 1.8 is 0.0196; the average share
of pluckers meeting the low threshold is about 53%; yet the diﬀerence in bonus coeﬃcients
in column 1 of Table 1.9 is not 53% of 0.0196 but somewhat lower at about 22%. Ignoring
limitations of statistical power, these computations would imply that, compared to workers'
reactions to the ﬁxed bonus, there are relatively more workers that reacted to the lottery
bonus with higher attendance who did not make the output thresholds.
Averaged across all weeks of the experiment the lottery bonus scheme had a small eﬀect
on regular income (without bonus) compared to the no-bonus condition. This is driven by
the slightly higher attendance combined with a lack of potentially oﬀ-setting diﬀerences in
per-day productivity. In contrast, the diﬀerence of the ﬁxed bonus compared to the no-bonus
to those of Table 1.8 for the attendance results and are also essentially the same for the remaining outcomes.
Alternative speciﬁcations that consider lags of the bonus assignment variables (results not shown) also give
similar results but generally reduce the precision of estimates. In all speciﬁcations with additional lags, the
one-week lags of bonus assignment are statistically signiﬁcant for the attendance outcomes, for which the
bonuses do have contemporaneous eﬀects, while further lags are not statistically signiﬁcant.
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Table 1.9: Eﬀects of bonus incentives on bonus criteria qualiﬁcation and income (individual random eﬀects estimation)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Met bonus criteria for 
low bonus [0/1]
Met bonus criteria for 
high bonus [0/1]
Regular income 
without bonus (output 
x piece rate) [MK]
Total expected income 
= 
regular income + 
expected bonus [MK]
Lottery Bonus 0.0230** 0.0239** 48.78** 355.3***
(0.0113) (0.0100) (19.87) (28.04)
Fixed Bonus 0.0187* 0.0139* 27.39 324.8***
(0.0105) (0.00839) (23.21) (27.95)
L1.Lottery Bonus -0.00764 -0.00345 0.111 -10.50
(0.00880) (0.00811) (21.40) (28.78)
L1.Fixed Bonus -0.0139 -0.0107 -27.41 -50.64
(0.0117) (0.00894) (24.11) (32.54)
P.-val. of Wald tests: 
Lottery Bonus = Fixed Bonus 0.622 0.200 0.358 0.295
Joint: Lottery Bonus = 0 and Fixed Bonus = 0 0.107 0.0578 0.0486 0
Joint: L1.Lottery Bonus = 0 
and L1.Fixed Bonus = 0 0.489 0.313 0.337 0.165
Mean of dep. variable in no-bonus condition during experiment 0.345 0.196 3360 3360
Number of gang-week observations during experiment 15603 15603 15603 15603
Number of gang-week observations in total 38,295 38,295 38,295 38,295
Number of workers 1,678 1,678 1,678 1,678
Notes: Stars indicate significance at 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***) levels. Standard errors are clustered at the gang level. Estimated results are from a worker-level random 
effect model with a full set of gang-week dummies. Wald-tests: “Lottery Bonus = Fixed Bonus” tests the equality of the two coefficients; “Joint: Lottery Bonus = 0 and Fixed 
Bonus = 0” and “Joint: L1.Lottery Bonus = 0 and L1.Fixed Bonus = 0” test the joint equality of the two pairs of coefficients. 
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condition is not statistically signiﬁcant. However, the diﬀerence between lottery and ﬁxed
bonus groups is not statistically signiﬁcant either. The bonus schemes had an eﬀect on total
expected income (including bonus). However, this diﬀerence is largely mechanical since in the
no-bonus condition expected bonus income was zero. Again, there is no diﬀerence between
lottery and ﬁxed bonus.
1.4.4 Regression results  eﬀects over time
In this section I present results analogous to the preceding section and estimate equation
(1.2) with individual random eﬀects. But instead of averaging eﬀects over time, I interact the
bonus condition indicators (both contemporaneous and lagged) with period or week dummies
to allow the eﬀect to vary by period or by week.
Tables 1.10 and 1.11 show the eﬀect of lottery and ﬁxed bonus on the same set of outcomes
as in the preceding section, averaged by period instead of across the entire experiment. The
eﬀect of either bonus are in general highest in period 3 when the bonus amounts were largest
(and eligibility criteria were arguably easier to understand). While there is a signiﬁcant
eﬀect of the lottery bonus on full attendance in period 1, and jointly the two bonus schemes
are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero for full weekly attendance (p-value 0.0638), there is no
statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect of either bonus scheme in period 2.
The diﬀerences between lottery and ﬁxed bonus with respect to attendance as discussed
in the previous section largely holds up for the diﬀerent periods. The diﬀerences between
lottery and ﬁxed bonus for full weekly attendance and the number of days in attendance
in Table 1.10 columns 1 and 2 are slightly higher in period 1 than in period 3; for column
1 the diﬀerence in period 1 is 0.03102 and in period 3 it is 0.0275. Since the level of the
eﬀects vis-a-vis the no-bonus condition are higher in period 3, the relative diﬀerence between
lottery and ﬁxed bonus is smaller in period 3. In period 2 the point estimates are very small
and statistically insigniﬁcant, and the coeﬃcient diﬀerences between lottery and ﬁxed bonus
coeﬃcient are close to zero.
The previous section discussed that together the bonus schemes had no or only little
eﬀect on output when averaging over time. Decomposing the eﬀect by periods shows that
there are no eﬀects in periods 1 and 2. However, in period 3 the situation is slightly diﬀerent.
While the joint null of no eﬀects of either scheme on weekly output, captured by indicators
for crossing the output thresholds (Table 1.10 columns 3 and 4) or by total output (column
5), cannot be rejected, this may be due to lack of power. The estimates for the diﬀerence of
lottery bonus vs. no-bonus condition are individually statistically signiﬁcant for both meeting
the high bonus output threshold and for total weekly output (columns 4 and 5 respectively).
The point estimates for period 3 in column 5 would imply a diﬀerence to the no-bonus
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Table 1.10: Eﬀects of bonus incentives on attendance and output of tea pluckers, by period (individual random eﬀects estimation)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Full attendance 
[0/1]
Weekly 
attendance 
[days]
Met low output 
threshold for 
weekly total 
output [0/1]
Met high 
output 
threshold for 
weekly total 
output [0/1]
Total weekly 
output [kg]
Weekly 
average of 
daily 
productivity if 
plucking 
[kg/day]
Period 1: Lottery Bonus 0.0394** 0.0696* 0.00314 -0.00312 0.451 -0.676
(0.0188) (0.0372) (0.0169) (0.0124) (5.142) (0.602)
Period 1: Fixed Bonus 0.00838 0.0233 -0.0112 -0.0200** -4.579 -0.913
(0.0133) (0.0350) (0.0162) (0.00970) (4.592) (0.570)
Period 2: Lottery Bonus 0.00960 0.00467 -0.0123 -0.00559 -0.946 0.208
(0.0166) (0.0318) (0.0175) (0.0117) (3.687) (0.454)
Period 2: Fixed Bonus 0.0117 0.0169 0.000248 -0.00367 3.651 0.0351
(0.0209) (0.0353) (0.0159) (0.0109) (3.582) (0.525)
Period 3: Lottery Bonus 0.0550*** 0.107*** -0.00960 0.0293** 10.91*** 0.190
(0.0142) (0.0319) (0.0131) (0.0142) (3.035) (0.407)
Period 3: Fixed Bonus 0.0275 0.0456 0.0114 0.0197 6.396 -0.0378
(0.0197) (0.0452) (0.0134) (0.0158) (4.502) (0.474)
P.-val. of Wald tests: 
Period 1: Lottery Bonus = Fixed Bonus 0.0260 0.107 0.270 0.123 0.165 0.448
Period 1: Joint: Lottery Bonus = 0 and Fixed Bonus = 0 0.0638 0.121 0.516 0.0722 0.301 0.246
Period 2: Lottery Bonus = Fixed Bonus 0.912 0.718 0.339 0.827 0.317 0.770
Period 2: Joint: Lottery Bonus = 0 and Fixed Bonus = 0 0.809 0.887 0.610 0.893 0.532 0.899
Period 3: Lottery Bonus = Fixed Bonus 0.0799 0.0334 0.0680 0.480 0.226 0.561
Period 3: Joint: Lottery Bonus = 0 and Fixed Bonus = 0 0.000262 0.000155 0.189 0.121 0.00116 0.806
Mean of dep. variable in no-bonus condition during period 1 0.527 5.220 0.289 0.182 390.1 80.55
Mean of dep. variable in no-bonus condition during period 2 0.597 5.392 0.403 0.226 394.5 80.84
Mean of dep. variable in no-bonus condition during period 3 0.552 5.283 0.777 0.312 374.7 81.42
Number of gang-week observations during period 1 1611 1611 1611 1611 1611 1598
Number of gang-week observations during period 2 1141 1141 1141 1141 1141 1130
Number of gang-week observations during period 3 890 890 890 890 890 886
Number of gang-week observations in total 38,295 38,295 38,295 38,295 38,295 38,117
Number of workers 1,678 1,678 1,678 1,678 1,678 1,678
Notes: Stars indicate significance at 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***) levels. Standard errors are clustered at the gang level. Estimated results are from a worker-level random 
effect model with a full set of gang-week dummies. Model includes interactions of periods with lagged bonus assignments as in models of tables 6 and 7 but the coefficient 
estimates are omitted here for clarify of presentation and are available on request. Wald-tests: For each period separately, “Lottery Bonus = Fixed Bonus” tests the equality of 
the two coefficients; “Joint: Lottery Bonus = 0 and Fixed Bonus = 0” test the joint equality of the two coefficients. 
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Table 1.11: Eﬀects of bonus incentives on bonus criteria qualiﬁcation and income, by period (individual random eﬀects estima-
tion)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Met bonus criteria for 
low bonus [0/1]
Met bonus criteria for 
high bonus [0/1]
Regular income 
without bonus (output 
x piece rate) [MK]
Total expected income 
= 
regular income + 
expected bonus [MK]
Period 1: Lottery Bonus 0.0165 0.00452 8.524 88.81*
(0.0156) (0.0128) (42.17) (45.79)
Period 1: Fixed Bonus 0.000269 -0.00845 -35.27 38.63
(0.0141) (0.0105) (37.04) (37.86)
Period 2: Lottery Bonus -0.00906 0.00850 -3.744 182.8***
(0.0188) (0.0160) (30.79) (35.17)
Period 2: Fixed Bonus 0.00498 0.0100 32.85 225.0***
(0.0197) (0.0150) (29.73) (38.87)
Period 3: Lottery Bonus 0.0496*** 0.0506*** 123.1*** 702.8***
(0.0165) (0.0159) (32.89) (46.42)
Period 3: Fixed Bonus 0.0421** 0.0353** 72.44 629.8***
(0.0206) (0.0146) (46.73) (58.28)
P.-val. of Wald tests: 
Period 1: Lottery Bonus = Fixed Bonus 0.224 0.229 0.140 0.114
Period 1: Joint: Lottery Bonus = 0 and Fixed Bonus = 0 0.426 0.430 0.273 0.129
Period 2: Lottery Bonus = Fixed Bonus 0.299 0.887 0.328 0.298
Period 2: Joint: Lottery Bonus = 0 and Fixed Bonus = 0 0.572 0.799 0.502 4.01e-10
Period 3: Lottery Bonus = Fixed Bonus 0.647 0.278 0.184 0.192
Period 3: Joint: Lottery Bonus = 0 and Fixed Bonus = 0 0.0110 0.00502 0.000655 0
Mean of dep. variable in no-bonus condition during period 1 0.225 0.152 3408 3408
Mean of dep. variable in no-bonus condition during period 2 0.330 0.191 3452 3452
Mean of dep. variable in no-bonus condition during period 3 0.438 0.230 4041 4041
Number of gang-week observations during period 1 1611 1611 1611 1611
Number of gang-week observations during period 2 1141 1141 1141 1141
Number of gang-week observations during period 3 890 890 890 890
Number of gang-week observations in total 38,295 38,295 38,295 38,295
Number of workers 1,678 1,678 1,678 1,678
Notes: Stars indicate significance at 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***) levels. Standard errors are clustered at the gang level. Estimated results are from a worker-level random 
effect model with a full set of gang-week dummies. Model includes interactions of periods with lagged bonus assignments as in models of tables 6 and 7 but the coefficient 
estimates are omitted here for clarify of presentation and are available on request. Wald-tests: For each period separately, “Lottery Bonus = Fixed Bonus” tests the equality 
of the two coefficients; “Joint: Lottery Bonus = 0 and Fixed Bonus = 0” test the joint equality of the two coefficients. 
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condition of about 2.9% and 1.7% of the average weekly output in the no-bonus condition
during that period (374.7 kg) for the lottery bonus and the ﬁxed bonus, respectively. The
point estimates would imply the lottery bonus eﬀect is larger than that of the ﬁxed bonus
with a relative diﬀerence vis-a-vis the no-bonus that is broadly similar to that for attendance
(about 2 times); however, the diﬀerence is not statistically signiﬁcant (p-value of 0.226 for
the usual two-sided test).
To further disaggregate results over time Figure 1.5 shows the diﬀerence in eﬀects between
lottery and ﬁxed bonus schemes on attendance and output from regressions with all weeks of
the experiment interacted with bonus scheme assignments. In the beginning the conﬁdence
bands are wide because of the gradual phase-in of gangs into the experiment: in week 5 only
one gang was part of the experiment, in week 6 there were 4, and only in week 8 did all
25 gangs of the study participate (see Table 1.2 on page 11). Horizontal bars in weeks 11
and 14 mark the change to the experiment's periods 2 and 3, respectively, for which bonus
conditions changed. The left panel of the ﬁgure plots the estimated coeﬃcient diﬀerences for
number of days in attendance; the right panel plots the same for total weekly output. While
the right panel is characterized by moderate-sized swings of the coeﬃcient diﬀerence around
zero, the left panel shows that the diﬀerence is positive for most weeks and non-decreasing
over time.
In conclusion, results from eﬀects averaged over time and disaggregated by time show
that both bonus schemes lead to higher attendance compared to the no-bonus group. The
bonus schemes at most weakly increased output and the eﬀects are concentrated in the last
phase of the experiment when bonus amounts were largest and for which the lottery bonus
is marginally statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the no-bonus condition.
Averaged across all weeks the lottery bonus increased attendance by a little more than
twice as much as the ﬁxed bonus. While there is substantial variation over time the results
do not suggest that the eﬀects waned over time. A caveat to that interpretation is that the
amounts of the lottery were changed and so while the probabilities of winning the diﬀerent
bonus amounts did not change (see Table 1.6 on page 19) temporary probability weighting
biases may have reset to some extent as the bonus amounts changed. However, there
is no obvious pattern of declining eﬀects within each of the three separate periods of the
experiment.13
13 In addition, bonus assignment eﬀects did not vary signiﬁcantly with the history of individual lottery
draws and winnings of the lottery or with that of worker's peers (results now shown); these tests, however,
are likely to suﬀer from low power because of limited overall eﬀects and limited variation in the number of
winners or individuals winning the large amounts.
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Figure 1.5: Eﬀect of lottery bonus vs. ﬁxed bonus over time
Notes: The ﬁgure shows coeﬃcients from an estimation following equation (4) and analogous to results of
Table 1.8 but with bonus assignments (both contemporaneous and one-week lags) interacted with a dummy
for every week of the experiment. Standard errors from weeks 5  7 are clustered only at the individual level,
not the gang level, due to the gradual phase-in of the experiment  with only one gang in the experiment
in week 5 gang-level clustering is not possible; until weeks 8 a low number of gangs was enrolled so that the
asymptotic approximation of the clustered variance estimator is poor and likely to be anti-conservative; for
those weeks individually clustered standard errors are larger.
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1.4.5 Further discussion of results: attendance vs. output impacts
The analysis above documents that the bonus schemes had a sizable impact on atten-
dance, had no eﬀects on output until period 3, and had only moderate-sized eﬀects on output
in period 3. Since both attendance and output were incentivized with the bonus one could
have expected an increase in outcomes in both dimensions. In addition, even if workers only
react along the dimension of attendance one might have expected total weekly output to
increase mechanically, if workers continue to do be at least as productive per day as before.
However, viewing attendance and productivity at work as two dimensions of eﬀort, the eﬀect
of a bonus that discretely changes marginal beneﬁts, as in this experiment, is theoretically
ambiguous. This is especially true if the two dimensions of eﬀort are complements in the
worker's cost of eﬀort function, which is likely to be the case, e.g. if the marginal cost of
increasing output per day is increasing in the total number of days worked per week.
Under the standard piece rate attendance was not explicitly incentivized. That changed
with the introduction of the bonus which required full weekly attendance. This changed
discretely the beneﬁts of coming to work every day of the week; but conditional on coming
to work every day it might not be optimal for pluckers to keep up the same average daily
productivity as before; it might be optimal to decrease output per day, keeping total weekly
output constant while increasing weekly attendance.
Thus, the attendance-output results fall well within standard theory as applied to this
setting. In addition, however, several other factors speciﬁc to the context of this experiment
may have also led workers to optimally choose higher attendance and not increase total
weekly output in period 1.
First, in general the marginal cost of attendance at work is subject to shocks, e.g. own
illness or illness of family members; however, weekly output is subject to the same shocks
plus additional uncertainty stemming from ﬁeld conditions: a day of absence will also reduce
total weekly output, and a day oﬀ work automatically disqualiﬁed a worker for the bonus
scheme, and any extra productivity will go uncompensated (besides the usual piece rate).
Furthermore, ﬁeld conditions vary substantially over time even within gangs and daily pro-
ductivity conditional on own eﬀort is partially unpredictable. Secondly, pluckers have very
precise knowledge of daily output this is announced at the end of the day and also is
committed to memory by pluckers in order to check for errors in pay calculations (payday
slips list daily output); however, many pluckers do not have have good knowledge of cumu-
lative weekly output. Computing cumulative output requires the skills of addition and also
attention and eﬀort. But education among workers is low. In addition, while adding and
keeping track of output ﬁgures require additional eﬀort, the expected return in the form of
expected bonus payments was initially quite low.
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Greater uncertainty about the marginal cost and marginal beneﬁts of eﬀort decreases
pluckers expected payoﬀ of increasing eﬀort and with uncertainty arguably higher for weekly
output, this may have led to a larger response in attendance than in weekly output. This
mechanism could also explain why there are signs of an output response in the last period
of the experiment. In period 3, the low output threshold was set to meeting only the daily
minimum amount that is expected even outside the bonus scheme, and the high output
threshold was a relative threshold. Since within-gang ranks are relatively more stable over
time as varying ﬁeld conditions no longer play a role, this may have reduced uncertainty
associated with the output targets, and thus maybe have increased eﬀort in that dimension,
relative to attendance.14
In the following I evaluate if the above mechanisms related to uncertainty over output
due to over-time variablility in ﬁeld conditions is empirically plausible. First, to provide a
sense of the relative variation in attendance and output between workers and over-time for a
given worker, I decompose the overall standard deviation variation. For the number of days
worked per week the ratio of within- to between standard deviation is 1.03; for total weekly
kg plucked the same ratio is .83. Thus, for both outcome variables both between-worker and
over-time variation are relevant. In particular for output, note that besides cross-sectional
variation, output of a given worker over time varies substantially. Furthermore, this over-time
variability in output for a given worker is driven to a substantial degree by time-varying
ﬁeld conditions and only to some degree by varying degrees of supply of eﬀort at work or
attendance. During the weeks of the experiment, of the over-time variation in weekly output
remaining after netting out worker ﬁxed eﬀects, over a third (37%) can be explained by
gang-week ﬁxed eﬀects alone. In conclusion, over-time variation in output is substantially,
and a large fraction of it can be attributed directly to changing ﬁeld conditions rather than
time-varying factors such as variation in worker opportunity cost of coming to work (own
sickness, family sickness, other tasks that need attention) or variation in worker eﬀort.
1.5 Conclusion
I study the introduction of a bonus scheme with lottery payoﬀs at a large agricultural
ﬁrm in Malawi. The lottery bonus was motivated by evidence from lab studies and by real
world behavior that suggests that people often become risk-seeking when faced with small
chances of relatively large gains. This result is borne out by lab results with hypothetical
14 In addition, larger bonus amounts in period 3 could have contributed to the diﬀerential in eﬀects
along the two dimensions of eﬀort. Suppose costs of attention and calculation for total weekly output are
non-negligible; then since these are ﬁxed costs with respect to the amount of the bonus, the larger the bonus
amount the more likely it is that such calculations are worth it in expectation.
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and real choices over gambles with small and high stakes and have helped formulate Prospect
Theory.
In this paper I test if `excess' risk-seeking by otherwise risk-averse agents holds for real
world labor supply decisions. I collaborated with the management of a tea estate in the south
of Malawi to set up a ﬁeld experiment that exogenously assigned piece-rate workers to two
bonus incentives that varied over time and between workers. In general, both workers' weekly
attendance and their productivity enter directly in this ﬁrm's proﬁt function. Attendance-
and output-based bonuses were introduced for over 1,600 piece-rate workers for up to 11
weeks. Workers were assigned weekly to one of two bonus schemes or a no-bonus group.
Weekly bonuses, conditional on qualifying, were paid either as a lottery or as a ﬁxed amount
of the same expected value. The (expected) values of the bonuses increased over time and
ranged from between about 5% to around 15%-20% of total weekly pay at the relevant
margins for qualifying.
The outcome of this experiment conﬁrms anecdotes and one strand of previous empirical
results that long-odd prospects of large gains are relatively more motivating than expected-
value equivalent certain prospects. The results suggest that this relative diﬀerence holds for
actual labor supply decisions with variation in actual monetary compensation. I ﬁnd that
the eﬀect of the lottery bonus on the probability of full weekly attendance a requirement
for bonus eligibility and an explicit target variable of the incentive schemes was about
twice as large as the eﬀect of the ﬁxed bonus. When output was aﬀected at all by the
bonus scheme, namely towards the end of the experiment, the point estimate for the lottery
bonus eﬀect was larger than the ﬁxed bonus eﬀect though the diﬀerences was not statistically
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent.
The diﬀerential eﬀect of the lottery bonus on attendance is statistically signiﬁcant towards
the end, in the last weeks of the experiment, suggesting that despite experience with the
prize distribution the lottery eﬀect persisted, at least over the horizon of this experiment.
In contrast, recent ﬁndings from lab experiments suggest that lottery preference disappears
over time. One reason for the diﬀerence in results could be that lab experiments that were
carried out over many repeated choices over diﬀerent gambles involved only small-stakes.
This experiment, in contrast, featured substantial stakes, decisions that were spaced out
over time, and interactions with as well as observation of peers. On the other hand, given
the limited statistical power of this design I would not be able to reject steady declines
in eﬀect sizes over time. Additionally, some details of the bonuses were changed in the
last phase of the experiment higher bonus amounts and lottery prizes, changes in output
requirements which could have led to a reset of overweighting of low the probabilities of
winning a large prize. Future work would be able to determine the longer-run stability of
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the real-stakes labor supply eﬀects measured in this experiment.
Besides the larger stakes, one obvious diﬀerence of this experiments' setting to prior
studies cited above was that this study took place in a developing country. In general,
take-up of lottery products is relatively higher for poorer individuals and so the incentive
eﬀect of right-skewed payoﬀs may be especially important in developing countries. In fact,
relative subjective wealth maybe one moderator of lottery take-up15 that could keep up
the interest in the lotteries as people feel they have a chance to make more than a trivial
diﬀerence in their lives and this chance is valued more than proportionally.
15 See Haisley, Mostafa and Loewenstein (2008).
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CHAPTER II
Income Timing, Temptation and Expenditures:
A Field Experiment in Malawi
From a work with Jason Kerwin.
2.1 Introduction
Savings rates in developing countries appear to be very low. People save very little,
whether in cash or other liquid assets. Moreover, despite evidently high returns to investment
in domains ranging from health (Jones et al., 2003) to agriculture and small business (de Mel,
McKenzie and Woodruﬀ, 2008, 2012), people do not seem to be making those investments.
In theory, even in the face of borrowing constraints, if returns are high enough households
should be able to save up and invest. However, households appear to have trouble saving:
households in developing countries act as if they are savings constrained", meaning that
transforming liquid wealth across time is costly.
In developing countries in particular, households face a range of explicit and implicit ex-
ternal" costs to savings, e.g. risk of theft, high transaction costs, or lack of access to formal
savings. In addition, savings constraints can be internal"  people might be present-biased,
causing them to save less than they would like. Present-biased preferences have been docu-
mented extensively in laboratory studies, and recent ﬁeld research has conﬁrmed that some
people do exhibit present-biased preferences in the context of real-life choices (Giné et al.,
2012). A number of papers have studied the potential of commitment savings accounts to
manage this kind of internal savings constraint (Dupas and Robinson, 2013b; Ashraf, Karlan
and Yin, 2006; Bune et al., 2014). However, the cause of present-biased preferences, and the
best way to mitigate their impact on the poor's ability to save, remains unclear: in their
review of the constraints that hinder savings among the poor, Karlan, Ratan and Zinman
(2014) conclude that remarkably little is known about which behavioral biases actually drive
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savings behavior." The canonical model of present bias is the Laibson (1997) model of quasi-
hyperbolic discounting, but this sheds little light on why some people are present-biased and
others are not. A possible explanation for variations in present bias comes from Banerjee and
Mullainathan (2013, henceforth BM), who point out that one potential cause of variation
in present bias is temptation: people may be biased toward present consumption because
they are tempted to spend on goods and services that they later regret spending on, such as
alcohol, tobacco, or fatty foods. Savings constraints could prevent people from saving up for
large, discrete purchases (such as certain investments or durable goods), and could prevent
people from having access to savings in the case of emergencies.
In light of this documented inability or unwillingness to save, the time structure of income
streams is likely to be important. People in developing countries invest considerable eﬀort
and expenditure into aggregating streams of small installments of income into lump sums,
in order to make purchases that cannot be broken up into small pieces (Collins et al., 2009).
As a result, larger income installments may lead to more saving by easing this process.
Lump-sum payments could also help savings under a BM-style temptation-based model of
time inconsistency: BM show that having a larger sum of money on hand can help people
overcome the fear that, if they do save, their future self will simply waste" all of the money
on temptation goods. However, converting smooth income streams into larger, deferred sums
may also lead to increased temptation and potentially poor choices. Fudenberg and Levine
(2006) note that ATMs are frequently placed in locations where lottery tickets are sold, or in
nightclubs, in order to induce impulse purchases by myopic consumers. This proverbial eﬀect
of money burning a hole in your pocket" is a potential concern in the Microﬁnance industry,
where recent research has studied whether access to microcredit can induce temptation
spending due to the generation of large lump sums (Angelucci, Karlan and Zinman, 2013).
In addition, this phenomenon is consistent with both theoretical and empirical work in
developed countries (Ozdenoren, Salant and Silverman, 2012; Stephens Jr., 2003; Shapiro,
2005) as well as with anecdotal reports of behavior around payday in developing countries.
In this paper we report results from a ﬁeld experiment in Malawi designed to examine
the role of timing of income for spending and savings decisions and its interaction with
issues of self-control. We vary the time structure of wage payments for 363 casual laborers,
with workers paid either in four weekly installments or a single lump sum at the end of the
month. We also vary the day of the week on which workers are paid, with half of the sample
being paid on Fridays, and half on Saturdays. All payments take place at same location,
on the site of the local weekend market, which takes place on Saturdays and is reported
to be an extremely tempting environment. The travel and time costs of purchasing goods
at the market are held constant across study arms by attendance at the payday site by all
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participants on all potential paydays, even when they do not receive money. Workers who
are paid on Saturdays are therefore exposed to a much more tempting environment at the
time when they receive their pay (relative to members of the Friday group), with all other
factors being held constant. Friday was chosen as the comparison group, rather than Sunday
or Monday, in order to eliminate the possibility that people in the Saturday group save less
of their income simply because the time frame is longer.
Workers in all study arms receive the same total amount of money: about MK3000, or
around 30% of their total cash income over the work period; they are employed in collabo-
ration with a local NGO in two separate rounds of work that are followed by payments with
re-randomization of experimental conditions after round 1.
The experiment has both a practical and a conceptual dimension: it was designed to
evaluate the role of internal savings constraints in a practically relevant context  temptations
to overspend on paydays and at weekend markets and local trading centers in particular  and
to test conceptually the role of temptation in mediating the diﬀerential eﬀects on spending
of income stream frequency.
Additionally, research using exogenous variation in the frequency of income streams is
rare. Two very recent papers study the eﬀect of lump sum payments relative to smoother
streams of income. Studying the Malawi Social Action Fund's Public Works Project, Beegle,
Galasso and Goldberg (2014) compare outcomes for workers who receive their wages in a
single lump sum, instead of 5 installments over the course of 15 days (results pending).
Haushofer and Shapiro (2013) ﬁnd a decrease in measured cortisol levels among people who
receive lump-sum, as opposed to monthly, transfers, suggesting lower levels of stress.
This paper provides novel empirical evidence in three ways. First, we provide evidence
that lump sum payments have an eﬀect on purchases of an actual investment: a high-return,
short-term bond" oﬀered by the project to all respondents. Second, we study the eﬀect
of the timing of payments within a week, which has not been examined in the previous
literature. Third, we exploit the eﬀect of the timing of payments within a week to explore
the role of temptation in driving internal savings constraints.
Qualitative evidence from the area targeted by the study found that people reported
market days as tempting environments. These anecdotes were conﬁrmed by survey responses
from the respondents in our experimental sample. We also use respondents' own perceptions
of regretted or mistaken expenditure, as reported on the surveys, as one of our measures
of spending on temptation goods. While goods the respondents self-reported as regretted
purchases included alcohol, tobacco, and sweets, the most common category was clothing.
This is consistent with anecdotal reports from the local area: clothing is a major expenditure
at the markets, with people making expensive purchases and then later regretting them.
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Responses from survey data we collected with respondents from this study also inform us
about how potential savings constraints interact with payment frequency. Before the start of
the experiment we described to workers a non-incentivized, purely hypothetical situation in
which they have two choices of wage payments: weekly payments or a lump sum payment in
the end. Workers were informed that they would be required to come to the same location
the same number of times (just as in the experiment we conducted; the hypothetical wage
amounts were also nearly identical to the actual ones). 72% of workers said they preferred a
lump sum payment. Of those 72%, a great majority (83%) stated, in an open ended question
with at most one answer, that the reason for this preference is that enables people to a make
better plan" for the money, and an additional 13% outright gave avoiding wasteful spending
as the reason. These answers imply either a commitment problem as the reason for the
lump sum preference or at the least an expected inability to save  be it internal such as
self-control problems or external reasons such as fear of theft.
The potential of temptation-driven waste due to market days, the frequency of payments
and their interaction are not merely theoretical concerns. Many organizations in Malawi are
presently moving to direct-deposit based payment schemes on an infrequent schedule that
bring their employees to major cities on focal dates, potentially triggering the sorts of temp-
tation issues discussed above. One example is Malawi's Ministry of Education; teachers now
receive their pay via direct deposits into their bank accounts, as opposed to cash payments.
This in turn induces a large fraction to travel to urban areas once a month to withdraw
all their pay in a lump sum. A similar pattern holds for unconditional cash transfers like
GiveDirectly: what makes that the program logistically feasible is that the payments are
sent through the M-Pesa mobile payments service. Haushofer and Shapiro (2013) state that
GiveDirectly recipients typically withdraw the entire balance of the transfer upon receipt."
Since withdrawals must be done at a participating M-Pesa agent, this will tend to draw
recipients to potentially-tempting trading centers at the same time as they receive their pay.
This study evaluates how infrequent payments and payments on market days in particu-
lar inﬂuence spending decisions, for a highly-relevant category of income for people in rural
Africa. Prior to the beginning of our study, 77% of our sample reported having done informal
agricultural work; it is a more common source of cash income than any other activity except
for selling one's own crops for cash. Our intervention also involves a smaller proportion of
income these other contexts: GiveDirectly provided income worth more than two months of
expenditures, and the direct deposit program covers all of a teacher's income. Our respon-
dents received additional income worth approximately 50% of their existing cash income.
This limits our ability to draw conclusions about the eﬀect of changing the timing of larger
proportions of income, but also means that our study more closely resembles realistic cash
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transfer programs for people in rural Africa, who are likely to have existing sources of cash
income as well.
We present two sets of ﬁndings from the experiment. First, in the context of this exper-
iment, despite strong motivation from anecdotes and suggestive survey data, being paid at
the site of the local market on the market day  Saturday  compared to the day before the
market day  Friday  does not strongly matter for expenditure decisions in the context of
our experiment. Drawing on a range of outcomes we document that neither the level nor
composition of expenditures varies signiﬁcantly by the day of the week that people were paid,
and that the frequency of payments does not aﬀect this result. We focus on a set of outcomes
related to spending at the market on each Friday and Saturday of the study, for which we
can reject even moderate-sized eﬀects of the being paid on Saturdays relative to Fridays.
However, some of our alternate outcome measures are noisy enough that we cannot that the
day of week of income receipt has moderate-sized eﬀects. This result does not conclusively
rule out important payday eﬀects in settings other those of our speciﬁc experiment  we dis-
cuss external validity in the conclusion  and it does not necessarily imply that self-control
more broadly is not a binding constraint for savings. The result should, however, lower our
priors about the empirical relevance of the market payday eﬀect, certainly in contexts that
are similar to the ones of this study.
Our second set of results relates to the diﬀerence in spending patterns by payment fre-
quency. We do not ﬁnd evidence that the composition of expenditures (including in partic-
ular self-reported wasteful consumption) varies with payment frequency.1 However, we ﬁnd
strong evidence that the mode of payment frequency matters for workers' ability to beneﬁt
from high-return investment opportunities with a large minimum investment size. Workers
in the monthly group have more cash left in the week after the last payday when the lump
sum payment was made and, moreover, they are 9.5 percentage points more likely than the
weekly payment group (a relative increase of 151% over the weekly mean of 6.3%) to invest
in a risk-free short-term bond" that required a large minimum installment size payment
and that was oﬀered by the project in the week after the last payday. The investment was
returned to the respondent together with 33% interest after exactly two weeks. Workers
knew about this opportunity before the beginning of round two of the experiment and had
gained experience with the product in a pilot oﬀer at the end of the ﬁrst round. In total,
lump sum group workers spent about twice as much as weekly payment group workers on
the investment opportunity. We cannot entirely rule out borrowing constraints as an expla-
nation for this result. However, based on other data, we argue that the result is driven by
1We elaborate on the speciﬁc features of this experiment that maybe have mitigated potential eﬀects in
the discussion of the empirical results.
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savings constraints.
These results, using a novel outcome measure for investments with a large minimum
installment size, also make an important contribution to existing research on the relationship
between savings constraints and high returns to investment. Previous research has found that
the return to investment is high, but that people do not appear to make those investments
 implying that people are constrained in their ability to save up for these investments.
However, prior studies either have not measured objective returns (relying on e.g. purchases
of health products), or have observed high average returns in a cross-section (e.g. cash
drop experiments). Research that uses investments in health products as an outcome relies
on the assumption that the return to health investment is actually high, and also that
respondents understand these high returns. Cash drop experiments also do not necessarily
show that people are failing to pursue high-return investments. Under heterogeneous returns
and borrowing constraints it is possible to observe high average returns without a binding
savings constraint. Those with access to high-return investments might be limited in how
much they invest at any given time because they face either a) borrowing constraints or
b) they prefer to not decrease present consumption too much. As a result, people do not
take advantage of all their high-return investment opportunities, allowing high returns to
persist over time. Our experiment resolves both of these concerns. First, we use an actual
investment with high returns and zero risk as an outcome. Second, we ensure that returns
are homogeneous. In our experiment everyone has access to the same high-return investment
oﬀer, but, compared to the lump sum group, the weekly group  who are otherwise identical
due to randomization  need to save to be able to invest. We observe that they do invest,
but to a much lesser extent. Thus this paper provides novel evidence for savings constraints
being a relevant driver of the persistence of observationally high returns to capital.
2.2 Study Design and Data
We designed a randomized experiment with informal agricultural workers from the Mu-
lanje District of Southern Malawi. These workers took part in an expansion of an existing
income-generation program that operates in Mulanje District. The subjects in the study
received identical nominal2 wages for their work, but were randomly assigned to receive the
pay with diﬀerent timing.
We worked with the Mulanje District Executive Council to expand a previously-existing
2The oﬃcial inﬂation rate in Malawi was about 23% per annum during the study period (https://www.
rbm.mw/inflation_rates_detailed.aspx), so prices would have risen just 1.7% per month. We therefore
ignore the distinction between nominal and real wages for the purposes of our analysis.
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income-generation program to an additional 365 workers3, who worked for a total of up to 15
days in two separate rounds of work and payments. This program was part of the Sustainable
Livelihoods program run by Mulanje Mountain Conservation Trust (MMCT), an NGO based
in Mulanje District that focused on environmental protection and promoting sustainability
in the Mulanje Mountain Forest Reserve and adjoining areas. MMCT provided detailed
guidance on how to mirror their existing practices; as with the majority of MMCT's other
projects, work oversight was conducted by oﬃcials from partnering government departments
of the Mulanje District.
The experiment was organized into two rounds that occurred over a period of three
months from November 2013 to January 2014, with subjects randomized into treatment
conditions separately by round. During each round, subjects worked for two weeks and then
received their pay either a) in weekly installments beginning at the end of the second week
of work; or b) in a single lump sum, about three weeks after the last day of work. Figure
2.1 shows the timing of experiment with respect to work, payments and data collection. In
addition to variation in payment frequency, workers received their pay either c) on Fridays
or d) on Saturdays. The two variations on the timing of pay  weekly vs. monthly and
Friday vs. Saturday  were cross-randomized, creating four study arms in each round. The
distribution of workers into experimental groups is shown in Table 2.1a (pooled) and Table
2.1b (separate by round); details of the randomization follow further below. The payments
were made at the site of a major local market that occurs on Saturdays, with the intention
of inducing variation in people's temptation to overspend. During the week after the last
payday in each round, all workers were visited for a detailed survey about their expenditure
and income.
2.2.1 Recruitment of Workers
We worked with MMCT to locate a set of villages that were potential targets for ex-
panding their Sustainable Livelihoods program. The key criteria for a village to be eligible
were:
1. Location. Villages had to lie within walking distance of the Forest Reserve, because
the work activities supported by the program are centered around natural resource
management and conservation.
2. No previous Sustainable Livelihoods program participation. Because this was an expan-
sion of the program, we excluded areas that were already actively participating in the
3The original recruitment included 350 workers two of which dropped early (one never showed up for
work; one never showed up to receive his wage); 15 workers were added for round 2 to replace workers who
dropped out after the round 1.
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Figure 2.1: Timing of work, payments and data collection
paydays
Midline 2Midline 1
paydays
work round 2work round 1
Baseline
lump sumlump sum
January 2014December 2013November 2013October 2013
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Table 2.1: Distribution of worker-round observations into experimental groups, (a) pooled across round 1 and 2 and (b) sepa-
rately for round 1 and round 2
a)
Payday
Frequency
Weekly 172 177 349
Lump sum 178 172 350
350 349 699
b)
Experimental group Round 1 Round 2 Total
Wkly, Fri 86 86 172
Wkly, Sat 89 88 177
Lump, Fri 87 91 178
Lump, Sat 86 86 172
Total 348 351 699
Friday Saturday
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program, or which had been included in the past.
3. Not included in any other recent income-generation programs. The expansion was
targeted toward underserved communities to maximize the beneﬁts brought to the
neediest people.
4. Limited geographic range. The villages for the study had to be physically close enough
to each other to allow work and payroll to be organized across all of them together.
Given the criteria above, we settled on a region of Traditional Authority (TA) Nkanda
near the Forest Reserve as the target location for the project; this area had not previously
been included in the Sustainable Livelihoods program, nor recently participated in other ma-
jor income-generating programs such as the Malawi government's Public Works Programme
(PWP). Within that region, we picked seven villages that all lie within the catchment area
of Mwanamulanje trading centre, one of the largest markets in TA Nkanda.
The selection of workers was handled by the standard operating procedure employed by
the Sustainable Livelihoods program. The nature of the program, including the kind of
work, the pay rate, and the expected length of employment, was explained at a meeting with
the village head and the village development committee (VDC). Each VDC was then tasked
with selecting a set of 50 participants and 15 substitutes. They were told to use the same
criteria they generally use for deciding who should beneﬁt from social programs. Discussions
with MMCT and the VDCs revealed that the main criterion used was generally poverty,
with some tendency to favor women as being more likely to be disadvantaged. The VDCs
were asked to list the workers in order of preference from 1 to 65, and told we would replace
workers who dropped out of the program by moving in order from position 51 to position 65
on the list of workers from their own village. This was done for a total of 15 workers at the
end of the ﬁrst round of the study.
This process generated an initial sample of 350 workers all of whom were interviewed in
a baseline survey. One person dropped out before the work started and one person never
showed up at payday (only an additional nine people missed any day of work). After all
payments of round 1 were done, 343 workers were successfully interviewed in the Midline 1
survey. Before the start of round 2 of the program, 13 workers left the study, and a total
of 15 replacement workers were added.4 A total of 352 workers participated in round 2 of
the study, of which all but 3 workers had full attendance and 346 were surveyed at Midline
2. The sample is similar to the broader population of the local region in most respects,
diﬀering chieﬂy in ways that are consistent with the selection criteria; for example, we re-
cruited more women (69% compared 55% in the district) and our sample is slightly worse of
4Only the 13 drop-outs should have been added to replace the dropped workers according to the protocol.
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socio-economically than the rest of Mulanje District.5 We consider the sample to be represen-
tative of the type of person likely to be involved in government- or non-government-provided
income-generation programs in Mulanje district.
2.2.2 Randomization
Our study exploits exogenous variation in the timing of individual's pay. We designed
this to vary in two ways. First, the payments are either in weekly installments for four weeks,
on a single lump sum during the last week. Second, the payments are made either on Fridays
or Saturdays.
The eﬀect of monthly lump sum payments, as opposed to weekly installments, is theoret-
ically ambiguous. In a context where people have problems aggregating streams of income,
receiving one's pay in a lump sum at the end of the payment period would increase take-up
of proﬁtable investments that are available after the end of the fourth week. However, if
people's temptation to overspend is an increasing function of their potential immediate con-
sumption, lump-sum payments could reduce savings instead. This would be the case if the
lump sum were received concurrently with opportunities to purchase temptation goods, in
which case the money could burn a hole in people's pockets", causing them to spend money
on things that ex ante they would prefer not to purchase. If these were the only two potential
mechanisms, the variation in the frequency of pay would allow us to see which one domi-
nates in our sample. However, the lump-sum payment could also increase savings through
borrowing constraints, if people would prefer a smoother stream of income and would ideally
borrowing against the future lump sum payment.
The variation in the day of the week of the payment is designed to shed light on the
mechanisms behind the savings constraints people face. If money is received in a tempting
environment, like the local market day, then arguably costs to resisting that temptation
increase and workers would decide to spend and consume more right at the market when
receiving their pay.
We picked Saturdays at the local trading center  so that payroll for this group happened
during the major market in the local area  as a tempting context for the receipt of income.
This choice was based on extensive qualitative and descriptive work with people in the
local area. Anecdotally, people in Mulanje District often describe market days as tempting
situations, in which excitement can cause them to purchase things they would rather not. Our
survey data conﬁrms this: for a free-response question about situations that are tempting
or in which respondents may waste" money, 37% of all respondents volunteered Market
5See Appendix B for detailed summary statistics on demographic characteristics.
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Days as a tempting situation, by far the most common among those being ever tempted.67
Multiple-choice questions conﬁrmed this pattern: 69% of people said that market days are
more tempting than the day before market days, and 65% of people said having a lot of
cash on hand at the trading center was more tempting than having it on hand elsewhere.
Based on these answers, payments during market days could exacerbate temptation-based
psychological savings constraints, by inducing people to spend money on tempting goods
that they would prefer to save. The alternate day  Friday  should not have the same eﬀect
on temptation spending, because the market does not take place on that day.
We chose Friday as the alternate day for several reasons. First, it was logistically simpler
to manage payments on two consecutive days than on diﬀerent ones; Sunday was not an
option because the vast majority of our sample goes to church on Sunday mornings. Second,
using the day before the market ensured that all respondents had the liquid cash needed to
make purchases at the market  if we had paid the comparison group on a later day, then
for the ﬁrst week they would not have had any money to spend at the market on Saturday.
Third, and most important, if the comparison group was paid after the Saturday group, then
any diﬀerences in savings could simply be a function of having to hang on to the money for
a shorter period. By choosing Friday as the comparison group, we ensured that any such
eﬀects worked against the expected direction of the results.
There are also a number of reasons why the Saturday payday might not increase temp-
tation, as well as mechanisms that might mute the eﬀects. First, as noted above many
respondents report that having cash at the trading center is more tempting than having it
elsewhere. While this is likely due to the market day itself, part of it could be independent
of market days: people might just be more tempted to spend at the trading center even if
the weekend market is not currently active; the selection of goods is always greater than at
the village. Second, while Saturday is the major market day for the local region, there are
other markets nearby that operate on Friday. Third, on an open-ended question about rea-
sons they waste money (where the options were not read aloud), only 42% of people report
spending on temptation as reason they spend money they later regret spending. This is an
appreciable fraction, but if it represents all the people who could possibly be aﬀected by the
Saturday treatment, any measured eﬀects will tend to be muted.
We employed a within-person cross-randomized design in order to maximize statistical
6Since 39% of respondents said they were never tempted, this constituted 58% of people who believe they
ever waste money. The next-most frequent answer was Going to the Trading Centre in general (not just
market days)" with 4% mentioning it.
7The exact phrasing of the question in English was In general, what are situations in which you waste
money or are tempted to spend money that you would rather not spend?" where waste" is the commonly
used translation used in the local dialect of English and has a clear but less judgmental-sounding translation
in the local language.
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power. Individuals were randomly assigned to one study arm in the ﬁrst round of the
study and then to another study arm (potentially the same one) for the second round. The
randomization for both rounds of the study was done prior to the baseline survey, but the
group assignments were not revealed to the workers until the beginning of each round of
work. For each round of the study, all workers were randomly assigned to one of four study
arms: Weekly payments on Fridays, Weekly Payments on Saturdays, Monthly Payments
on Fridays, or Monthly Payments on Saturdays. For the ﬁrst round, the randomization
assignment was stratiﬁed by village and gender. The randomization for round 2 was then
stratiﬁed on the round 1 assignment and village.
2.2.3 Work Activities
Each subject worked for two weeks during each round of the project, for about four days
per week, at a daily wage rate of MK400. There were 7 work days during the ﬁrst round of
the project and 8 days during round two. Workers were employed in conservation-oriented
activities that promoted the sustainable use of natural resources. At the beginning of each
round of work, representatives from the project met with the workers from each village to
help them decide on the speciﬁc activities to pursue for that round, based on guidance from
MMCT's sustainable livelihoods program. The two kinds of work done by the subjects
during the study fell under the categories of Tree Planting and Milambala.
Tree Planting had two separate aspects. During the ﬁrst round of the project, workers
prepared pits for trees to be planted in, and nurseries to house the seedlings for later planting;
the seedlings were provided by the Department of Forestry as part of a reforestation program
in the area. During round two, which happened once the rainy season had begun, workers
did the actual planting of trees. Milambala is a land conservation activity that focuses
on building small bund walls to prevent the inundation of ﬁelds and limit environmentally
harmful erosion of the topsoil. The principal tools needed for the work were hoes, which
all the workers already owned. Milambala also required line levels and ropes, which were
provided by the project.
Workers were trained in the tasks for each work activity by oﬃcials from Mulanje's Dis-
trict Forestry and District Agricultural Oﬃces for Tree Planting and Milambala respectively.
Progress on the work was also overseen by oﬃcials from the two departments, who set targets
for the work to be done on each day and checked in to make sure it was accomplished.
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2.2.4 Payroll
Payroll for the project was organized at Mwanamulanje Trading Centre, a major local
market in TA Nkanda that was within 4 kilometers of all the villages included in the study.
Subjects were informed about how they would be receiving their pay (weekly or monthly,
Fridays or Saturdays) at the beginning of each round of work; the procedure was explained
verbally, and they were also given a simple handout explaining their group assignment.
To ensure that transit and time costs were held equal across the four study arms, all
subjects were required to come to the payroll site on all eight days during each round 
even when they were not being paid. This also allowed us to collect high-frequency data
on people's cash holdings and spending behavior, via questions that we asked during the
payroll administration. In order to encourage attendance and defray some of people's time
costs, all subjects received an MK100 show-up fee for each day, on top of any money they
were slated to receive as part of their pay for the project. For example, a person who was
paid monthly on Fridays was required to come to the market on all the preceding Fridays
and Saturdays, and received MK100; on the day she received her pay, she received MK100
plus her entire wages for the project. The payment schedules in each round across the
four payday weekends resulting from the show-up fees and payment of wages according to
treatment group and number of work days is overviewed in Table 2.2.
MMCT ordinarily manages payroll for its activities using experienced cashiers that work
for the organization. For this project, the cashiers were instead employees from the Mulanje
District council.
The location and timing of the payroll was speciﬁcally chosen to maximize the likelihood
that people would be exposed to temptation goods. In pilot testing and qualitative work,
people commonly reported market days as periods when they were tempted to spend against
their ex ante plans, or tended to waste money. The market at Mwanamulanje happens only
on Wednesdays and Saturdays (with Saturdays having the larger market out of the two
days), and principally in the morning, which is when people were paid. Shops are still open
on Fridays, and there are some mobile vendors, but the majority of market activity happens
on Saturdays.
While the purpose of the show-up fee on non-payday days was to equalize transaction
costs across treatment groups and make spending patterns comparable, the fact that some
amount of money was paid each time may have reduced the potential to observe diﬀerences
across groups: possibly workers satisﬁed most of their temptation consumption needs with
the MK 100 they received each time they showed up at the market.
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Table 2.2: Payment schedules by payday group and round (all values in MK)
Round 1 Fri Sat Fri Sat Fri Sat Fri Sat
Payment group
Wkly, Fri 800 100 800 100 800 100 800 100
Wkly, Sat 100 800 100 800 100 800 100 800
Lump, Fri 100 100 100 100 100 100 2,900 100
Lump, Fri 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 2,900
Round 2
Payment group
Wkly, Fri 900 100 900 100 900 100 900 100
Wkly, Sat 100 900 100 900 100 900 100 900
Lump, Fri 100 100 100 100 100 100 3,300 100
Lump, Fri 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 3,300
Payday weekends
#1 #2 #3 #4
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2.2.5 Data
Our data comes from three distinct sources. A detailed survey, focused on expenditures in
the past week; several single-item recall questions administered during the payroll; and, as an
objective measure of savings behaviors, respondents' choices about purchasing a short-term,
high-return, zero-risk investment oﬀered by the project at the end of the second round of
the study.
The survey data was collected three times: once at baseline, and once after each round of
the study. Subjects were interviewed at their homes, and answered questions about income,
assets, savings, and ﬁnancial transfers, as well as a detailed module about their expenditures
since the previous Friday. This module went through a list of goods and asked respondents if
they had bought the good since the previous Friday. If they said yes" to a good, they were
asked about how much they bought on each of Friday, Saturday, and Sunday up to now.
Also part of the survey data were a set of questions on wasting money and being tempted
to buy things one should not. Respondents were asked about goods that respondents found
particularly tempting, or that they thought they wasted money on, as well as situations in
which they felt they wasted money. They were also asked ex post about whether they felt
they had wasted money in the period since they received their pay; this question was only
included on the survey after the second round.
Our second data source is a set of questions asked during the payroll process. On each
of the eight paydays, all respondents were required to come to the payroll site as described
above. Prior to receiving their pay, they were asked simple aggregate questions about the
money they had on them at the time (not including their pay, which they had yet to receive)
and the amount of money they spent at the market on the previous payday. Hence on
Fridays, people were asked about the money they spent on the Friday of the previous week,
and on Saturdays, they were asked about the money they spent yesterday. During the second
round of the study, we also asked two additional questions as sensitivity checks: ﬁrst, we
asked people to recall their spending from the Friday of the previous week, to look at the
inﬂuence of recall bias. Second, we asked people about money they spent outside of the
market, in case there were diﬀerential patterns in non-market spending.
A third source of data comes from an investment opportunity oﬀered to respondents at
the end of the second round of the study. This opportunity was announced before the ﬁrst
payday for the second round, so all respondents had a chance to take part irrespective of
their treatment status. Respondents were oﬀered the chance to buy the investment good
only once, immediately after we visited them for the midline survey. The investment took the
form of a bond", with shares that cost MK1500 to purchase and that paid back the principal
plus MK500 interest after exactly two weeks. Each respondent could buy a maximum of two
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shares, and no fractional shares were allowed. All respondents who purchased the bond were
paid back on time according to the terms of the investment.
The investment good was intentionally oﬀered only once per round, in the week after
the ﬁnal payment was made. This allows us to use it to test for the existence of savings
constraints, since members of the weekly group must save their pay in order to use it for the
investment good. An alternative design would have oﬀered the investment opportunity each
week. This would have lowered the amount of time that the weekly group needed to save in
order to purchase it, thus relaxing the savings constraint somewhat. We chose this design in
order maximize our statistical power to detect diﬀerences across the two groups.
Summary statistics from these data sources for all variables used in the regression analysis
are presented in Table 2.3, separately for pre-experiment baseline and for outcome variables.
At baseline, the households' total spending considering all expenditures from the last Friday
prior to being interviewed up to the day of the survey averages MK2,257 (about US$5.6 or
PPP$ 14). Respondents report having an average of MK670 (about US$1.7 or PPP$4.2)
left out of the money they had received since the Friday prior to interviewing. Households
spend about 69% of their total expenditures on food for preparation at home, another about
6% on immediate consumption away from home and about 28% on non-food items.8 About
a third of food expenditure was on maize, which is the principal staple crop in the region.
Randomization led to a sample with no notable diﬀerences in pre-program characteristics
across study arms. See discussion in Appendix B.
2.3 Empirical Speciﬁcation
We study the eﬀects of the experimentally-induced variation in payment timing on several
sets of outcomes: expenditure at the market when payment was received; total expenditure
levels and composition over the last weekend of each round, including self-reported waste-
ful expenditures; asset accumulation; and take-up of the large installment-size, risk-free,
high-return investment opportunity.
We present three regression speciﬁcations reported as separate panels in the main results
tables. The ﬁrst tests the eﬀect of being randomly assigned to a Saturday payday relative to
being assigned to a Friday payday. In Panel A of the subsequent tables, we run regressions
of the form
Yir = αSaturdayir + β
′Xir + εir (2.1)
8The shares do not add to 1 exactly due to Winsorizing.
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Table 2.3: Summary statistics
Mean Std. dev.
10th 
percentile Median
90th 
percentile Obs.
Baseline variables
Index of asset ownership -0.02 2.695 -2.489 -0.713 3.061 342
Total spending since incl. last Fri [MK] 2257 3763 200 1000 4600 321
Remaining cash out of received since incl. last Fri [MK] 670 2623 0 20 1400 321
Expenditure shares based on itemized elicitation
Food for consumption at home 0.69 0.214 0.361 0.742 0.937 341
Maize only 0.234 0.26 0 0.17 0.605 341
Food for consumption out of home 0.061 0.069 0 0.038 0.144 341
Non-Food 0.279 0.235 0.04 0.189 0.655 341
Outcome variables
Market spending on paydays
Amount spent on day of wage receipt 1645 1151 200 1500 3200 683
Amount spent at market on Fridays 1, 2, & 3 651 685 200 300 1895 690
Amount spent at market on Saturdays 1, 2, & 3 829 759 200 480 2300 691
Amount spent at market on Friday 4 524 761 50 120 1500 675
Amount spent at market on Saturday 4 823 939 60 500 2300 689
Follow-up survey measures
Total spending since incl. last Fri [MK] 2509 2395 800 2300 4000 689
Remaining cash out of received since 
incl. last Fri [MK]
529 996 0 0 2000 689
Expenditure shares based on itemized elicitation
Food for consumption at home 0.698 0.212 0.371 0.751 0.930 689
Maize only 0.359 0.266 0.000 0.371 0.709 689
Food for consumption out of home 0.051 0.056 0.000 0.034 0.125 689
Non-Food 0.251 0.206 0.043 0.188 0.572 689
Value of net asset purchases since last interview 2154 7486 0 0 5300 689
Self-reported wasteful spending on weekend 4 of round 2
Total since incl. last Fri [MK] 306 685 0 25 800 346
Friday 
[MK] 164 462 0 0 400 346
Saturday  
[MK] 73 256 0 0 150 346
Sunday and after
[MK] 66 281 0 0 90 346
Round 2 investment opportunity take-up
Bought any shares [0/1] 0.108 0.311 351
Total spent on shares [MK] 265 798 0 0 1500 351
Notes: Sample includes 359 respondents who participated in at least one round of the work program and have data from at least one data source for that round (either the payday data, 
the survey, or both). All money amounts are in Malawian Kwacha (MK); during the study period the market exchange rate was approximately MK400 to the US dollar, and the PPP 
exchange rate was approximately MK160 to the US dollar. See Appendix B for variable definitions.
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Yir is the dependent variable of interest for worker i in round r. Saturdayir is an indicator
variable for individual-level assignment to a Saturday payday in round r. The coeﬃcient
α measures the eﬀect of receiving wages on Saturday (either in four weekly installments or
in a lump sum at the end). Xir is a vector that includes stratiﬁcation cell dummies; two
household ﬁnancial variables measured at baseline prior to the randomized assignment;9 and
a linear function of the weekday of the exogenously-assigned (ﬁrst attempted) interview date.
The available baseline controls are summarized in Table 3. εir is a mean-zero error term.
Whenever data from both rounds are used (so r=1, 2 in the equation above) standard
errors are clustered at the worker level to account for statistical dependence of outcome
measures for the same individual across the two rounds. The stratiﬁcation cell dummies are
separate by round, so these implicitly control for round ﬁxed eﬀects when multiple rounds
are used.
In Panel B, we compare the impact of the payday assignment separately for weekly and
lump sum payment frequency. Regressions are of the form
Yir = γ1Sat_wklyir + γ2Lump_sumir + γ3Sat_lumpir + β
′Xi + εir (2.2)
where Yir and Xir are deﬁned as above. Sat_wklyir is an indicator for assignment to the
Saturday payday group and weekly payments, Lump_sumir is an indicator for assignment to
the lump sum payment group (either payday), and Sat_lumpir is an indicator for assignment
to the Saturday payday group and lump sum payments. The coeﬃcient γ1 represents the
eﬀect of assignment to the Saturday payday group relative to the Friday payday group among
those who are assigned to weekly payments. γ2 represents the eﬀect of assignment to the
lump sum payment condition relative to the weekly payment condition among the Friday
payment group. γ3 captures the eﬀect analogous to γ1 for the Saturday payday eﬀect but
among those who are assigned to the lump sum condition. The diﬀerence between γ3 and
γ1, then, captures how the Saturday payday eﬀect varies across payment frequency. The
estimated coeﬃcient diﬀerence and the p-value for the test of the null hypothesis of no
diﬀerence (between γ3 and γ1) is reported at the bottom of each Panel B.
Finally, panel C  and all speciﬁcations shown in Table 7  is analogous to panel A, except
the included experimental group indicator captures the eﬀect of being assigned to the lump
sum payment condition relative to the weekly payment condition and gives the according
eﬀect averaged across payday assignments (i.e. across Friday and Saturday assignments).
9Our baseline ﬁnancial controls are an index of asset and livestock ownership (using principal component
analysis) and the total amount of money the respondent spent out of their income received since the Friday
prior to the baseline survey. Results are not sensitive to the speciﬁc choice of baseline ﬁnancial controls.
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In general, workers in this project interact with each other and so in theory we cannot
exclude that workers assigned to one experimental group had an impact on workers in an-
other. Our design does not allows us to address potential contamination. In the context of
our design, this should bias results against ﬁnding diﬀerences between treatment groups: for
example, if monthly payment group members gave loans to weekly payment group members,
this should diﬀerences in expenditures between the two groups. Additionally, empirically,
we ﬁnd no evidence of increased cash or in-kind transfers for any of the experimental groups
(results not shown).
2.4 Empirical Results
2.4.1 Saturday vs. Friday Payday
We examine the eﬀects of the experimentally-induced variation of being paid on Saturday
compared to Friday on expenditures. We begin by looking at reported expenditures at the
market on all four paydays. Next, we consider total spending over the course of the last
payday weekend and into the following week, and the composition of spending. We consider
estimates of equations (2.1) and (2.2) in Panels A and B, respectively, of Tables 4 through
6. We return to estimates shown in Panels C of the same tables further below.
We ﬁrst examine how the speciﬁc day on which people were paid aﬀected spending at the
market over the course of the eight paydays during each round. Table 2.4 presents estimates
for outcomes from the panel of data collected during paydays.
Table 2.4 column 1 presents the eﬀect of the treatment on the amount of money people
spend at the market on the day that they receive their wages. This variable measures
expenditure on Fridays for the Friday condition and on Saturdays for the Saturday condition;
it includes spending on all four paydays for the weekly condition, but only on the fourth
week of paydays for the lump sum condition. Panel A indicates that the day of receipt
did not matter for same-day market expenditures. If receiving pay in the environment of
Saturday's weekend market was tempting for workers then we should expect to see workers
in the Saturday group spending more at the market on the day they were paid. The point
estimate is close to zero and relatively tightly bounded: the mean of the dependent variable
in the Friday group is MK 1656, the point estimate for the Saturday eﬀect is MK -12.5 with
a standard error of MK 90. Panel B shows the Saturday eﬀect separately for weekly payment
condition and the lump sum condition. The diﬀerence in coeﬃcients and p-values of the test
of no diﬀerence is given below Panel B. There is no diﬀerential eﬀect by payment frequency.
Table 2.4 columns 2 through 5 reveal that those workers with payments on Friday spend
more money at the market on Fridays  the estimate of the Saturday coeﬃcient is negative for
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Friday expenditures  and those with payments on Saturday spend more on Saturdays. The
negative coeﬃcient on the Saturday dummy is larger in absolute value for Friday outcomes
than for Saturday outcomes, suggesting that Friday wage receivers spend some of their money
on Saturday, while Saturday wage receivers do not have extra funds to spend on Friday 
the day before their pay receipt.
The natural follow-up question is to ask whether total expenditures over the whole week-
end and in the days following the payday weekend were diﬀerent by Saturday vs. Friday
payment. Thus, we turn to Table 2.5 column 1 which presents the eﬀects for days of and
after the fourth payday weekend for each of the two rounds, including also non-market ex-
penditures. In Panel A, the point estimate for the Saturday eﬀect is positive but far from
statistically signiﬁcant; taken at face value, the point estimate of MK 59.27 would imply a
relative eﬀect of ca. 2.4% of the Saturday assignment on total expenditures compared to the
Friday assignment (mean of MK 2500). Compared to the market data of Table 2.4 that was
available for all payday weekends, the standard errors are higher, and so moderate Saturday
eﬀects cannot be rejected with high conﬁdence for this outcome variable. Panel B shows
that the Saturday eﬀect point estimates are higher for the lump sum condition but neither is
the sub-group diﬀerence individually statistically signiﬁcant nor is the diﬀerence across the
two payment frequency conditions signiﬁcant.
Column 2 shows a statistically-insigniﬁcant but negative estimated eﬀect of the Saturday
condition on the amount of cash respondents had received since the Friday before the inter-
view but had not yet spent. The diﬀerence of about MK 114 is large relative to the Friday
payday condition mean of MK 579, and so we cannot reject moderate-sized eﬀects on this
outcome.
We have established that there is no detectable Saturday eﬀect on the level of expen-
ditures on market day and beyond. However, if Saturdays are tempting, being paid on
Saturdays could also aﬀect the composition of expenditures. To explore this we look at the
two sets of outcome variables: self-reported wasteful expenditures and the composition of
spending in broad expenditure categories. Table 2.5 columns 3 through 6 show eﬀects on
self-reported wasteful spending (How much did you spend on items that you later thought
you should not have spent money on?), both in total for the last payday weekend as well
as separately for Friday, Saturday and after. Table 2.6 columns 1 through 4 show expendi-
ture shares in broad categories. These data are constructed from detailed, itemized listings.
Again, we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant Saturday eﬀects on average or in interactions with payday fre-
quency. The conﬁdence bands around these sets of point estimates implied by the standard
errors are, however, not very narrow and so relatively large diﬀerences  relative to the mean
in the comparison group  cannot be rejected with conﬁdence.
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Table 2.4: Eﬀects of treatment assignment on market spending
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent variable: 
Amount spent on 
same day as 
income receipt 
Money spent at 
market on Fridays 
1, 2, 3
Money spent at 
market on 
Saturdays 1, 2, 3
Money spent at 
market on 
Friday 4
Money spent at 
market on 
Saturday 4
Panel A - Saturday vs. Friday
Saturday payday -12.50 -558.6*** 282.3*** -750.6*** 203.1***
(90.15) (48.27) (58.43) (50.35) (67.31)
Mean dep var Friday payday 1656 930.6 686.1 912.6 722.7
Panel B -Saturday vs. Friday x Frequency
(a) Saturday  payday, weekly  payment 18.53 -1,151*** 542.1*** -375.3*** 202.2***
(114.3) (64.22) (89.18) (41.02) (76.56)
(b) Any payday, lump sum -828.2*** -1,189*** -408.1*** 671.3*** 489.8***
(107.2) (61.47) (62.08) (87.04) (95.94)
(c) Saturday  payday, lump  sum -64.11 3.892 1.954 -1,106*** 224.7**
(119.4) (32.23) (50.43) (84.52) (109.5)
Mean dep var excluded category 
(Friday payday, weekly payment): 
2068 1540 892.8 557.1 474.2
Difference in coefficients and p-values of tests of no difference; H0: (Sat, lump - Fri, lump) - (Sat, wkly - Fri, wkly) = 0
Coefficient difference: row (c) - row (a) -82.65 1155 -540.1 -730.8 22.54
P-value of H0: coef difference  = 0 0.620 0 0 0 0.869
Panel C - Lump sum vs. weekly
Lump sum payment -869.8*** -598.3*** -683.4*** 309.4*** 496.6***
(83.55) (49.26) (53.83) (56.15) (73.40)
Mean dep var weekly payment 2067 950.6 1170 362.3 576.3
Number of observations 683 690 691 675 689
Notes: Stars indicate significance at 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***) levels. Regressions are run on pooled data from round 1 and round 2 (see Empirical 
Strategy for details). Standard errors are clustered at the individual level in parentheses. USD 1 is ca. MK 400 for study period. All regressions include 
stratification cell fixed effects and an index of baseline asset ownership based on first principal components, difference in days between date of 
interview and the preceding weekend, baseline total spending. For complete variable definitions, see Appendix B, and Table 2 for summary statistics.
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Table 2.5: Eﬀects of treatment assignment on total spending and cash saving and wasteful spending
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable: 
Total spending
since last Fri, 
inclusive [MK]
Remaining cash 
out of received 
since last Fri, 
inclusive [MK]
Total since last 
Fri, inclusive 
[MK]
Friday 
[MK]
Saturday  
[MK]
Sunday and after
[MK]
Panel A - Saturday vs. Friday
Saturday payday 59.27 -113.6 -59.74 -123.8** 52.14* -3.199
(165.4) (76.36) (71.68) (47.85) (27.58) (32.45)
Mean dep var Friday payday 2500 579.2 324.3 220.7 43.49 64.11
Panel B -Saturday vs. Friday x Frequency
(a) Saturday  payday, weekly  payment -87.93 -51.66 -126.2 -116.6* 12.61 -17.59
(232.8) (109.3) (88.62) (60.60) (30.30) (48.82)
(b) Any payday, lump sum 1,275*** 196.3* 26.22 71.81 -6.284 -21.24
(247.5) (106.8) (107.6) (83.14) (24.94) (44.61)
(c) Saturday  payday, lump  sum 265.8 -170.0 6.301 -129.5* 91.02** 10.60
(214.9) (109.2) (112.7) (76.15) (43.85) (42.22)
Mean dep var excluded category 
(Friday payday, weekly payment): 
1881 483.5 322.3 189.1 52.59 73.53
Difference in coefficients and p-values of tests of no difference; H0: (Sat, lump - Fri, lump) - (Sat, wkly - Fri, wkly) = 0
Coefficient difference: row (c) - row (a) 353.7 -118.3 132.5 -12.90 78.41 28.19
P-value of H0: coef difference  = 0 0.266 0.448 0.358 0.897 0.129 0.659
Panel C - Lump sum vs. weekly
Lump sum payment 1,451*** 139.2* 92.77 66.54 32.28 -7.165
(159.1) (71.40) (70.53) (47.43) (27.63) (31.06)
Mean dep var weekly payment 1833 468.5 261.8 132.3 58.36 67.60
Number of observations 689 689 346 346 346 346
Notes: Stars indicate significance at 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***) levels.  Regressions of columns 1 and 2 are run on pooled data from round 1 and round 2 for 
which standard errors are clustered at the individual level; remaining columns use only round 2 data since outcomes are not available in round 1. All 
regressions include stratification cell fixed effects and an index of baseline asset ownership based on first principal components, difference in days between 
date of interview and the preceding weekend, baseline total spending and -if available- the baseline value of the outcome variable. For complete variable 
definitions, see Appendix B, and Table 2 for summary statistics.
Self-reported wasteful spending on weekend 4 of round 2
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Table 2.6: Eﬀects of treatment assignment on expenditure composition and asset accumulation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent variable: 
Food for 
consumption at 
home
Maize only
Food for 
consumption out 
of home
Non-Food
Panel A - Saturday vs. Friday
Saturday payday -0.00366 0.00327 0.00443 -0.00125 -805.3
(0.0154) (0.0183) (0.00413) (0.0155) (534.4)
Mean dep var Friday payday 0.700 0.359 0.0491 0.250 2581
Panel B -Saturday vs. Friday x Frequency
(a) Saturday  payday, weekly  payment 0.0159 0.0181 0.00902 -0.0257 -520.6
(0.0217) (0.0270) (0.00570) (0.0213) (842.3)
(b) Any payday, lump sum 0.00443 0.0328 0.000595 -0.00579 287.1
(0.0233) (0.0282) (0.00591) (0.0228) (865.7)
(c) Saturday  payday, lump  sum -0.0237 -0.0107 -0.000288 0.0238 -1,088
(0.0221) (0.0246) (0.00618) (0.0219) (725.0)
Mean dep var excluded category 
(Friday payday, weekly payment): 
0.702 0.348 0.0473 0.250 2604
Difference in coefficients and p-values of tests of no difference; H0: (Sat, lump - Fri, lump) - (Sat, wkly - Fri, wkly) = 0
Coefficient difference: row (c) - row (a) -0.0396 -0.0289 -0.00931 0.0495 -567.4
P-value of H0: coef difference  = 0 0.207 0.430 0.276 0.103 0.623
Panel C - Lump sum vs. weekly
Lump sum payment -0.0153 0.0182 -0.00416 0.0190 19.61
(0.0162) (0.0192) (0.00449) (0.0161) (525.7)
Mean dep var weekly payment 0.707 0.352 0.0523 0.240 2271
Number of observations 689 689 689 689 689
Notes: Stars indicate significance at 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***) levels. Regressions are run on pooled data from round 1 and round 2 (see 
Empirical Strategy for details). Standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses. USD 1 is ca. MK 400 for study period. All 
regressions include stratification cell fixed effects and an index of baseline asset ownership based on first principal components, difference 
in days between date of interview and the preceding weekend, baseline total spending and -if available- the baseline value of the outcome 
variable. For complete variable definitions, see Appendix B, and Table 2 for summary statistics.
Expenditure shares based on itemized elicitation
Value of net asset 
purchases since 
last interview
66
The wasteful spending variables in Table 2.5 are only available for round 2; we choose to
shows this set of outcomes as it most unambiguously reﬂects temptation spending and avoids
constructing outcomes with researcher-imposed ideas of what are temptation expenditures.
There are multiple ways of constructing outcomes with the same intention. One variation
that we have explored is based on reports of unplanned purchases of items: we have consid-
ered both items that are commonly unplanned purchases across the whole sample, as well
as individual self-reports that a speciﬁc purchase was not planned. Neither of these varia-
tions aﬀects the pattern of no signiﬁcant treatment eﬀects, and so we omit these alternative
speciﬁcations for brevity. Lastly, column 5 of Table 2.6 shows that over the course of the
entire payment period, Saturday payments did not diﬀerentially aﬀect asset accumulation
compared to Friday payments.
We also explore the possibility that the day of the week on which people are paid might
interact with the frequency of their pay. The estimates and p-values in Panel B of the Ta-
bles 4 to 7 show that there is no signiﬁcant interaction of Saturday payments with payment
frequency for the remaining cash outcome variable. We consistently see no signiﬁcant inter-
actions between the day of the week on which respondents are paid and the frequency of
their payments.
2.4.2 Lump Sum Payment vs. Weekly Payments
In the preceding section, we showed that Saturday payments did not aﬀect expenditures
compared to Friday payments. In this section we focus on the eﬀect of receiving a lump-sum
payment relative to receiving weekly installments. Workers were randomized into one of the
two payment frequency conditions; the lump sum group received wage payments on the last
of four weekends at which the weekly payment condition received their wages. However, all
workers were required to come to the site where payroll was administered every Friday and
Saturday on all four payday weekends, even if no wages were received. Workers received
a small show-up fee" of MK 100 and were also asked the payday questions described in
Section 2 above.
We brieﬂy return to the outcomes of Tables 4 through 6 discussed above. Panel C shows
the eﬀect of lump sum payments vis-à-vis the weekly payment condition, all of which are
strongly statistically signiﬁcant. Table 2.4 column 1 shows market expenditures on the day
of receipt of pay across the entire payment period (e.g. across all four Fridays of reach round
for those paid weekly on Friday; or spending on Saturday of the last payday only for those in
the Saturday lump sum group). On average, workers in the lump sum condition spent MK
870 less of their total pay at the market on the same day that they received it. In payday
weekends 1 through 3, when the lump sum condition was not receiving any wages, market
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expenditure on paydays was lower in the lump sum condition: on Fridays 1, 2 and 3 in total
workers only spend about 37% of the average in the weekly payment condition (Column 2)
and the same rate is about 42% for Saturdays (Column 3). On the last payday weekend,
when those in the lump sum group receive their wages, expenditures are higher by MK 309
and MK 497, respectively. The increase in the monthly group's expenditures during the
fourth weekend is smaller than their decline in expenditures in weekends 1, 2 and 3.
Table 2.4 concerned expenditures at the market; Table 2.5 (Panel C) looks at survey
measures of total expenditures during the fourth payday weekend. Consistent with the
payday data about market expenditure, total expenditures over the weekend and into the
following week are higher for the lump sum group (by MK 1,451, column 1). Despite the
higher spending, cash remaining on hand out of the money received since the Friday prior to
the follow-up interview are marginally statistically signiﬁcantly higher with a point estimate
of ca. MK 139. Wasteful spending, however, was not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent for the lump
sum group (columns 3 through 6), suggesting that the higher receipt of cash in one chunk
does not lead recipients to overspend on goods they later regret  at least in this context.
While the standard errors are large enough that we cannot reject a doubling of wasteful
expenditure, the results from Panel C of Table 2.6 are consistent with the idea that the
composition of expenditure did not change in the monthly group (Columns 1 to 4). The
shares of expenditure in diﬀerent broad item categories were not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent.
Column 5 of the same table examines if higher expenditures lead to diﬀerential asset
purchases. The estimates show that net asset accumulation over the course of the all payday
weekends does not appear to be diﬀerent between lump sum and weekly payment conditions.
However, standard errors are large and so economically signiﬁcant eﬀects cannot be ruled
out by these estimates.
Lastly, in Table 2.7 we examine the eﬀect of lump sum payments on take up of a large
minimum-installment, high-return, risk-free investment opportunity" that was oﬀered to
respondents right after the follow-up interview.10 Workers were able to buy either 1 or 2
shares" from the project that had a risk-free return of 33% and were repaid after exactly
two weeks. This investment opportunity was oﬀered to test if the timing of payments aﬀects
respondents' ability to take up proﬁtable but lumpy investment opportunities. The main ad-
vantages of this novel outcome variable is that it provides a controlled investment instrument
with known features, and, moreover, that it makes a high-return investment opportunity,
that requires a large minimum investment, homogeneously available to every respondent at
10There is no eﬀect of Saturday vs. Friday payments on these outcomes, consistent with the lack of
diﬀerence in remaining cash after weekend 4. For clarity of presentation we omit the speciﬁcations of Panels
A and B and focus only on the regressions analogous to Panel C in the preceding results tables.
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the time of surveying. In real life respondents' opportunities vary widely cross-sectionally
and, importantly, over time  e.g. farming investments are largely only available during a
limited period of the year.
In round 1 the opportunity to invest was only announced in the week preceding the ﬁnal
payday. This limits the usefulness of the round 1 results, because workers already knew
their treatment status but did not know about the investment opportunity until a week
before it was made available to them. This could bias any estimated eﬀects either upwards
or downwards. An upward bias ccould occur because the weekly payment group members
did not know about this opportunity until they had received three quarters of their wage.
The wage amount remaining to paid in the last payday weekend was smaller than minimum
requirement amount for the investment opportunity (the remaining payment was MK 800
but one unit of the investment oﬀer was priced at MK 1500); this would eliminate the subset
of weekly workers who had less than MK700 in weekly income from being able to purchase the
investment good. A downward bias could occur because lump sum payment group members
may have already committed their pay to other expenditures. This would limit their ability
to purchase the investment good, thus understating any measured eﬀects.
In contrast, in round 2 the investment opportunity was announced before the start of the
round, so all respondents across both groups knew they would have the opportunity prior
to learning which payment group they were in. Workers therefore had advance notice of
the prospect of this opportunity before any wage payments began, and before they could
potentially commit any of their wages to other expenditures in a way that depended on their
study arm assignment. Because of these diﬀerences in setup across rounds, we show results
both from regressions on pooled data from both rounds and then speciﬁcally for round 2.
Table 2.7 columns 1 and 2 repeat outcome variables from Table 2.5 columns 1 and 2 (cf.
Panel C) to be able to track diﬀerences due to changing sets of observations across Panels
I through III (pooled, round 2 only, round 1 only, respectively). Columns 3 and 4 of Table
2.7 show eﬀects on take-up of the investment opportunity. In Panel I, pooling observations
across the two rounds, lump sum payment group members had a 4.8 percentage points higher
probability of buying any share (signiﬁcant at the 10% level) and the total amount spend
on the investment opportunity was about MK 122 higher (signiﬁcant at the 5% level). The
comparison to Panels II and III show that this eﬀect is concentrated in round 2 where the
eﬀect of lump sum payments on probability of taking up 9.5 percentage points, relative to a
base of only 6.3% among the weekly payment group.11 Total spending  number of shares
11Takeup actually remains the same across rounds for the monthly group and declines from round 1 to
round 2 for the weekly group. However, we cannot draw any strong conclusions from this pattern because of
general seasonal variations in behavior - for example, spending levels are generally higher in round 1 before
the start of the lean season in round 2.
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Table 2.7: Eﬀects of treatment assignment on post-interview risk-free, high-return invest-
ment oﬀer
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: 
Total spending
since last Fri, 
inclusive [MK]
Remaining cash 
out of received 
since last Fri, 
inclusive [MK]
Bought any shares 
[0/1]
Total spent on 
shares [MK]
Panel I - Round 1 and 2 pooled
Lump sum payment 1,451*** 139.2* 0.0484* 121.7**
(159.1) (71.40) (0.0247) (58.81)
Mean dep var weekly payment 1836 468.5 0.106 223.5
Number of observations 689 689 699 699
Panel II - Round 2 only
Lump sum payment 1,658*** 274.0*** 0.0949*** 196.2**
(190.6) (96.82) (0.0327) (84.80)
Mean dep var weekly payment 1634 393.1 0.0632 172.4
Number of observations 346 346 351 351
Panel III - Round 1 only
Lump sum payment 1,252*** -4.320 0.00396 52.51
(245.2) (109.6) (0.0381) (79.20)
Mean dep var weekly payment 2036 543.0 0.149 274.3
Number of observations 343 343 348 348
Notes: Stars indicate significance at 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***) levels. Regressions in Panel A are run on pooled data from 
round 1 and round 2 (standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses); Panels B & C are run separately on 
round 1 and round 2, respectively (robust standard errors in parentheses) . USD 1 is ca. MK 400 for study period. All 
regressions include stratification cell fixed effects and an index of baseline asset ownership based on first principal 
components, difference in days between date of interview and the preceding weekend, baseline total spending and -if 
available- the baseline value of the outcome variable. For complete variable definitions, see Appendix B, and Table 2 for 
summary statistics.
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times the price per share  was about MK 196 higher in the lump sum group, relative to a
base of MK 172 in the weekly payment group. Both diﬀerences are statistically signiﬁcant,
at the 1 percent and 5 percent levels, respectively.
The results from Table 2.7 suggests that paying workers in a lump sum enabled them
to hold enough cash to make use of a high-return lumpy investment opportunity, while the
weekly group did not have suﬃcient extra cash holdings at the time opportunity was oﬀered
 despite experience with the product (from round 1) and suﬃcient advance notice.
In theory, the higher investment by the lump sum payment group could be driven by
credit constraints alone, as opposed to savings constraints. Consider the case in which work-
ers assigned to the lump sum payment group really wanted to smooth their consumption in
the way the weekly payment group was able to, but could not due to a borrowing constraint.
In that case, lump sum workers would involuntarily" end up with more cash at the time the
investment opportunity was oﬀered and so they make use of it. While borrowing constraints
are likely binding for many in the economic environment of this study, several arguments
make this model an unlikely driver of our result: 72% of workers at baseline report preferring
to be paid in a lump sum after four weeks as opposed to receiving four weekly installments
(with the same twice-weekly attendance requirements in the hypothetical scenario that re-
spondents were asked about as were imposed in this experiment). Of those 72%, a great
majority (83%) state, in an open ended question with at most one answer, that the reason for
this preference is that it enables them to a make better plan" for the money. 13% outright
list avoiding wasteful spending as the reason. These answers imply either a commitment
problem as the reason for the lump sum preference, or at the least an expected inability
to save  either due to internal constraints, such as self-control problems, or external con-
straints, such as fear of theft. Lastly, if lump sum payment group members truly preferred
to smooth consumption in the way the weekly group was able to then they should not prefer
to invest in the shares oﬀered in this project as it locks up half (if they bought one share) or
all (if they bought two shares) of total received wage payments for two weeks without any
opportunity to access it. While in theory workers could have potentially borrowed against
the future income receipt to access the money in the investment, this would also have held for
the receipt of their wages, implying borrowing constraints could not be driving the results.
If lump sum condition households were limited in their ability to smooth consumption in
the face of shocks then we would also expect that lump sum condition households would  rel-
ative to the weekly payment condition  receive more transfers from their social network over
the course of the four payday weekends or request more loans  two of the most common risk
coping mechanisms for workers of this study. However, we do not ﬁnd statistically-signiﬁcant
eﬀects on either of these outcomes; the point estimates are small, but the standard errors
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are large and so even sizeable eﬀects along these dimensions cannot be ruled out (results not
shown).
2.5 Discussion and Conclusion
Markets for ﬁnancial intermediations in developing countries are imperfect. Besides the
external" constraints this creates for households, these market imperfections may exacer-
bate internal" constraints such as time-inconsistent preferences and limited attention. In
such a setting the exact timing of income streams can matter for spending and savings de-
cisions. Spending may be higher, or skewed towards unplanned or wasteful expenditures in
environments that are tempting, and spending may be diﬀerent depending on the frequency
of payments. If the timing of income receipt matters, this may have implications for the pay-
ment policies of employers and cash transfer programs, who may be interested in structuring
payments to maximize beneﬁts to income recipients.
In the speciﬁc context of this study, and in developing countries in general, there are
two concerns about how wage payments are structured across time. First, when income is
received in tempting environments, recipients may end up spending more, or may spend
more on diﬀerent items than they had planned ex ante, or than deemed prudent ex post.
Second, when income is received in small installments, people may ﬁnd it harder to generate
meaningful sums that can be used for large-installment expenditures such as durable goods
purchases, buying in bulk to receive quantity discounts, or high-return investments. In order
to determine if these concerns are empirically relevant we designed a ﬁeld experiment that
varied the degree of temptation people faced when receiving payments, as well as whether
payments were received in small installments or as a lump sum.
Based on ample qualitative evidence suggesting that spending  in particular frivolous
spending  might be higher if income is received on market days, our experiment used the
day of the week that workers were paid to vary the level of temptation workers faced when
receiving income. Half of our sample received their income during the major local market
day, which happened on Saturdays; the other half received their income at the same site on
Fridays. However, we do not ﬁnd evidence, for the sample of casual workers in Malawi that
were part of our study, that the speciﬁc day of the receipt of income is an important driver
of expenditures. Observed spending and savings behavior had no statistically-signiﬁcant
diﬀerences between those paid on Fridays and those paid on Saturdays, and we can rule out
moderate-sized eﬀects. This pattern does not depend on whether people are paid in a single
lump sum or in small installments.
These ﬁndings do not reject the general idea that the environment in which people are
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paid matters. We worked in seven villages around one particular trading center in Malawi.
In this setting, other trading centers with complementary market days  e.g. ones that take
place on Fridays, when the payday trading center's market was not occurring  are within 30
minutes' travel. In other settings in which there are no complementary nearby market days,
the day of payment may matter more. However, the setting of our study is fairly typical for
many rural areas in Malawi and other countries in the region, where there are very often
trading centers with a market day covering most days of the week, located within distances
that can be traveled in reasonable times. Thus, the ﬁndings of our study should imply that
the speciﬁc day of income receipt is not a major driver of spending decisions in a broad range
of settings in rural Africa.
We also investigate the impact of paying workers in one lump sum compared to weekly
payments. Our ﬁndings suggest that organizations can help income recipients overcome
savings constraints by providing income in larger installments rather than smaller ones.
Workers in the lump sum payment group spend relatively less of it immediately on receipt.
Since they also receive more money on the last payday weekend  the full amount of wages
compared to the weekly group that is receiving only the fourth of four equal installments
 lump sum payment group members remain with more cash in the week after the last
payday. In general, receiving income in a lump sum does not appear to aﬀect the composition
of expenditure, only the level. This mitigates concerns that lump sums burn a hole in
workers' pockets". Moreover, we ﬁnd evidence that lump-sum income receipt promotes
saving: people in the lump sum payment group show higher propensity to save in a high
interest, relatively short-term asset that was oﬀered to all respondents and required a large
minimum investment. We argue that the diﬀerential investment is largely a function of the
weekly payment group workers' inability to have cash available at the time of the investment
oﬀer (the timing of which was known to all workers before any payments were made).
The ﬁndings suggest that it is preferable for recipients that organizations pay at least
part of wages or cash transfers in lump sums as a form of pre-committed savings. There is
a trade-oﬀ between a desire to smooth consumption and the ability to generate lump sums;
and so in an environment with borrowing constraints and generally high costs of risk coping,
receiving all household income infrequently is unlikely to be desirable for households. In the
context of this study, however, almost all households had some other means  besides the
income from this project  of securing basic levels of consumption. Furthermore, a majority
of households reports that they prefer to receive this additional income as a lump sum.
This supports the idea that projects designed to generate income for people in developing
countries, such as GiveDirectly, should provide income in strategically-timed lump sums (or
at least oﬀer this option) in order to maximize beneﬁts to recipients.
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The investment opportunity was artiﬁcially provided to study participants as part of
this project in order to improve measurement of investment behavior in a small sample
observed over a small time horizon and in a context where absolute income diﬀerentials across
treatment groups were small. In addition, overall take-up of the investment opportunity was
low. As such, the observed eﬀects mainly support the overall conceptual point. However, the
implied magnitudes are also interesting: we provided both the weekly and the lump group
households with identical total additional income of MK 4000 (MK 3200 wages + 8 x MK
100 show up fees) over the course of the second round of this project. The point estimates
imply that on average each member of the lump sum group was able to increase household
income by an additional MK 6512  about 1.6% of income from the project's employment 
within two weeks of the last payday via the investment opportunity, solely because of the
changed timing of payments.
Practically speaking, the eﬀect of changing the payments from small installments to
lump sums will depend on the return to the relevant investment. We can get a sense of
this by considering an example of an investment that is very similar to the one we oﬀered:
secondary school fees, which are approximately MK3000 ($7.50) per year in Malawi, and
which generally must be paid in total at the beginning of the school year, rather than in
installments. If people do think about education as an investment, we would expect that
a project that pays respondents' total wages of MK3000 in a single lump sum timed for
the beginning of the school year, rather than in small installments, to increase school fees
payments by as much as 9 percentage points. This could have signiﬁcant social beneﬁts: if
school fees are the only barrier to attending secondary school (and they are commonly cited
as a reason teenagers do not go to school in Malawi) then that shift would have similar eﬀects
on the rate of school attendance. To get a sense of the total social beneﬁt of this change in
timing, note that Malawi has a GNI per capita of $320, and that research on the returns to
education generally estimates ﬁgures of at least 10% per year in developing countries. Thus
the additional 9% of children who are able to attend school would earn an additional $32
per year. Over a 40-year working life, starting 4 years after the investment, and at a social
discount rate of 10%, this would raise a child's income by $213, for a net beneﬁt of $206 per
person. This is a substantial payoﬀ for a relatively minor change.
School fees also highlight the external validity of our results for the investment good: they
are time-sensitive, as are many other investment opportunities in the developing world, such
as farm input purchases, which must be timed for the planting season.13 This exacerbates
1233% of 196.2, from Table 7, column 4.
13While some farm inputs can be bought and stored, others cannot for various reasons. For example,
Malawi's government subsidizes fertilizer purchases immediately before the planting season, so farmers must
have the cash to purchase the subsidized fertilizer within a fairly tight window.
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the savings constraints that people face: it is easier to save up for an investment if you
can make the purchase whenever you have the money, as opposed to needing to bring the
money on a speciﬁc day. There are other important investments that do not have this same
time-sensitive feature: for example, metal rooﬁng has a large minimum installment size,
but can be purchased whenever people have the money for it. Due to the design of the
investment option used in this study, we cannot be sure that our results hold for alternative,
less time-sensitive goods.
These beneﬁts would come at relatively little cost, and organizing payroll just once a
month, could even be cheaper for the paying organization. We also see no signiﬁcant down-
sides to partial lump sums payments, even when they are received during one of the most
tempting environments that people typically experience in rural Africa. However, further
research is needed in order to better-establish whether lump-sum payments can potentially
backﬁre in developing countries.
Our results provide several lessons for future research on lump sum payments as well as
on the role of self-control problems in driving savings constraints. First, people are aware
of the self-control problems they face, and thus survey questions that directly ask people
about temptation and wasteful spending are a useful way to measure people's self-control
issues. Second, oﬀering study participants a meaningful investment opportunity that bears
actual interest can be a helpful way to isolate an intervention's eﬀects on savings constraints.
Other outcomes have two kinds of limitations: non-ﬁnancial investments such as health and
education may not be perceived as investments by respondents, and heterogeneity in returns
may generate misleading inferences about the extent of savings constraints. Third, to the
extent that self-control problems are generating internal savings constraints in rural Africa,
they may not be particularly amenable to policy interventions. Receiving one's pay during
the market  a location commonly listed as being tempting by the respondents in our study
 generated only small variations in their level of self-reported wasteful spending, possibly
because people continue to select into other tempting situations. This suggests that other
causes of savings constraints may merit further research.
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CHAPTER III
Facilitating Savings for Agriculture:
Field Experimental Evidence from Malawi
From a work with Xavier Giné, Jessica Goldberg, and Dean Yang.
3.1 Introduction
Agriculture in Sub-Saharan Africa employs two-thirds of the labor force and generates
about one-third of GDP growth. According to the 2008 World Development Report, GDP
growth originating in agriculture is about four times more eﬀective in reducing poverty than
GDP growth originating outside agriculture. For this reason, policies that foster agricultural
productivity can have a substantial impact on food security and poverty reduction.
In recent decades, there has been substantial interest among policy-makers, donors, and
international development institutions in microﬁnance (ﬁnancial services for the poor) as an
anti-poverty intervention. Provision of microcredit has perhaps attracted the most attention.
In 2009, the Microcredit Summit estimated that there were more than 3,500 microﬁnance
institutions around the world with 150 million clients (Daley-Harris, 2009). While these
outreach numbers are impressive, microcredit today is largely devoted to non-agricultural
activities (Morduch, 1999; Armendáriz and Morduch, 2005) due to the substantial challenges
inherent in agricultural lending.1 Given the limited supply of credit for agriculture, many
donors and academics (for example, Deaton, 1990; Robinson, 2001, and more recently the
Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation) have emphasized the potential for increasing access to
formal savings.2
1Giné, Goldberg and Yang (2012) ﬁnd that imperfect personal identiﬁcation leads to asymmetric infor-
mation problems (both adverse selection and moral hazard) in the rural Malawian credit market.
2Aportela (1999) ﬁnds that a post-oﬃce savings expansion in Mexico raised savings by 3-5 percentage
points. Burgess and Pande (2005) ﬁnd that a policy-driven expansion of rural banking reduced poverty
in India, and provide suggestive evidence that deposit mobilization and credit access were intermediating
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The motivating question of this study is whether facilitating formal savings can promote
agricultural development. To this end, we collaborated with a bank and private sector
ﬁrms to implement a randomized controlled trial of a program facilitating formal savings
for Malawian cash crop (tobacco) farmers. To our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst randomized
study of the agricultural impacts of an intervention facilitating savings in a formal banking
institution.
In advance of the May-July 2009 harvest season, farmers were randomized into a con-
trol group or one of several treatment groups. Formal savings were facilitated for farmers
in the treatment group by oﬀering them the opportunity to have their cash-crop proceeds
from the upcoming harvest channeled into bank accounts that would be opened for them, in
their own names. Two main varieties of this treatment were implemented: 1) an ordinary
savings treatment, where the bank accounts oﬀered had no special features, and 2) a com-
mitment savings treatment, in which farmers had the option of saving in special accounts
that disallowed withdrawals until a set date (chosen by the account owner).3
Treated farmers were encouraged to use these accounts to save for future agricultural
input purchases. Farmers in the control group, on the other hand, received no such facil-
itation of formal savings accounts, and were simply paid their crop sale proceeds in cash
(which was the status quo).4 We examine treatment impacts on savings at the partner bank
(observed in administrative data) as well as on agricultural and other household outcomes
(via a household survey).
The ﬁrst key ﬁnding is that there are positive and statistically signiﬁcant treatment ef-
fects on a range of outcomes. Facilitating formal savings leads to higher deposits into formal
savings accounts at the partner bank, higher savings at the partner bank immediately prior
to the next planting season (November-December 2009), higher agricultural input expendi-
tures in that season, higher output in the subsequent harvest (May-July 2010), and higher
per capita consumption in the household after that harvest. Impacts on agricultural input
expenditures and on output are substantial, amounting to increases over the control group
mean of 13.3% and 21.4% respectively.
The second key ﬁnding is somewhat unexpected, and has to do with the mechanism
channels. Bruhn and McKenzie (2009) ﬁnd that bank branch openings by consumer durable stores in Mexico
leads to increases in the number of informal business owners, in total employment, and in average income.
3In addition, these treatments were cross-randomized with another treatment intended to create variation
in the public observability of savings balances (details are explained in Section 3.2). In total, there were
six diﬀerent randomly-assigned treatment types. Diﬀerences in impacts across treatments are typically not
statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from one another, so we place little emphasis on diﬀerentiating impacts
across treatment types in this paper.
4Control group farmers also received a generic encouragement to save for future agricultural input pur-
chases, so as to distinguish this eﬀect from the eﬀect of formal savings facilitation.
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through which treatment translates into agricultural outcomes. Ex ante, the leading candi-
date mechanism was the alleviation of savings constraints. In the status quo, farmers have
imperfect means of preserving funds between harvest and the subsequent planting season.
Depletion of funds not held in bank accounts over this period could be due to self-control
problems, demands for sharing with one's social network, and losses due to other factors
(e.g., theft, ﬁre). Improving access to formal savings would therefore give farmers a better
means of preserving funds between harvest and the subsequent planting, leading to increases
in agricultural input expenditures (and then to improvements on other subsequent related
outcomes).
Our results indicate, however, that only a minority of the treatment eﬀect on agricultural
input expenditures is likely to be attributable to alleviating formal savings constraints. While
amounts initially deposited into the accounts would have been suﬃcient to pay for the
increase in agricultural input expenditures that we observe, administrative data from the
bank reveals that the majority of these funds were withdrawn almost immediately after
being deposited. Three months later, just prior to the end-of-2009 planting season treated
farmers still had 1,863 Malawi kwacha (US$12.85) higher savings than did control-group
farmers, but the treatment eﬀect on agricultural input expenditures is higher by a factor of
four: MK 8,023 (US$55.33). Therefore, only about a quarter of the eﬀect of the treatment
on agricultural input expenditures can be attributed to alleviation of savings constraints per
se.5
We discuss a variety of mechanisms for which we are able to provide incomplete evidence
as well other mechanisms that can be ruled out. In the end, with the design implemented and
data available we are not able to identify the precise mechanisms through which our treatment
eﬀects operated. For example, the funds held in accounts may have served as a buﬀer stock,
allowing farmers to self-insure and take on more risk (by investing more in agricultural
inputs.) Alternately, the existence of the accounts could have helped study participants
resist demands to share resources with their social network. Behavioral phenomena such
as mental accounting or reference-dependence also provide possible explanations. We must
leave exploration of these and other possible mechanisms to future work.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the
experimental design and data sources. Section 3.3 describes our empirical speciﬁcation.
Section 3.4 presents the treatment eﬀect estimates. Section 3.5 then considers evidence
on the mechanisms through which the treatment eﬀects may have operated. Section 3.6
concludes.
5Dupas and Robinson (2013a) conduct a randomized experiment of a savings intervention in a sample of
Kenyan microentrepreneurs, and interpret impacts as due to this mechanism.
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3.2 Experimental design and survey data
The experiment was a collaborative eﬀort between Opportunity Bank of Malawi (OBM),6
Alliance One, Limbe Leaf, the University of Michigan and the World Bank. Opportunity
International is a private microﬁnance institution operating in 24 countries that oﬀers sav-
ings and credit products; in Malawi, it has a full banking license that allows it to collect
deposits and on-lend funds. Alliance One and Limbe Leaf are two large private agri-business
companies that oﬀer extension services and high-quality inputs to smallholder farmers via
an out-grower tobacco scheme.7 These two companies work with smallholder out-growers by
organizing them geographically into clubs of 10-20 members who obtain tobacco production
loans under group liability from OBM.8 Tobacco clubs meet regularly and sell their crop
output collectively to the tobacco auction ﬂoor. In the central Malawi region we study,
tobacco farmers have similar poverty and income levels to those of non-tobacco-producing
households.9
While all farmers in the study were loan customers of OBM at the start of the project,
the loans provided a ﬁxed input package that for the majority of farmers fell short of optimal
levels of fertilizer use on their tobacco plots.10 This is important because it suggests that
there is room for savings to increase input utilization. In addition, while a minority of
farmers was using optimal levels of fertilizer for the amount of land they were cultivating
at baseline, even those farmers could use savings generated by the intervention to obtain
additional inputs and expand land under tobacco cultivation, or shift land from other crops
6At the time of th e study, our bank partner went by the company name Opportunity International Bank
of Malawi (OBM), but has since changed its name to Opportunity Bank of Malawi (OBM).
7Tobacco is central to the Malawian economy, as it is the country's main cash crop. About 70% of the
country's foreign exchange earnings come from tobacco sales, and a large share of the labor force works in
tobacco and related industries.
8The cost of an input loan includes an interest rate of 28% percent per year and a one-time 2.5% processing
fee.
9Based on authors' calculations from the 2004 Malawi Integrated Household Survey (IHS), individuals in
tobacco farming rural households in central Malawi live on PPP$1.46/day on average, while the corresponding
average for non-tobacco farmers is PPP$1.51/day. That said, the two groups are diﬀerent in other ways.
Tobacco farmers have somewhat larger households (6.68 persons compared to 4.94 persons for households not
farming tobacco), higher levels of education of the household head (5.61 years compared to 4.63 years) and
a higher share of school age kids (6-17 years) currently in school conditional on having school age children
(88.1% compared to 77.9%).
10The input package was designed for a smaller cultivated area. As a result, 60.4% of farmers were
applying less than the recommended amount of nitrogen on their tobacco plots at baseline. The ﬁgures
for the two other key nutrients for tobacco are even more striking: 83.2% and 84.7% of farmers used less
than the recommended amount of phosphorus and potassium, respectively. For each of the three nutrients,
among farmers using less than recommended levels, the mean ratio of actual use to optimal use was about
0.7. Optimal use levels were determined by Alliance One and Limbe Leaf in collaboration with Malawi's
Agricultural Research and Extension Trust (ARET), and are similar to nutrient level recommendations in
the United States (Pearce and Denton, 2011).
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towards tobacco. Finally, the savings intervention could also aﬀect use of fertilizer and other
inputs on maize (the main staple crop in Malawi) and other crops.11
The experiment was designed to test the impact of facilitating savings in formal bank
accounts. In addition, we sought to test whether oﬀering accounts with commitment
features would have a greater impact than oﬀering ordinary bank accounts without such
features.12 Farmer clubs were randomly assigned to either a control group oﬀered no savings
facilitation, an ordinary savings treatment group that was oﬀered assistance setting up
direct deposit into individual, liquid savings accounts, and a commitment savings treatment
group that was oﬀered assistance setting up direct deposit into individual ordinary savings
accounts and additional accounts with commitment features.
The design of the experiment also aimed to explore the role of savings accounts in helping
farmers resist pressure to share resources with others in their social network. Farmer clubs
in the ordinary and commitment savings treatment groups were further cross-randomized
into sub-groups that were or were not entered into a rae wherein they could win prizes
based on their account balances (described further below).
In sum, the two cross-cutting interventions result in seven treatment conditions: a pure
control condition without savings account oﬀers or raes; ordinary savings accounts with no
raes, with private distribution of rae tickets, and with public distribution of rae tickets;
and commitment savings accounts with no raes, with private distribution of rae tickets,
and with public distribution of rae tickets (see Table 3.2).
Figure 3.1 presents the timing of the experiment with reference to the Malawian agri-
cultural season. The baseline survey and interventions were administered in April and May
2009, immediately before the 2009 harvest. As a result, farmers in the commitment treat-
ment group made allocation decisions into the commitment and ordinary accounts in the
cold state prior to receiving the net proceeds from tobacco sales.13 Planting starts between
11At baseline, 89.5% and 99.9% of farmers were applying less than the recommended amount of nitrogen
and phosphorus, respectively, on their maize plots and 44.1% and 98.6% of farmers applied less than half the
recommended amounts for the two nutrients. Among farmers applying less than the recommended amount
of nitrogen (phosphorus) on maize, the ratio of actual use to optimal use was 0.48 (0.14). Potassium is not
recommended for maize cultivated in central Malawi. Nutrient recommendations are from Benson (1999).
12Research on savings accounts with features that self-aware individuals can use to limit their options
in anticipation of future self-control problems includes Ashraf, Karlan and Yin (2006), who investigate
demand for and impacts of a commitment savings device in the Philippines and ﬁnd that demand for
such commitment devices is concentrated among women exhibiting present-biased time preferences. Duﬂo,
Kremer and Robinson (2011) ﬁnd that oﬀering a small, time-limited discount on fertilizer immediately after
harvest has an eﬀect on fertilizer use that is comparable to that of much larger discounts oﬀered later, around
planting time. Giné, Goldberg and Yang (2012) ﬁnd that Malawian farmers with present-biased preferences
are more likely to revise a plan about how to use future income, a result that supports the potential of
commitment accounts to improve welfare for those with self-control problems.
13If decisions had been made the day that tobacco sales were transferred to OBM then the allocations into
the commitment accounts by present-biased individuals would have been lower.
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November and December depending on the arrival of the rains. We will therefore refer to
the time from harvest until end October as the pre-planting period.
Randomization of the savings and rae treatments was conducted at the club level in
order to minimize cross-treatment contamination.14 The sample consists of 299 clubs with
3,150 farmers surveyed at baseline (February-April 2009), for whom we can track savings
deposits, withdrawals, and balances in our partner bank's administrative data. In addition,
we have data from an endline survey administered in July-September 2010, after the 2010
harvest, for 2,835 farmers from 298 clubs. Attrition from the baseline to the endline survey
was 10.0% and is not statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent across diﬀerent treatment groups (as
shown in Online Appendix Table 1). The endline survey will be used to examine impacts on
outcomes such as farm inputs, production, and household per capita expenditures.
3.2.1 Financial education
Members of all clubs attended a ﬁnancial education session immediately after the baseline
survey was administered. The session reviewed basic elements of budgeting and explained
the beneﬁts of formal savings accounts, with an emphasis on how such accounts could be
used to set aside funds for future consumption and investment. The full script of the ﬁnancial
education session can be found in Appendix A.
The same ﬁnancial education session was deliberately provided to all clubs - includ-
ing those subsequently assigned to the control group - so that treatment eﬀects could be
attributed solely to the provision of the ﬁnancial products, abstracting from the eﬀects of
ﬁnancial education that are implicitly provided during the product oﬀer (for example, strate-
gies for improved budgeting). For this reason, we can estimate neither the impact of the
ordinary and commitment treatments without such ﬁnancial education, nor the impact of
the ﬁnancial education alone.
3.2.2 Savings treatments
Implementation of the savings treatments took advantage of the existing system of de-
positing crop sale proceeds into OBM bank accounts. At harvest, farmers sold their tobacco
to the company at the price prevailing on the nearest tobacco auction ﬂoor.15 For farm-
ers in the control group, the proceeds from the sale were then electronically transferred to
14Prior to randomization, treatment clubs were stratiﬁed by location, tobacco type (burley, ﬂue-cured or
dark-ﬁre) and week of scheduled interview. The stratiﬁcation of treatment assignment resulted in 19 distinct
location/tobacco-type/week stratiﬁcation cells.
15The tobacco growing regions are divided among the two tobacco buyer companies. In their coverage
area each buyer company organizes farmers into clubs and provides them with basic extension services.
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Figure 3.1: Project Timing
82
OBM, which deducted the loan repayment (plus fees and surcharges) of all borrowers in the
club, and then credited the remaining balance to a club account at OBM. Club members
authorized to access the club account (usually the chairman or the treasurer) came to OBM
branches and withdrew the funds in cash.
Farmers in the ordinary savings treatment were oﬀered account opening assistance and
the opportunity to have their harvest proceeds (net of loan repayment) directly deposited into
individual accounts in their own individual names (see Figure 3.2 for a schematic illustration
of the money ﬂows). These ordinary savings accounts are regular OBM savings accounts with
an annual interest rate of 2.5%. After their crop was sold, farmers traveled to the closest
OBM branch to conﬁrm that funds were available at the club level, i.e. that club proceeds
exceeded the club's loan obligation. Authorized members of the clubs (often accompanied
by other club members) then ﬁlled out a sheet specifying the division of the balance of the
club account between farmers. Funds were transferred into the individual accounts of club
members who had opted to open them. Other club members received their share of the
money in cash.
Farmers in clubs assigned to the ordinary savings treatment were oﬀered only one (or-
dinary) savings account. Farmers assigned to the commitment treatment had the option of
opening an additional account with commitment features. The commitment savings account
had the same interest rate as the ordinary account, but allowed farmers to specify an amount
to be transferred to this illiquid account, and a release date when the bank would allow
access to the funds.16 During the account opening process, farmers stated how much they
wanted deposited in the ordinary and commitment savings accounts after the sale of their
tobacco crops. For example, if a farmer stated that that he wanted MK 40,000 in an ordinary
account and MK 25,000 in a commitment savings account, funds would ﬁrst be deposited
into the ordinary account until MK 40,000 had been deposited, then into the commitment
savings account for up to MK 25,000, with any remainder being deposited back into the
ordinary account. The choice of a trigger amount that had to ﬂow into the ordinary ac-
count before any money would be deposited into the commitment account turns out to be
important, because many farmers chose triggers higher than their eventual crop sale revenue,
and therefore ended up without deposits into their commitment accounts. Opening only a
commitment account was not an option, though farmers who wanted to deposit all of their
proceeds into the commitment account and none into their ordinary account were free to
do so. No fees were charged for the initial post-crop-sale deposits into the ordinary or com-
16By design, funds in the commitment account could not be accessed before the release date. In a small
number of cases OBM staﬀ allowed early withdrawals of funds when clients presented evidence of emergency
needs, e.g. health or funeral expenditures.
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Figure 3.2: Tobacco Sales and Bank Transactions
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mitment accounts. Further details on account features and fees can be found in Appendix
A.
Farmers who were not oﬀered a particular account type due to their treatment status
(e.g., control group farmers who were not oﬀered either type of account, or ordinary treat-
ment group farmers who were not oﬀered the commitment account) but learned about and
requested them were not denied those accounts, but they were not given information about
or assistance in opening them.17 In other words, the savings treatments were implemented
as an encouragement design.
3.2.3 Rae Treatments
To study the impact of public information on savings and investment behavior, we imple-
mented a cross-cutting randomization of a savings-linked rae. Participants in each of the
two savings treatments were randomly assigned to one of three rae conditions (members
of the control group were not eligible for rae tickets, because the tickets were based on
savings account balances).
We distributed tickets for a rae to win a bicycle or a bag of fertilizer (one of each per
participating branch), where the number of tickets each participant received was determined
by his or her savings balance as of pre-announced dates that fell before large expenditures
(like fertilizer purchases) were likely to deplete savings balances. Every MK 1,000 in an OBM
account (in total across ordinary and commitment savings accounts) entitled a participant
to one rae ticket. Ticket allocations would be on the basis of average balances from July
1 to August 1 (ﬁrst distribution) and from September 1 to October 1 (second distribution).
By varying the way in which tickets were distributed, we sought to exogenously vary the
information that club members had about each other's savings balances.
Because the rae itself could provide an incentive to save or could serve as a reminder to
save (Karlan, McConnell, Mullainathan, Zinman, 2012; Kast, Meier and Pomeranz, 2012),
one third of clubs assigned to either ordinary or commitment savings accounts was randomly
determined to be ineligible to receive rae tickets (and was not told about the rae).
Another one third of clubs with savings accounts was randomly selected to have rae tickets
distributed privately. Study participants were called to a meeting for rae ticket distribution
but were handed their tickets out of view of other study participants. The ﬁnal third of clubs
17During the baseline interaction with study participants, no farmers in the control group expressed to our
survey staﬀ a desire for either ordinary or commitment accounts, and none in the ordinary treatment group
requested commitment accounts. According to OBM administrative records, seven individuals in the control
group (1.7%) and 52 farmers in the ordinary treatment group (3.7%) had commitment accounts by the end
of October 2009 (these were opened without our assistance or encouragement). None of these farmers had
any transactions in the accounts.
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with savings accounts was randomly selected for public distribution of rae tickets. In these
clubs, each participant's name and the number of tickets received was announced verbally
to everyone that attended the rae meeting.
A feature of the simple formula for determining the number of tickets was that farmers
in clubs where tickets were distributed publicly could easily estimate other members' savings
balances. Private distribution of tickets, though, did not reveal information about individ-
uals' account balances. The rae scheme was explained to participants at the time of the
baseline survey with a participatory demonstration. Members were ﬁrst given hypothetical
balances, and then given rae tickets in a manner that corresponded to the distribution
mechanism for the treatment condition to which the club was assigned. In clubs assigned to
private distribution, members were called up one by one and given tickets in private (out of
sight of other club members). In clubs assigned to public distribution, members were called
up and their number of tickets was announced to the group. Since real tickets based on
actual account balances were distributed twice during the experiment, the ﬁrst distribution
also functioned as an additional demonstration. (As reported in Section 3.4 below, however,
substantial withdrawals from both the ordinary and commitment accounts occurred soon
after funds were deposited, and as a result, this public revelation treatment was likely to
have had little eﬀect.)
3.2.4 Sample
Table 3.1 presents summary statistics of baseline household and farmer club character-
istics. All variables expressed in money terms are in Malawi Kwacha (MK145/USD during
the study period). Baseline survey respondents own an average of 4.7 acres of land and are
mostly male (only six percent were female). Respondents are on average 45 years old. They
have an average of 5.5 years of formal education, and have low levels of ﬁnancial literacy.18
Sixty three percent of farmers at baseline had an account with a formal bank (mostly with
OBM).19 The average reported savings balance in bank accounts at the time of the baseline
was MK 2,083 (USD 14), with an additional MK 1,244 (USD 9) saved in the form of cash
at home.
18In particular, 42% of respondents were able to compute 10% of 10,000, 63% were able to divide MK
20,000 by ﬁve and only 27% could apply a yearly interest rate of 10% to an initial balance to compute the
total savings balance after a year.
19This number includes a number of payroll accounts opened in a previous season by OBM and one of
the tobacco buyer companies as a payment system for crop proceeds, and which do not actually allow for
savings accumulation. Our baseline survey unfortunately did not properly distinguish between these two
types of accounts.
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics
Mean
Standard
 Deviation
10th
Percentile
Median
90th
Percentile
Observations
Treatment conditions
Control group 0.135 0.341 3,150
Panel A
Savings 0.865 0.341 3,150
Panel B
Commitment Savings 0.417 0.493 3,150
Ordinary Savings 0.448 0.497 3,150
Panel C
Commitment, no raffle 0.136 0.342 3,150
Commitment, priv. raffle 0.142 0.349 3,150
Commitment, pub. raffle 0.139 0.346 3,150
Ordinary, no raffle 0.146 0.354 3,150
Ordinary, priv. raffle 0.149 0.356 3,150
Ordinary, pub. raffle 0.153 0.360 3,150
Baseline Characteristics
Number of members per club 13.88 6.44 9.00 11.00 23.00 299
Female 0.063 0.243 3,150
Married 0.955 0.208 3,150
Age [years] 45.02 13.61 28.00 44.00 64.00 3,150
Years of education 5.45 3.53 0.00 6.00 10.00 3,150
Household size 5.79 1.99 3.00 6.00 9.00 3,150
Asset index -0.02 1.86 -1.59 -0.67 2.46 3,150
Livestock index -0.03 1.15 -1.00 -0.36 1.37 3,150
Land under cultivation [acres] 4.67 2.14 2.50 4.03 7.50 3,150
Cash spent on inputs [MK] 25,169 41,228 0 10,000 64,500 3,150
Proceeds from crop sales [MK] 125,657 174,977 7,000 67,000 300,000 3,150
Has bank account 0.634 0.482 3,150
Savings in cash at home [MK] 1,244 3,895 0 0 3,000 3,150
Savings in bank accounts [MK] 2,083 8,265 0 0 3,000 2,949
Hyperbolic 0.102 0.303 3,117
Patient now, impatient later 0.304 0.460 3,117
Net transfers made in past 12m [MK] 1,753 7,645 -2,990 500 8,100 3,150
Missing value for formal savings and cash 0.064 0.244 3,150
Missing value for time preferences 0.010 0.102 3,150
Transactions with Partner Institution
Any transfer via direct deposit 0.154 0.361 3,150
Deposits into ordinary accounts, pre-planting [MK] 18,472 82,396 0 0 38,907 3,150
Deposits into commitment accounts, pre-planting [MK] 615 5,367 0 0 0 3,150
Deposits into other accounts, pre-planting [MK] 296 3,804 0 0 0 3,150
Total deposits into accounts, pre-planting [MK] 19,383 84,483 0 0 40,694 3,150
Total withdrawals from accounts, pre-planting [MK] 18,600 82,744 38,600 0 0 3,150
Net of all transactions, pre-planting [MK] 762 13,857 0 0 649 3,150
Net of all transactions, Nov-Dec [MK] -848 6,870 0 0 2 3,150
Net of all transactions, Jan-Apr [MK] -269 4,032 0 0 4 3,150
Endline Survey Outcomes
Land under cultivation [acres] 4.52 2.66 2.00 4.00 8.00 2,835
Cash spent on inputs [MK] 21,632 32,853 500 11,000 51,500 2,835
Total value of inputs [MK] 68,046 84,014 1,500 43,750 157,272 2,835
Proceeds from crop sales [MK] 109,604 162,580 0 56,000 270,000 2,835
Value of crop output (sold & not sold) [MK] 177,747 201,131 27,480 115,582 387,203 2,835
Farm profit (output-intput) [MK] 110,703 156,747 0 70,372 264,953 2,835
Total expenditure in last 30 days [MK] 11,905 13,219 2,250 7,500 26,000 2,835
Household size 5.80 2.15 3.00 6.00 9.00 2,835
Total transfers made [MK] 3,152 5,099 0 1,300 8,000 2,835
Total transfers received [MK] 2,204 4,377 0 500 6,050 2,835
Total net transfers made [MK] 939 5,896 -3,000 350 5,750 2,835
Tobacco loan amount [MK] 40,787 77,962 0 0 130,000 2,835
Has fixed deposit account 0.067 0.250 2,835
Not interviewed in follow-up 0.100 0.300 3,150
Data based on two surveys conducted in February to April 2009 (baseline) and July to September 2010 (endline), and on administrative records of our partner 
institution. "MK" is Malawi kwacha (MK145 = US$1 during study period). Withdrawals presented as negative numbers. See Appendix B for variable 
definitions.
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Table 3.2: Assignment of clubs to treatment conditions
No savings intervention
Savings intervention: 
ordinary accounts offered
Savings intervention: 
ordinary and commitment 
accounts offered
No raffle Group 0: 42 clubs Group 1: 43 clubs Group 4: 42 clubs
Public distribution of raffle tickets N/A Group 2: 44 clubs Group 5: 43 clubs
Private distribution of raffle tickets N/A Group 3: 43 clubs Group 6: 42 clubs
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3.2.5 Balance of baseline characteristics across treatment conditions
To examine whether randomization across treatments achieved balance in pre-treatment
characteristics, Table 3.3 presents the diﬀerences in means of 17 baseline variables in the
same format as used for the subsequent analysis. Panel A checks for balance between the
control group and the treatment group, the latter pooled across all of the savings and rae
treatments. Panel B looks for diﬀerences between the control group, the ordinary savings
group, and the commitment savings group, with each of the savings treatments pooled across
their respective rae sub-treatments.
With a few exceptions, the sample is well balanced. We test balance for 17 baseline
variables. In Panel A, respondents assigned to the savings treatment are four percentage
points more likely to be female and two percentage points less likely to be married than
those assigned to the control group. At baseline, they report spending nearly MK 4,000
more in cash on agricultural inputs, a diﬀerence that is statistically signiﬁcant at the 90
percent conﬁdence level.
Panel B reveals that respondents in both the commitment and ordinary treatment groups
are more likely to be female and less likely to be married. The treatment-related imbalance
with respect to cash spent on inputs found in Panel A appears to be driven by imbalance in
the ordinary treatment group, which is diﬀerent from the control group at the 5% level (the
diﬀerence between the commitment treatment group and the control group for that variable
is not statistically signiﬁcant at conventional levels.) Those in the commitment treatment
group are also less likely to be patient now and impatient later, compared to the control
group (signiﬁcant at the 5% level).
To alleviate any concerns that baseline imbalance may be driving our results, we follow
Bruhn and McKenzie (2009) and include the full set of baseline characteristics in Table 3.3
as controls in the main regressions, in addition to the stratiﬁcation cell ﬁxed eﬀects.
3.3 Empirical speciﬁcation
We study the eﬀects of our experimental interventions on several sets of outcomes: de-
posits into and withdrawals from savings accounts, savings balances, agricultural outcomes
from the next year's growing season and household expenditure following that season, house-
holds' ﬁnancial interactions with others in their network, and future use of ﬁnancial prod-
ucts. These data come from the endline survey administered after the 2010 harvest, and
from administrative data on bank transactions and account balances collected throughout
the project.
We present two regression speciﬁcations reported as separate panels in the main results
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Table 3.3: Test of Balance in Baseline Characteristics (ordinary least-squares regressions)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17)
Dependent variable: Female Married
Age 
[years]
Years of 
edu-cation
House-
hold size
Asset 
index
Live-stock 
index
Land 
under 
culti-
vation 
[acres]
Pro-ceeds 
from crop 
sales [MK]
Cash 
spent on 
inputs 
[MK]
Has bank 
account
Savings in 
accounts 
and cash  
[MK]
Hyper-
bolic
Patient 
now, im-
patient 
later
Net 
transfers 
made in 
past 12m 
[MK]
Missing 
val.: 
formal 
savings 
and cash
Missing 
val.: time 
prefe-
rences
PANEL A
Any treatment 0.044*** -0.018** -1.42 0.14 -0.03 0.08 -0.07 -0.01 6,997 3,918* -0.021 371 0.012 -0.054 72 -0.002 0.001
(0.012) (0.009) (0.93) (0.20) (0.13) (0.11) (0.09) (0.14) (8,891) (2,027) (0.029) (550) (0.017) (0.034) (452) (0.013) (0.005)
P-values of F-tests for joint significance of baseline variables: 0.1481
PANEL B
Commitment treatment 0.045*** -0.019* -1.39 0.09 -0.04 0.07 -0.06 -0.05 5,604 3,337 -0.039 376 0.024 -0.076** -195 -0.004 0.003
(0.013) (0.010) (0.97) (0.22) (0.13) (0.12) (0.09) (0.15) (9,779) (2,357) (0.032) (612) (0.019) (0.036) (476) (0.014) (0.005)
Ordinary treatment 0.042*** -0.018* -1.45 0.19 -0.02 0.09 -0.07 0.02 8,294 4,459** -0.005 367 0.000 -0.034 320 0.000 0.000
(0.013) (0.010) (0.98) (0.22) (0.13) (0.12) (0.09) (0.15) (9,639) (2,209) (0.031) (588) (0.018) (0.037) (475) (0.015) (0.005)
P-val. of F-test: Coefficients on 
commitment and ordinary 
treatments are equal
0.790 0.912 0.924 0.557 0.857 0.825 0.936 0.549 0.731 0.592 0.219 0.985 0.083 0.110 0.094 0.730 0.661
P-values of F-tests for joint significance of baseline variables:
Commitment savings 0.6168
Ordinary savings 0.8851
Mean dep. var. in Control group 0.024 0.972 46.23 5.31 5.81 -0.11 0.03 4.67 117,495 21,798 0.658 3,235 0.095 0.352 1,655 0.066 0.009
Number of observations 3,150 3,150 3,150 3,150 3,150 3,150 3,150 3,150 3,150 3,150 3,150 2,949 3,117 3,117 3,150 3,150 3,150
Notes: Stars indicate significance at 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***) levels. Standard errors are clustered at the club level. USD 1 is ca. MK 145. All regressions include stratification-cell fixed effects. For variable definitions, see Appendix 
B. F-test of Panel B: "Commitment savings = Ordinary savings" tests the equality of means in commitment and ordinary treatment groups. F-tests of joint significance: test of joint significance in regression of respective treatment 
dummies on all 17 baseline variables.
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tables. The ﬁrst tests the eﬀect of being randomly assigned to any of the savings facilitation
treatments, relative to being assigned to the control group. In Panel A of the subsequent
tables, we run regressions of the form
Yij = δ + αSavingsj + β
′Xij + εij. (3.1)
Yij is the dependent variable of interest for farmer i in club j. Savingsj is an indica-
tor variable for club-level assignment to either of the two savings treatment groups. The
coeﬃcient α measures the eﬀect of being oﬀered direct deposit into an individual savings
account (either ordinary savings accounts only or ordinary plus commitment accounts). Xij
is a vector that includes stratiﬁcation cell dummies and the 17 household characteristics
measured in the baseline survey prior to treatment, and summarized in Table 3.3, and εij is
a mean-zero error term. Because the unit of randomization is the club, standard errors are
clustered at this level (Moulton, 1986).
In Panel B, we compare the impact of assignment to the ordinary savings treatment to
the impact of assignment to the commitment savings treatment. Regressions are of the form
Yij = δ + γ1Ordinaryj + γ1Commitmentj + β
′Xij + εij, (3.2)
where Yij and Xij are deﬁned as above. Ordinaryj is an indicator for club-level assign-
ment to the ordinary savings treatment, and Commitmentj is an indicator for assignment
to the commitment savings treatment. The coeﬃcient γ1represents the eﬀect of eligibility
for direct deposit into ordinary accounts only, relative to the control group. γ2 captures the
analogous eﬀect for eligibility for direct deposit into ordinary accounts and automatic trans-
fers into commitment savings accounts. The diﬀerence between those two coeﬃcients, then,
captures the marginal eﬀect of the commitment savings account relative to direct deposit
into the ordinary account. The p-value for the test of the null hypothesis that γ1 = γ2 is
reported at the bottom of each Panel B.
Both regression equations (3.1) and (3.2) measure treatment eﬀects that pool the rae
sub-treatments. Results with full detail on the rae sub-treatments (six treatments in all)
are presented in Online Appendix Tables 3-6.
Throughout the analysis, we focus on intent-to-treat (ITT) estimates because not every
club member oﬀered account opening assistance decided to open an account. We do not re-
port average treatment on the treated (TOT) estimates because it is plausible that members
without accounts are inﬂuenced by the training script itself or by members who do open
accounts in the same club, either of which would violate the stable unit treatment value
assumption (Angrist, Imbens and Rubin, 1996, SUTVA).
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3.4 Empirical results
We ﬁrst examine the eﬀects of our experimental interventions on formal savings: the ﬂow
of funds into and out of accounts, and savings account balances. In and of themselves, how-
ever, these are not measures of wellbeing. Therefore, we also analyze impacts on agricultural
input use, farm output, household expenditures, and other household behaviors.
3.4.1 Take-up and impacts on savings transactions
The ﬁrst question of interest is whether the experimental treatments changed use of
individual savings accounts. Table 3.4 presents estimates of equations (3.1) and (3.2) (in
Panels A and B, respectively) for outcomes from administrative data on account transactions.
Column 1 presents treatment eﬀects on take-up of the oﬀered ﬁnancial services: opening
of individual bank accounts coupled with direct deposit of tobacco crop proceeds.20 Panel A
indicates that take-up was 19.4% among respondents oﬀered any treatment (this dependent
variable is zero by design in the control group). Take-up is very similar across the commit-
ment and ordinary treatments (Panel B), and statistically indistinguishable across them (the
p-value of the diﬀerence in take-up across the two groups is 0.432.)
Owing to the study's aim to promote agricultural input investments in the Nov-Dec 2009
planting season, for the remaining dependent variables in Table 3.4, we examine transactions
over the months preceding that period, March through October 2009. In column 2, the
dependent variable is total deposits into all accounts at the partner bank (these are direct
deposits from the tobacco companies as well as other deposits made by account holders).
The mean of this variable in the control group is MK 3,281 (USD 21.72). Compared to
this amount, the impact of being assigned to any treatment group shown in Panel A is large
(MK 17,609, or USD 121.44) and statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at the 1% level.
Given that take-up was very similar across the two treatment groups, and that take-up by
design meant that all crop proceeds were deposited with the partner bank, it should not be
surprising that the treatment eﬀect is very similar across commitment and ordinary treatment
groups (Panel B). Each separate treatment eﬀect is statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from
zero at the 1% level, but the treatment eﬀects are not statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from
one another (p-value 0.642).
The next three columns provide more detail on the types of account into which deposits
were destined, examining treatment eﬀects on deposits into ordinary accounts, commitment
accounts, and other accounts that study participants might have held at the partner bank
20The time period over which this dependent variable is calculated is intentionally very broad (Mar 2009 to
Apr 2010), so as to capture any direct deposit from the tobacco purchase companies into the study respondent
accounts. In practice the vast majority of direct deposits took place in the May-July 2009 harvest season.
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Table 3.4: Impact of Treatments on Deposits and Withdrawals (ordinary least-squares re-
gressions)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable: 
Any transfer 
via direct 
deposit 
(take-up)
Total 
deposits 
into 
accounts 
[MK]
Deposits 
into 
ordinary 
accounts 
[MK]
Deposits 
into commit-
ment 
accounts 
[MK]
Deposits 
into other 
accounts 
[MK]
Total with-
drawals 
from 
accounts 
[MK]
Time period:
Mar 2009 - 
Apr 2010
Mar-Oct 
2009
Mar-Oct 
2009
Mar-Oct 
2009
Mar-Oct 
2009
Mar-Oct 
2009
PANEL A
Any treatment 0.194*** 17,609*** 16,807*** 668*** 134 -16,761***
(0.036) (3,910) (3,773) (224) (163) (3,819)
PANEL B
Commitment treatment 0.207*** 18,801*** 17,021*** 1,490*** 290 -17,511***
(0.039) (4,360) (4,137) (358) (202) (4,235)
Ordinary treatment 0.181*** 16,513*** 16,611*** -88 -9 -16,071***
(0.040) (4,840) (4,743) (181) (163) (4,745)
P-val. of F-test: Coefficients on 
commitment and ordinary 
treatments are equal
0.432 0.642 0.931 0.000 0.074 0.764
Mean dep. var. in Control group 0.000 3,281 3,107 0 174 -3,256
Number of observations 3,150 3,150 3,150 3,150 3,150 3,150
Notes: Stars indicate significance at 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***) levels. Standard errors are clustered at the club level. USD 1 is ca. 
MK 145. All regressions include stratification cell fixed effects and the following baseline variables: Dummy for male respondent; 
dummy for married; age in years; years of completed education; number of household members; asset index; livestock index; land 
under cultivation; proceeds from tobacco and maize sales during the 2008 season; cash spent on inputs for the 2009 season; dummy 
for ownership of any formal bank account; amount of savings in bank or cash (with missing values replaced with zeros); dummy for 
hyperbolic (missing values replaced with zeros); dummy for "patient now, impatient later" (missing values replaced with zeros); net 
transfers made to social network over 12 months; dummy for missing value in savings amount; dummy for missing value in 
hyperbolic and "patient now, impatient later". For complete variable definitions, see Appendix B. F-test of Panel B tests the equality of 
means in commitment and ordinary treatment groups. Planting season is Nov-Apr. Fertilizer application occurs in Nov-Dec. 
Fertilizer purchases occur in both pre-planting period (Oct and before) and start of planting season (Nov-Dec). Net deposits are 
deposits minus withdrawals.
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(which we did not assist in opening). The vast majority of deposits were into ordinary
savings accounts. Treatment eﬀects on that outcome (Panels A and B of column 3) are very
similar in magnitude and statistical signiﬁcance levels to those for total deposits in column
2.
In contrast, treatment eﬀects on deposits into commitment accounts were much smaller
(column 4). Panel A reveals that respondents assigned to any treatment group deposited
less than MK 700 into a commitment account (signiﬁcant at the 1% level), but that ﬁgure
pools across individuals oﬀered the commitment savings accounts and those oﬀered ordinary
accounts only. In Panel B, as we might expect, the impact of the ordinary treatment is
very close to zero (and not statistically signiﬁcant), while the impact of the commitment
treatment is MK 1,490 (USD 10.28) and statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level. Results
in column 4 reveal that the encouragement design had the intended eﬀect of increasing
use of illiquid savings instruments in the commitment treatment group. While impacts on
commitment savings balances are positive and statistically signiﬁcant, it is clear commitment
savings deposits are substantially lower than deposits into ordinary accounts, even among
those oﬀered the commitment treatment.
Column 5 indicates that there were no large or statistically signiﬁcant treatment eﬀects
on deposits into other partner bank accounts that were not oﬀered by the project.
Treatment eﬀects on withdrawals in the pre-planting period (column 6) are nearly as large
in magnitude as eﬀects on deposits. The any treatment coeﬃcient in Panel A as well as
the separate commitment and ordinary treatment coeﬃcients in Panel B are all statistically
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at the 1% level.
3.4.2 Time patterns of deposits and withdrawals
A key aim of this project was to promote savings for agricultural input investments,
by facilitating individual bank account opening and channeling substantial resources (re-
spondents' own crop proceeds) into those accounts. The results in Table 3.4 are therefore
sobering, in that both deposits into and withdrawals from OBM accounts in the 2009 pre-
planting period were substantial for both the commitment and ordinary treatments.
A question of interest is whether funds remained deposited in the accounts until the
following planting period (November-December 2009), when agricultural inputs are typically
applied. As it turns out, in many cases funds in ordinary accounts were withdrawn relatively
quickly after the initial deposit of crop proceeds was made. About 22 percent of the initial
deposits into ordinary accounts were followed by withdrawals on the same day of nearly equal
amounts.21 On average, only 26 percent of the original balance remained in an ordinary
21See Appendix B for details about the construction of deposit spells underlying these calculations.
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savings account two weeks after it was initially deposited.
Figure 3.3 presents average deposits into and withdrawals from ordinary and other (non-
commitment) accounts, by month, from March 2009 to April 2010.22 The sample in Figure
3.3.a is individuals in the commitment treatment, while the sample for Figure 3.3.b is in-
dividuals in the ordinary treatment. For comparison, the sample used in Figure 3.3.c is
individuals in the control group.
The ﬁgures indicate that peak deposits occurred in June, July, and August 2009, coin-
ciding with the peak tobacco sales months. Average deposits in every month for individuals
in both the commitment and ordinary treatments are quite similar in magnitude to average
withdrawals, indicating that the majority of deposited funds were withdrawn soon thereafter.
As a result, savings balances during the pre-planting period were much lower than deposited
amounts, explaining why most farmers did not participate in the rae.23
One likely reason funds in the ordinary accounts were withdrawn soon after they had
been deposited has to do with transaction costs. Farmers lived on average 20 kilometers
away from the bank branch and would typically travel there by foot, bus, or bicycle.24 In
addition to travel time, farmers report a median waiting time at the branch to withdraw
money of one hour.
In contrast to the time pattern of the ordinary accounts, funds into commitment accounts
do stay in accounts for longer periods of time. Figure 3.3.d displays average deposits into
and withdrawals from commitment accounts, by month, for individuals in the commitment
treatment. For deposits, the peak months are June, July, and August, coinciding with the
peak deposit months for the ordinary accounts. But withdrawals from the commitment ac-
counts are delayed substantially, occurring in October, November, and December, coinciding
with the key months when agricultural inputs must be purchased and applied on ﬁelds. Of
course, as revealed in Table 3.4, the amounts of money involved in these transactions are
much lower than those in ordinary accounts.
3.4.3 Impacts on savings balances
Notwithstanding the fact that substantial amounts were withdrawn from accounts very
soon after the direct deposits occurred, it is still possible that enough funds remained in total
across both types of accounts to be able to detect statistically signiﬁcant eﬀects on savings
balances. Due to our interest in facilitating savings for agricultural input utilization in the
22The data presented are the sum of the dependent variables in columns 4 and 6 of Table 3.4.
23The pattern is similar for individuals in the control group, but levels are much lower owing to the fact
that direct deposit from the tobacco auction ﬂoor into farmer accounts was not enabled for that group.
24The median round-trip bus fare is MK 400 and takes two hours each way.
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Figure 3.3: Deposits into and withdrawals from ordinary accounts
a. Commitment treatment group deposits into ordinary accounts 
 
b. Ordinary treatment group deposits into ordinary accounts 
 
c. Control group deposits into ordinary accounts 
 
d. Commitment treatment group deposits into commitment accounts 
 
Notes: Deposits and withdrawals are denominated in Malawi kwacha (MK). Figures a, b, and c include transactions in ordinary 
accounts opened as part of the intervention as well as other non-commitment accounts owned by study participants (sum of 
dependent variables in columns 3 and 5 of Table 4). Figure d shows deposits into and withdrawals from commitment accounts, 
for individuals in commitment treatment group. 
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November-December 2009 planting season, we now examine treatment eﬀects on savings
balances immediately prior to that period.
Table 3.5 reports coeﬃcient estimates from estimation of equations (3.1) and (3.2) for
savings balances in the diﬀerent types of OBM accounts, on October 22, 2009. In Panel A,
which presents the impact of any treatment, we ﬁnd that the treatment eﬀect is positive and
statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at the 1% level for total savings balances (column
1), ordinary savings balances (column 2), and commitment savings balances (column 3). In
addition, the coeﬃcient in the regression for savings balances in other accounts (column 4)
is also positive and statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at the 5% level.
In Panel B, which estimates separate eﬀects for the commitment and ordinary treatments,
we ﬁnd that the eﬀects of each treatment on total savings balances (column 1) are positive
and statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at the 1% level. That said, the eﬀect of the
commitment treatment is larger than that of the ordinary treatment, and this diﬀerence is
statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level. Eﬀects of the treatments are very similar on savings
in ordinary accounts and on savings in other accounts (columns 2 and 4); we cannot reject
equality of the ordinary and commitment treatment eﬀects for these outcomes at conventional
signiﬁcance levels. By contrast, the two treatments (unsurprisingly) diﬀer in their impact
on savings balances in commitment savings accounts: the commitment treatment eﬀect is
positive and statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at the 1% level, while the ordinary
treatment eﬀect is very close to zero and is not statistically signiﬁcant. Equality of these two
coeﬃcients is rejected at the 1% level. It is therefore clear that the diﬀerence in the impacts
of the commitment and ordinary treatments on total savings (shown in column 1) is being
driven by the diﬀering impacts on savings in commitment accounts (column 3).
These results reveal that both types of savings accounts have positive impact on savings
preservation between the May-July 2009 harvest and the November-December 2009 planting
season, with the commitment treatment providing an additional boost to savings on top
of the impact of the ordinary account. The magnitudes of these eﬀects are not negligible,
in absolute terms for rural Malawian households as well as in comparison to control group
savings of MK 364 (USD 2.36). The impact of any treatment on savings from Panel A is
MK 1,863 (USD 12.85). From Panel B, the impact of the commitment savings treatment is
MK 2,475 (USD 17.07) and the impact of the ordinary treatment is MK 1,301 (USD 8.97).
3.4.4 Impacts on agricultural outcomes and household expenditure
In Table 3.6, we turn to the impacts of the treatments on agricultural outcomes in the
2009-10 season (land cultivation, input use, crop output) and on household expenditures
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Table 3.5: Impact of Treatments on Savings Balances (ordinary least-squares regressions)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: 
Account type: All accounts, in total Ordinary Commitment Other
PANEL A
Any treatment 1,863*** 1,167*** 435*** 262**
(412) (302) (154) (124)
PANEL B
Commitment treatment 2,475*** 1,167*** 935*** 372**
(524) (364) (238) (187)
Ordinary treatment 1,301*** 1,167*** -26 160
(442) (349) (129) (129)
P-val. of F-test: Coefficients on 
commitment and ordinary treatments 
are equal
0.019 0.999 0.000 0.290
Mean dep. var. in Control group 364 302 0 62
Number of observations 3,150 3,150 3,150 3,150
Notes: Stars indicate significance at 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***) levels. Dependent variable is savings balance on Oct 22, 2009, 
just prior to November-December 2009 planting season. Standard errors are clustered at the club level. USD 1 is ca. MK 145. All 
regressions include stratification cell fixed effects and the following baseline variables: Dummy for male respondent; dummy 
for married; age in years; years of completed education; number of household members; asset index; livestock index; land 
under cultivation; proceeds from tobacco and maize sales during the 2008 season; cash spent on inputs for the 2009 season; 
dummy for ownership of any formal bank account; amount of savings in bank or cash (with missing values replaced with 
zeros); dummy for hyperbolic (missing values replaced with zeros); dummy for "patient now, impatient later" (missing values 
replaced with zeros); net transfers made to social network over 12 months; dummy for missing value in savings amount; 
dummy for missing value in hyperbolic and "patient now, impatient later". For complete variable definitions, see Appendix B. F-
test of Panel B: "Commitment savings = Ordinary savings" tests the equality of means in commitment and ordinary treatment 
groups. 
Savings balance immediately prior to planting period (on Oct 22, 2009) 
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Table 3.6: Impact of Treatments on Agricultural Outcomes in 2009-2010 Season and House-
hold Expenditure after 2010 Harvest
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable: 
Land under 
cultivation 
[acres]
Total value of 
inputs [MK]
Proceeds from 
crop sales [MK]
Value of crop 
output (sold 
and not sold) 
[MK]
Farm profit 
(output-input) 
[MK]
Total 
expenditure in 
30 days prior to 
survey  [MK]
PANEL A
Any treatment 0.30** 8,023* 19,595** 23,921** 16,927* 1,151*
(0.15) (4,131) (8,996) (11,529) (9,117) (601)
PANEL B
Commitment treatment 0.33** 10,297** 26,427*** 31,259** 21,369** 1,442**
(0.16) (4,563) (9,979) (12,510) (10,064) (656)
Ordinary treatment 0.27* 5,946 13,358 17,223 12,872 885
(0.16) (4,504) (9,518) (12,204) (9,577) (650)
P-val. of F-test: Coefficients on 
commitment and ordinary 
treatments are equal
0.614 0.246 0.086 0.117 0.246 0.283
Mean dep. var. in Control group 4.28 60,372 91,747 155,685 95,210 10,678
Number of observations 2,835 2,835 2,835 2,835 2,835 2,835
Notes: Stars indicate significance at 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***) levels. Standard errors are clustered at the club level. USD 1 is ca. MK 145. 
All regressions include stratification cell fixed effects and the following baseline variables: Dummy for male respondent; dummy for 
married; age in years; years of completed education; number of household members; asset index; livestock index; land under cultivation; 
proceeds from tobacco and maize sales during the 2008 season; cash spent on inputs for the 2009 season; dummy for ownership of any 
formal bank account; amount of savings in bank or cash (with missing values replaced with zeros); dummy for hyperbolic (missing values 
replaced with zeros); dummy for "patient now, impatient later" (missing values replaced with zeros); net transfers made to social network 
over 12 months; dummy for missing value in savings amount; dummy for missing value in hyperbolic and "patient now, impatient later". 
For complete variable definitions, see Appendix B. F-test of Panel B tests the equality of means in commitment and ordinary treatment 
groups.
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Table 3.7: Impact of treatments on household size, transfers and ﬁxed deposit demand
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable: Household size
Tobacco loan 
amount [MK]
Total transfers 
made [MK]
Total transfers 
received [MK]
Total net 
transfers made 
[MK]
Has fixed 
deposit 
account
PANEL A
Any treatment 0.14 3,158 215 -301 477 0.032***
(0.09) (4,583) (249) (248) (322) (0.012)
PANEL B
Commitment treatment -0.004 3,418 304 -316 568 0.050***
(0.019) (4,897) (275) (258) (347) (0.014)
Ordinary treatment -0.010 2,920 134 -288 394 0.016
(0.019) (5,068) (267) (262) (342) (0.012)
P-val. of F-test: Coefficients on 
commitment and ordinary 
treatments are equal
0.748 0.899 0.431 0.856 0.483 0.008
Mean dep. var. in Control group 5.72 40,147 2,872 2,492 418 0.039
Number of observations 2,835 2,835 2,835 2,835 2,835 2,835
Notes: Stars indicate significance at 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***) levels. Standard errors are clustered at the club level. USD 1 is 
ca. MK 145. All regressions include stratification cell fixed effects and the following baseline variables: Dummy for male 
respondent; dummy for married; age in years; years of completed education; number of household members; asset index; 
livestock index; land under cultivation; proceeds from tobacco and maize sales during the 2008 season; cash spent on inputs for 
the 2009 season; dummy for ownership of any formal bank account; amount of savings in bank or cash (with missing values 
replaced with zeros); dummy for hyperbolic (missing values replaced with zeros); dummy for "patient now, impatient later" 
(missing values replaced with zeros); net transfers made to social network over 12 months; dummy for missing value in savings 
amount; dummy for missing value in hyperbolic and "patient now, impatient later". For complete variable definitions, see 
Appendix B. F-test of Panel B: "Commitment savings = Ordinary savings" tests the equality of means in commitment and 
ordinary treatment groups.
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after the 2010 harvest.25
Column 1 presents treatment eﬀects on land under cultivation in acres. Panel A indicates
that land cultivated was higher by 0.30 acres among respondents oﬀered any treatment (sta-
tistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level), compared to 4.28 acres in the control group. Treatment
eﬀects are very similar when estimated for the commitment and ordinary treatments sepa-
rately (Panel B), and the diﬀerence between the two is not statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from zero.26
Results in column 2, Panel A show that the treatment had a positive impact on the total
monetary value of agricultural inputs used in the 2009-10 planting season, which is statis-
tically signiﬁcant at the 10% level. Estimating the eﬀects separately for the commitment
and ordinary treatments reveals that both eﬀects are positively signed, and the eﬀect of
the commitment treatment is statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at the 5% level.
While the commitment treatment coeﬃcient is larger in magnitude than the ordinary treat-
ment coeﬃcient, we cannot reject at conventional statistical signiﬁcance levels that the two
treatment coeﬃcients are equal to one another.
The increase in agricultural input utilization caused by the treatment appears to have,
in turn, caused increases in agricultural output. Columns 3-5 show treatment eﬀects on,
respectively, crop sale proceeds, value of crop output (both sold and unsold), and farm proﬁt
(value of output minus value of inputs). For each of these outcomes, the any treatment
coeﬃcient in Panel A is positive and statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% or 10% level. In Panel
B, the commitment treatment coeﬃcient is positive and statistically signiﬁcant in each of
the regressions at the 1% or 5% level, and is larger in magnitude in each case than the
corresponding ordinary treatment coeﬃcient. Only in column 3 (proceeds from crop sales)
can we reject at conventional levels (10% in this case) the hypothesis that the commitment
and ordinary treatment coeﬃcients are equal.27, 28
25All outcomes in Table 3.6 are for the total household, not per capita. We show in Table 3.7, column 1
that the treatments have no eﬀect on household size, so interpretation of impacts in Table 3.6 is not clouded
by concurrent changes in household size.
26We investigated whether the treatment eﬀects on land are due to increased land rentals, and found no
large or statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect (for any treatment and for the commitment and ordinary treatments
separately). Results available from authors on request.
27The increase in farm proﬁt in column 5 and in the value of the inputs in column 2 suggests a high rate
of return to inputs. Most of the increases in expenditures were on ﬁrewood to cure tobacco and on fertilizer.
Among the diﬀerent varieties of tobacco grown, the highest value one needs more curing, so the increased
proﬁts could be due to a shift in the crop mix towards higher value tobacco as well as the increased inputs. In
addition, historical production and weather data suggest that 2010 was a good production year with average
crop prices.
28In results available upon request, we ﬁnd that increases in production caused by the treatments are
relatively concentrated in tobacco production. In the control group, tobacco accounts for 66.5% of the
kwacha value of production, but increases in tobacco production account for 81.4% of the treatment eﬀect
(MK19,477 of the MK23,921 increase in the value of crop output).
101
Given the positive treatment eﬀects on agricultural production, it is of interest to examine
eﬀects on household expenditures, in column 6. The eﬀect of any treatment is positive
and statistically signiﬁcant at the 10% level (Panel A). Results in Panel B show that both
commitment and ordinary treatment eﬀects are positive in magnitude, and the commitment
treatment eﬀect is statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at the 5% level. We cannot
reject at conventional signiﬁcance levels that the commitment and ordinary treatment eﬀects
are equal.
The treatment eﬀects identiﬁed in Table 3.6 are economically signiﬁcant. In Panel A, the
treatment eﬀect on total value of inputs is MK 8,023 (USD 55.33), amounting to an increase
of 13.3 percent over the control group mean, while the treatment eﬀect on value of crop
(sold and unsold) is MK 23,921 (USD 164.97), an increment of 15.4 percent over the control
group mean. The increase in household expenditure is 10.8 percent vis-a-vis the mean in the
control group. These results show large, consistent eﬀects of any treatment on outcomes
that are likely connected to household well-being.
Consistent with these ﬁndings, column 6 of Table 3.7 shows that being assigned to a
savings treatment group increased the probability of owning a ﬁxed-deposit account over a
year later by 0.03 percentage points, a statistically signiﬁcant increase of 75 percent relative to
the control group mean of 0.039.29 In addition, study participants continue to use the oﬀered
ordinary accounts. Using the bank's administrative data we ﬁnd that treatment eﬀects on
deposits, withdrawals, and net deposits persist during the May to July 2010 period, more
than a year after the initial intervention, particularly in the ordinary treatment group.
The continued usage of ordinary accounts and the increased take-up of ﬁxed deposit
accounts one year after the intervention suggest that farmers in the treatment group found
something of value in the savings products oﬀered.
3.5 Mechanisms
We now turn to considering the mechanisms through which our treatment eﬀects may
have operated. Studies of the impact of savings account access typically posit (implicitly
or explicitly) that eﬀects would operate via alleviation of savings constraints (Dupas and
Robinson, 2013a; Prina, 2013, for example). A study population is typically thought to have
imperfect methods for preserving funds, which can be depleted for a variety of reasons such as
self-control problems, demands for sharing with one's social network, or theft. In our study
29Fixed deposit accounts (also known as time deposit or term deposit accounts in other countries) are
accounts in which the depositor accepts lower liquidity (an agreement not to withdraw) for a certain spec-
iﬁed time period, in return for a higher interest rate. Such accounts could be seen as providing a similar
commitment function to the commitment savings accounts oﬀered in the experiment.
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population, alleviation of savings constraints via provision of formal savings accounts could
help farmers preserve funds between harvest and the subsequent planting season, leading to
positive impacts on agricultural input expenditures (and then on other subsequent related
outcomes).
While we do ﬁnd positive treatment eﬀects on both savings balances and on subsequent
agricultural input utilization, the relative magnitudes of the eﬀects are inconsistent with
alleviation of savings constraints being the only mechanism at work. Consider the impact
of any treatment on the value of agricultural inputs used (Table 6, column 2), MK 8,023.
While the treatment did cause an increase in deposits exceeding that amount (MK 17,609,
from Table 4, column 2), withdrawals happened quite soon after deposits, so that very little
remained in the accounts some months later once the time came for the November-December
input purchases: the treatment eﬀect on savings balances at the end of October is just
MK 1,863 (Table 5, column 1), which is just 23% of the increase in the value of inputs.30
Therefore, no more than about a quarter of the eﬀect of the treatment on agricultural input
expenditures can be attributed to alleviation of savings constraints per se.
In Table 7, we estimate treatment eﬀects on other outcomes, to test for other operative
mechanisms behind our main results. One possible explanation for the increase in total
expenditure on inputs for the savings treatment group could be that increased savings at
the bank led to increased eligibility for loans, and it is these loans that funded the increased
purchases of inputs.31 Column 2 examines the size of loans provided by a lender in the
subsequent season. While coeﬃcients in Panels A and B are positive, none are statistically
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero.32 It should be said, however, that the point estimates are
relatively imprecise, and 95% conﬁdence intervals do include the estimated treatment eﬀects
on the value of agricultural inputs.
Other alternate explanations have in common the hypothesis that while most funds de-
posited in the accounts at harvest time were withdrawn fairly soon thereafter, they may have
nonetheless been spent on agricultural inputs. They could have been spent on inputs some-
time between harvest and the November-December planting (making immaterial our ﬁnding
of low savings balances in late October.) Or they could have been preserved outside the
bank (say in cash held at home or with money guards) and used for input purchases during
30A one-sided test that the any treatment eﬀect on the value of agricultural inputs (8,023) is larger than
the treatment eﬀect on end-of-October savings balances (1,863) is statistically signiﬁcant at the 10% level
(p-value 0.061). Corresponding tests for the ordinary treatment and commitment treatment have p-values
of 0.143 and 0.038 respectively.
31Loans from informal lenders and friends and family account for a small fraction of total borrowing. At
any rate, conducting this analysis for total credit instead of just tobacco credit yields very similar results.
32Similarly, we ﬁnd no diﬀerence across treatment and control groups in the probability of accessing a loan
(results not shown).
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the planting season. In either case alleviation of savings constraints via provision of formal
accounts per se cannot be the operative mechanism, so we search for other mechanisms.
One hypothesis is that the existence of the accounts allowed households to resist social
network demands for resources (what one might call other-control problems) in the period
between the harvest and planting seasons. While the data from our partner bank show
relatively low savings overall, with only a minority in the restricted-access commitment ac-
counts, neither total balances nor the share in commitment accounts were public knowledge
to the community. The existence of formal accounts may have provided an excuse to turn
down requests for assistance from the social network by claiming that savings were inacces-
sible.33 We test this hypothesis in Table 7 by regressing three direct measures of transfers
between households (transfers made, transfers received, and net transfers) on the treatment
variables. We ﬁnd no eﬀect of either intervention in any of these outcomes, however. All
coeﬃcients (in both Panels A and B) are relatively small in magnitude and none are sta-
tistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at conventional levels. That said, these measures
span the pre-planting to post-harvest period, and are thus consistent with lower transfers
during the pre-planting season, when commitment accounts were active and therefore could
serve as a valid excuse for reducing transfers, followed by higher transfers after the harvest,
when farmers with commitment accounts realized larger revenues. Unfortunately, we lack
the data needed to examine the timing of transfers. In addition, it is still possible that
the commitment treatment allowed study participants to keep funds from others within the
household, or to refrain from consuming resources early in anticipation of future requests
from others (as in Goldberg, 2011).
Another possibility is that the ability to hold a buﬀer stock in formal savings accounts
made farmers willing to take on the risk of making higher input investments (Angeletos and
Calvet, 2006; Kazianga and Udry, 2006).
Alternatively, treatment may also have aﬀected agricultural production decisions via one
or more of several mechanisms suggested by research in psychology and behavioral economics.
Because the savings accounts were framed by the experiment as vehicles for accumulating
funds for agricultural inputs, the very act of signing up for deposits into savings accounts
could have been viewed by farmers as a commitment to raise expenditures of this type. This
mere elicitation of farmers' intentions may have inﬂuenced their later behavior (Feldman
and Lynch, 1988; Webb and Sheeran, 2006; Zwane et al., 2011). Relatedly, the act of signing
33To be sure, one of the rae arms involved public distribution of rae tickets based on savings balances.
We do not ﬁnd that these eﬀects are distinguishable from the eﬀects of treatments with no distribution of
tickets. Also, the distribution of funds across ordinary and commitment accounts was not public knowledge
because the cross-randomized rae treatments awarded rae tickets on the basis of total funds across all
accounts, so even the public rae did not reveal how little was saved in commitment accounts.
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up for direct deposits into savings accounts may have created an agricultural input mental
account for the deposited funds (Thaler, 1990), even if most funds were withdrawn soon after
being deposited and relatively small amounts remained in the accounts. Finally, signing up
for direct deposit into accounts could have altered study participants' reference points about
future input use, farm output, and consumption. In this context, prospect theory (Kahneman
and Tversky, 1979b) would predict that farmers oﬀered savings accounts could have become
more willing to invest in agricultural inputs, so as to avoid losses in the form of failing to
achieve their (experimentally-induced) higher reference points for input use, output, and
consumption. Unfortunately, we can oﬀer no direct evidence to support or contradict that
such psychological channels may have been at work.
3.6 Conclusion
Viewed as a policy intervention for increasing the use of agricultural inputs by households
in developing countries, savings accounts have appealing features. Unlike subsidies, they
do not require major government budget commitments. While the supply of credit for
agricultural inputs is often constrained, banks are eager to attract new savings customers.
The results of our ﬁeld experiment among cash crop farm households in Malawi show that
oﬀering access to individual savings accounts not only increases banking transactions, but
also has statistically signiﬁcant and economically meaningful eﬀects on measures of household
wellbeing, such as investments in inputs and subsequent agricultural yields, proﬁts, and
household expenditure. Ours is one of the ﬁrst randomized studies of the economic impact
of savings accounts, and the ﬁrst (to our knowledge) to measure impacts on important
agricultural outcomes (input use and farm output) and household consumption levels.
An important direction for future research would be to provide evidence on the mech-
anisms underlying the eﬀects we found, since our treatment eﬀects on input utilization are
larger than can be explained by alleviation of savings constraints alone. Other mechanisms
that might be explored might be the role of savings as a buﬀer stock for self-insurance,
increases in credit access, reductions in demands from others in the social network (other-
control problems), as well as mechanisms suggested by behavioral economics (e.g., mental
accounting and reference dependence).
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APPENDIX A
Robustness checks
A.1 Robustness checks
This section includes alternative speciﬁcations for the main regression results. See text
for description.
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Table A.1: Eﬀects of bonus incentives on attendance and output of tea pluckers (pooled OLS estimation)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Full attendance 
[0/1]
Weekly 
attendance 
[days]
Met output low 
threshold for 
weekly total 
output [0/1]
Met output 
high threshold 
for weekly total 
output [0/1]
Total weekly 
output [kg]
Weekly 
average of 
daily 
productivity if 
plucking 
[kg/day]
Lottery Bonus 0.0357*** 0.0607*** -0.00521 0.00947 3.380 -0.0849
(0.0112) (0.0208) (0.00985) (0.00839) (2.726) (0.407)
Fixed Bonus 0.016 0.03 4.99e-05 0.000396 1.473 -0.210
(0.0107) (0.0218) (0.00748) (0.00668) (2.569) (0.297)
L1.Lottery Bonus 0.00176 -0.0192 -0.00144 -0.00326 -1.123 -0.316
(0.0125) (0.0200) (0.00768) (0.00789) (2.684) (0.408)
L1.Fixed Bonus -0.0196 -0.0523*** -0.000343 -0.00825 -3.971 -0.465
(0.0127) (0.0176) (0.00985) (0.00869) (2.756) (0.392)
P.-val. of Wald tests: 
Lottery Bonus = Fixed Bonus 0.0611 0.0747 0.506 0.238 0.515 0.663
Joint: Lottery Bonus = 0 and Fixed Bonus = 0 0.0134 0.0205 0.793 0.447 0.473 0.714
Joint: L1.Lottery Bonus = 0 
and L1.Fixed Bonus = 0
0.0602 0.0227 0.965 0.590 0.284 0.498
Mean of dep. variable in no-bonus condition during experiment 0.555 5.290 0.533 0.250 384.4 81.01
Number of gang-week observations during experiment 15603 15603 15603 15603 15603 15490
Number of gang-week observations in total 38,295 38,295 38,295 38,295 38,295 38,117
Number of workers 1,678 1,678 1,678 1,678 1,678 1,678
Notes: Stars indicate significance at 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***) levels. Standard errors are clustered at the gang level. Estimated results are from a worker-level random 
effect model with a full set of gang-week dummies. Wald-tests: “Lottery Bonus = Fixed Bonus” tests the equality of the two coefficients. “Joint: Lottery Bonus = 0 and Fixed 
Bonus = 0” and “Joint: L1.Lottery Bonus = 0 and L1.Fixed Bonus = 0” test the joint equality of the two respective pairs of coefficients. 
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Table A.2: Eﬀects of bonus incentives on attendance and output of tea pluckers (individual ﬁxed eﬀects estimation)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Full attendance 
[0/1]
Weekly 
attendance 
[days]
Met output low 
threshold for 
weekly total 
output [0/1]
Met output 
high threshold 
for weekly total 
output [0/1]
Total weekly 
output [kg]
Weekly 
average of 
daily 
productivity if 
plucking 
[kg/day]
Lottery Bonus 0.038*** 0.07*** -0.006 0.009 4.1* -0.1
(0.011) (0.02) (0.010) (0.007) (2.2) (0.3)
Fixed Bonus 0.018 0.04* -0.001 0.000 2.4 -0.3
(0.011) (0.02) (0.008) (0.006) (2.6) (0.2)
L1.Lottery Bonus 0.005 -0.01 -0.003 -0.004 -0.1 -0.3
(0.012) (0.02) (0.008) (0.008) (2.3) (0.3)
L1.Fixed Bonus -0.016 -0.04** -0.001 -0.009 -2.7 -0.5
(0.012) (0.02) (0.010) (0.008) (2.7) (0.3)
P.-val. of Wald tests: 
Lottery Bonus = Fixed Bonus 0.051 0.113 0.479 0.213 0.536 0.407
Joint: Lottery Bonus = 0 and Fixed Bonus = 0 0.003 0.004 0.754 0.387 0.181 0.438
Joint: L1.Lottery Bonus = 0 
and L1.Fixed Bonus = 0
0.047 0.043 0.934 0.531 0.407 0.335
Mean of dep. variable in no-bonus condition during experiment  .55491488 5.29 0.533 0.250 384.4 81.0
Number of gang-week observations during experiment  15603 15,603 15,603 15,603 15,603 15,490
Number of gang-week observations in total  38295 38,295 38,295 38,295 38,295 38,117
Number of workers 1,678 1,678 1,678 1,678 1,678 1,678
Notes: Stars indicate significance at 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***) levels. Standard errors are clustered at the gang level. Estimated results are from a worker-level random 
effect model with a full set of gang-week dummies. Wald-tests: “Lottery Bonus = Fixed Bonus” tests the equality of the two coefficients. “Joint: Lottery Bonus = 0 and Fixed 
Bonus = 0” and “Joint: L1.Lottery Bonus = 0 and L1.Fixed Bonus = 0” test the joint equality of the two respective sets of coefficients. 
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APPENDIX B
Balance and comparison demographic characteristics of
sample to census data
B.1 Balance and comparison demographic characteristics of sample
to census data
Appendix Table B.1 shows summary statistics for important baseline characteristics: all
available baseline measures corresponding to outcome variables used in the results tables as
well as an index of asset holdings (used as controls in the main results tables). Columns 4
and 5 present formal statistical tests of the null hypothesis that pre-program characteristics
have equal means across all four study arms. For each covariate, the test is conducted by
running two linear regressions as seemingly-unrelated regressions (SURs) of the variable on a
saturated set of categorical indicator variables for study arm, one regression for each round.
We then run a joint test of the null hypothesis that all the coeﬃcients are zero. Column
5 shows the p-values, which are uniformly above 0.3. The last row shows the test statistic
and p-value for a joint test of the hypothesis that all the coeﬃcients equal zero across all
26 regressions. We fail to reject the null of no diﬀerences (p-value of 0.81). The sample is
similarly balanced on demographic covariates; see analogue test statistics in Appendix Table
B.2.
Table B.2, columns 1 to 3, presents summary statistics of demographic characteristics for
the 350 workers from our sample for whom baseline data is available. As a basis for com-
parison, we also present statistics for Mulanje District as a whole, taken from the IPUMS-
International 10% sample of the 2008 Malawi Population and Housing Census. A comparison
of our sample with the rest of the district suggests that it is generally representative of the
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Table B.1: Balance of baseline variables
Variable
(1)
Mean
(2)
SD
(3)
N
(4)
Chi2
(5)
p-value
Income and Spending
Total spending since last Friday, inclusive [MK] 2271.04 3728.39 329 3.84 0.70
Cash remaining out of total received since last Friday, inclusive [MK] 683.81 2618.13 329 7.00 0.32
Expenditure Composition
Food for consumption at home 0.66 0.23 349 3.05 0.80
Maize only 0.23 0.26 349 2.24 0.90
Food for consumption out of home 0.06 0.07 349 1.77 0.94
Non-Food 0.28 0.23 349 3.83 0.70
Assets
Baseline Asset Ownership Index (First Principal Component) 0.00 2.68 350 5.53 0.48
Combined Test Across All Variables 28.50 0.81
Worker Sample Summary 
Statistics
Test for Difference 
Across Study Arms
Notes: Sample includes 359 respondents who participated in at least one round of the work program and have data from at least 
one data source for that round (either the payday data, the survey, or both). All money amounts are in Malawian Kwacha (MK); 
during the study period the market exchange rate was approximately MK400 to the US dollar, and the PPP exchange rate was 
approximately MK160 to the US dollar. Tests for any difference in means across study arms use seemingly-unrelated regressions of 
a variable on a full set of categorical indicator variables for study arm, clustered by respondent, to do pooled tests of the null 
hypothesis that all study arms have equal means in both rounds; the test statistics are chi-square distributed with 6 degrees of 
freedom. The Combined Test Across All Variables is a combined SUR of all 8 covariates in both rounds; its chi-square test statistic 
has 36 degrees of freedom due to some constraints being dropped.
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local area, with diﬀerences that are likely due to the criteria used by the Village Development
Committee (VDCs) to select workers for the program. Our sample is 69% female, which is
substantially higher than the district average of 55%. It also has a larger share of people
from the Lomwe ethnic group, at 90% compared with 75%. It is otherwise quite similar to
the district as a whole, with similar rates of marriage (70%) and Christian religion (90%).
The diﬀerences in the other variables are fairly small, and consistent with the VDCs selecting
people of lower socioeconomic status for the program. For example, our sample averages 3.5
years of completed schooling, compared with 4.4 years for the district as a whole, and has a
mean age of 40 compared with 37 for Mulanje District. Our workers are also more likely to
be divorced and less likely to be single.
111
Table B.2: Demographic characteristics of sample - balance and comparison to census
Variable
(1)
Mean
(2)
SD
(3)
N
(4)
Chi-square
(5)
p-value
(6)
Mean
(7)
SD
Male 0.31 0.46 344 3.79 0.70 0.45 0.50
Religion
Christian 0.90 0.30 341 5.93 0.43 0.91 0.28
Muslim 0.10 0.30 341 5.93 0.43 0.05 0.22
Marital Status
Married 0.69 0.46 338 5.46 0.49 0.71 0.45
Divorced/Widowed 0.25 0.44 338 5.44 0.49 0.17 0.37
Single 0.05 0.21 338 8.74 0.19 0.12 0.33
Ethnic Group
Lomwe 0.89 0.31 344 1.66 0.95 0.75 0.43
Yao 0.07 0.26 344 2.29 0.89 0.05 0.22
Mang'anja 0.02 0.13 344 6.15 0.41 †
Other 0.02 0.15 344 8.27 0.22 0.20 0.40
Years of Education Completed 3.54 3.15 341 3.47 0.75 4.45 3.91
Age (Years) 40.03 15.40 344 4.24 0.64 37.35 17.27
Combined Test Across All Variables 61.42 0.73
Mulanje District 2008 
Census Summary 
Statistics
Worker Sample Summary 
Statistics
Test for Difference Across 
Study Arms
Notes: Pooled Sample includes 359 respondents who participated in at least one round of the work program. Tests for any 
difference in means across study arms use seemingly-unrelated regressions of a variable on a full set of categorical indicator 
variables for study arm, clustered by respondent, to do pooled tests of the null hypothesis that all study arms have equal means 
in both rounds; the test statistics are chi-square distributed with 6 degrees of freedom. The Combined Test Across All Variables 
is a combined SUR of all 13 covariates in both rounds; its chi-square test statistic has 69 degrees of freedom due to some 
constraints being dropped. † The 2008 Malawi Census does not report Mang'anja ethnicity as a separate category, si it is 
included in "other". 
112
APPENDIX C
Variable deﬁnitions
C.1 Variable deﬁnitions
Data used in this paper come from three rounds of full length" surveys (a baseline and
two follow-up interviews), from two- to four-question surveys during paydays as well as from
administrative records of the project. We conducted a baseline survey from 4 Oct 2013 to
19 Oct 2013 and two follow-up surveys after the last payday weekend of each round, once
from 2 Dec 2013 to 7 Dec 2013 and once from 27 Jan 2014 to 31 Jan 2014. All variables
that are created from survey data are Winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. All ﬁgures
in money terms are in local currency units, Malawi Kwacha (MK).
C.1.1 Variables from payday surveys
Amount spent on same day as income receipt is total market spending on all days that
workers received their wages (sum of all four payday Fridays or Saturdays for the weekly
payment group; the fourth payday Friday or Saturday for the lump sum payment group).
Money spent at market on Fridays 1, 2, 3 is the sum of total market spending on the
ﬁrst three payday Fridays.
Money spent at market on Saturdays 1, 2, 3 is the sum of total market spending on the
ﬁrst three payday Saturdays.
Money spent at market on Friday 4 is the total market spending on the fourth payday
Friday.
Money spent at market on Saturday 4 is the total market spending on the fourth payday
Saturday.
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C.1.2 Variables from follow-up surveys
Total spending since last Friday, inclusive [MK] is the total household spending starting
from the fourth payday Friday until the day of interview in the week after the fourth pay-
day. The variable is derived from the diﬀerence of the answers to the questions Since last
Friday, how much cash have you received?" and How much of that cash do you have left?",
respectively.
Remaining cash out of received since last Friday, inclusive [MK] is household's remaining
cash holdings out of money received starting from the fourth payday Friday until the day of
interview.
Self-reported wasteful spending on weekend 4 of round 2 variables ask for money that
respondents report as wasted" or spending which the respondent was tempted into spending
that he/she should not have spent?
• Total since last Friday, inclusive [MK] is the sum of total wasteful spending starting
from the fourth payday Friday until the day of interview in the week after the fourth
payday.
• Friday [MK] is total wasteful spending on the fourth payday Friday.
• Saturday [MK] is total wasteful spending on the fourth payday Saturday.
• Sunday and after [MK] is the sum of total wasteful spending starting from the fourth
payday Sunday until the day of interview in the week after the forth payday.
Expenditure shares based on itemized elicitation is the sum of itemized expenditures grouped
diﬀerent categories as a share of total expenditures across all items based on an large listing
of possible items (with items derived from Malawi's Integrated Household Survey; a select
number of items was consolidated or omitted but including other" items in each category;
total number of 105 items in 12 categories).
• Food for consumption at home includes eight categories of food items typically used
for home consumption.
• Maize only includes only maize ﬂour and maize grain.
• Food for consumption out of home includes all items from categories cooked foods
from vendor" and Beverages" which are typically consumed away from home.
• Non-Food includes all non-food items.
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Value of net asset purchases since last interview is the sum of diﬀerence between value of
assets bought and assets sold from an itemized list of common assets as well as an other"
category considering purchases and sales since the last interview, i.e. since baseline interview
for follow-up 1 and since follow-up 1 for follow-up 2.
C.1.3 Variables from baseline surveys
Assets index is an index based on the ﬁrst principal component of the number of items
owned of 64 common non-ﬁnancial, non-livestock assets and the number of animals owned
of 9 common types of livestock.
Total spending is deﬁned similarly to Total spending since last Friday, inclusive" de-
scribed under follow-up variables above, covering the last Friday prior to the interview until
the day of the interview.
C.1.4 Variables from project records
Bought any shares is an indicator for whether respondent bought at least one share" of
the investment opportunity oﬀered after the follow-up interviews (see details in main text in
Data Collection section).
Total spent on shares is the total amount spent on the investment opportunity oﬀered
and equal the number shares bought times the price of one share (MK 1,500).
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APPENDIX D
Account details and full text of training script
D.1 Savings account details
We oﬀered farmers training and account opening assistance for two types of accounts
depending on treatment status (control, ordinary savings or commitment savings). The
" ordinary" account referred to in the main text is OBM's Kasupe account. Kasupe accounts
had an account opening fee of MK500, no monthly fee, three free withdrawals transactions
via ATM per month, and a MK25 fee per ATM withdrawal thereafter (all withdrawals at
the teller were free). The minimum balance for Kasupe accounts was MK500 and there was
an account closing fee of MK1,000. Kasupe accounts paid an interest rate of 2.5% p.a. with
interest accruing quarterly. Deposit transactions into Kasupe accounts were free.
Farmers were given the option to have their proceeds directly deposited into an existing
account if they already had a savings account with OBM. Another type of savings account
not actively marketed in this experiment but part of OBM's product portfolio was standard
savings accounts with the following fee structure: an opening fee of MK500; a monthly fee
of MK75; no withdrawal fees; minimum balance of MK1,000; a closing fee of MK1,000; an
interest rate of 6.5% p.a. with quarterly accrual. This less common account type is included
in the category " ordinary" accounts together with Kasupe accounts.
The " commitment" account referred to in the main text was an account newly developed
for the project called " SavePlan." SavePlan accounts paid the same interest rate as Kasupe
accounts, but had no minimum balance requirement. SavePlan accounts also had no account
opening or closing fees. Deposit transactions into SavePlan accounts were free. The only
withdrawals permitted for SavePlan accounts were transfers to ordinary (Kasupe or other)
savings accounts, for which no fee was charged.
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D.2 Scripts for savings training, account oﬀers, and rae training
(Scripts were administered in club meeting immediately following administration of base-
line survey. Malawian research project staﬀ played the roles of Persons 1 and 2.)
D.2.1 Section 1: Savings Accounts (All Clubs)
Person 1: Saving money in an individual bank account is a very smart way to protect
your money and improve your wellbeing. As you know, OBM has Kasupe accounts that are
easy and aﬀordable to use.
Person 2: But I already have a savings account with my club. What is better about this
Kasupe account?
First ask the group to list things that are good about the Kasupe account. When the group
has come up with several suggestions, move on to the next line:
Person 1: The Kasupe account is yours alone. You don't share it with the rest of your
club members. You are the only one who can take money out of the account and the only
one who knows how much money you have saved in the account.
Person 2: What are the details of the account? How much does it cost, and what is the
interest?
Person 1: MK 500 for smartcard, MK 500 for initial deposit, no monthly charge, MK 25
transaction charge (ATM fee, withdrawal fee).
Person 2: But I can just keep money at home. What are some of the beneﬁts of saving
my money in a Kasupe account instead of at home?
Let the group make suggestions. After several things have been suggested, agree with the
group and then move on to the next line.
Person 1: Money is safer in a bank account than at home. If you keep your money at
home, it could be stolen or lost in a ﬁre. If you keep it at the bank, it is protected. Also, if
you keep money at home, you may feel obligated to give money to your family or friends if
they ask for it. If your money is in the bank, you can say that you don't have any money to
give.
Person 2: That is interesting, but I think my money is safe at home.
Ask the group: "Do you think money is safe at home?" Let the group come up with
answers, then move on.
Person 1: There are other reasons to keep money in the bank, too. Keeping money in a
bank account can help you save for the future. If you have money at home, it is easy to be
tempted to spend it on food or drinks or household items. If you have money in the bank,
you will think twice about taking it out to spend. Instead, you can leave it in the bank to
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save for important purchases like school fees or buying fertilizer or accumulating the deposit
for a new loan. Also, you can be sure to put away money in case you have an emergency in
the future, like someone gets sick and needs to go to the hospital.
D.2.2 Section 2: Saving for the future (All Clubs)
Person 2: It would be good to save for the future, but I have many needs now. How can
I aﬀord to save?
Person 1: It is important to make a plan for how to spend your money. One way to do
this is to divide the money you will have after selling your tobacco and paying your loans
into two amounts. One amount is to use now, and the other amount is to use in the future.
Then, you can commit to keeping the future amount safe, and not touching it now.
Person 2: How can I do that?
Person 1: Think about how much money you will have after you sell your tobacco and
repay your loan to OBM. Then, think about expenses you have immediately.
Have the group list things they need to spend money on immediately. Get a list of 5-6
things, then move on.
Person 2: Yes, I will have to pay someone who has done weeding for me. Also, I need to
buy some soap and other household goods. My children need new clothes, too.
Person 1: Yes, these are the kinds of things you need to spend money on right away,
when you get paid. But now think of things you will need to spend money on in the future.
What do you want to be absolutely sure you can aﬀord?
Ask the group to list things they want to save for in the future. Make sure they are
thinking of long-term things or expenses that will happen in a few months. Get the group to
list 5-6 things, then move on.
Person 2: I can think of many things. I will need to pay school fees. Also, I want to
make sure I can buy fertilizer for my maize. And I want to have money for food next year
during the hungry season.
Person 1: These are important expenses. You should plan to protect some of your money
so that it is available for those expenses. You can do that by committing to locking it away
until a date in the future, when you will need it. What is a date that makes sense? Choose
a time that is close to when you will need the money for the reasons you just described, so
that you aren't tempted to spend it on other things.
Ask the group: "When do you think you want to access money you would save for the
future?" Let the group discuss several dates. Make sure they consider purchasing inputs, and
also food during the hunger season.
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Person 2: Hmmm. November 1 is probably a good time. That will be in time for me to
buy fertilizer and pay my loan deposit.
Person 1: Now that you have chosen a date, you have to decide how to divide your
money between things you will buy before that date, and the things you are saving for in the
future. This is an important choice. You have to make sure that you have enough money
for your immediate needs and things you will have to buy before the date you have chosen.
You also have to estimate how much money you will need for the things you want to buy in
the future. Start with money you need soon. Of the money you will have after you sell your
tobacco and repay your loan, how much do you need to have available for spending before
November 1, which is the date you have chosen?
Have the group suggest amounts of money they will spend on immediate expenses.
Person 2: Well, I need to pay someone for ganyu. And I need to buy clothes, and some
household items right away. I will also need to spend some money after the harvest season
on small things like soap. I will need to spend MK 25,000 between when I get money and
November 1.
Person 1: Ok. How much do you want to make sure to have for the future, after that
date you have chosen?
Person 2: I will need MK 4,500 for fertilizer, and MK 3,000 for a deposit on a new loan.
Also, I want to keep MK 2,000 for food in the hungry season. That is MK 9,500 total.
Person 1: So in total, your plan is to spend at least MK 25,000 now, and MK 9,500 in
the future. That is MK 34,500. Do you think you will have at least that much proﬁt after
selling your tobacco and repaying your loan?
Person 2: Yes, I think I will have about MK 40,000.
Person 1: Good. If you earn that much, then the extra money can be available immedi-
ately. Then you can commit to saving MK 9,500 for the future, and keep your other money
available to spend sooner. You don't have to spend it all before your date of November 1,
of course, but it will be available while you are committing to lock away MK 9,500 until
then. You made three decisions: You decided how much money you needed immediately,
you decided how much money to lock away for the future, and you decided when you needed
to access that locked away money.
Person 2: Yes. Those weren't hard decisions. But let's demonstrate how it would work
if I had chosen diﬀerent options.
D.2.3 Section 3: Account Allocation Demonstration (All Clubs)
In this section, the two enumerators will work together to do a demonstration with bottle
caps. You will need 12 bottle caps for this demonstration. Draw two big circles in the dirt,
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and make sure everyone can see them.
These circles represent money available for use immediately (point at one circle) and
money committed to be saved for the future (point at the other circle). These bottle caps
represent money. Think of each cap as MK 1,000. So, the 12 caps I have here represent MK
12,000 that someone has after selling his crop and repaying his loan.
Now, if I need MK 3,000 now and commit to saving MK 5,000 for the future, then the ﬁrst
MK 3,000 I earn goes in this circle, for use immediately (put 3 bottle caps in the immediate
use circle). Then, the next MK 5,000 I earn gets locked away for the future ( put 5 bottle
caps in the future circle). Any extra money is available for use in the future, even though I
don't have to spend it immediately it is not locked away (put the remaining 8 bottle caps in
the immediate use circle).
(Collect all of the bottle caps). Think of this like a debt. I owe the ordinary account
3 bottle caps, and I owe the commitment account 5 bottle caps. I must pay the ordinary
account ﬁrst, before I pay the commitment account. Suppose I get 10 bottle caps after I sell
my tobacco and repay my loans. (Hold up 10 caps).
First, I put 3 for immediate use. (Put 3 caps in the immediate use circle.) Next, I lock
5 away for use in the future. ( Put 5 caps in the future use circle.) Then, since I've met
the targets for immediate use and future use, I put all the other caps in the immediate use
circle. (Put the remaining 2 caps in the immediate use circle.)
What if I only get 3 caps? (Have someone come up to demonstrate. Give the person
3 caps. See where he puts them. All 3 should go in the immediate circle, and none in the
future circle. If he gets this wrong, ask if anyone has a diﬀerent idea. Explain if necessary.)
(Enumerator, if farmers don't understand the demonstration you just performed, please
skip back to the start of the demonstration and explain the bottle caps idea again.)
What if I get 6 caps? (Have a volunteer come up and give him 6 caps. Correct answer:
3 in immediate, 3 in future.)
What if you get 12 caps? (Have another volunteer come up, etc. Correct answer: ﬁrst
put 3 in immediate, then 5 in future, then 4 more in immediate. Total is 7 immediate, 5 in
future.)
Dividing the bottle caps between the two circles is just like the spending plan you made
before. You decide how much money you need to have available for immediate use. When
you get money, it is ﬁrst made available for immediate use, up to the goal you set. (Point at
the immediate use circle). Then, you decide how much to save for the future. After making
sure you have money for immediate use, you protect money for the future. (Point at the
future use circle). Then, if there is money left after you meet both your immediate and
future goals, that extra money remains available for use whenever you choose. (Point at the
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immediate use circle). This way, you can make a plan for how to divide your money between
money you need now, and money you can commit to saving for the future, even when you
don't know exactly how much you will earn.
D.2.4 Section 4: Oﬀer of Kasupe (Ordinary) Accounts (All Clubs Except Group
0)
Person 1: We have talked a lot about how to make a budget that gives you enough
money for immediate needs and commits you to saving money for the future. Also, we've
discussed why saving at the bank is useful.
Person 2: Yes. I can make a plan about the amount of money I need for the short term,
an amount I want to be sure to save for the future, and a date in the future when I will want
that money. But how am I to use the bank?
Person 1: Usually, when you are paid for your tobacco, money is put into your group
account. Then, the club oﬃcers give you your share of the cash. You leave it in the group
account if you want. Or, you can save it at the bank, but to do that, you have to take your
cash to the bank and deposit it into your individual account.
Person 2: Yes. It is inconvenient to have to take the money back to the bank, and often,
I am tempted to spend the money as soon as I receive it.
Person 1: This season, we are oﬀering you a new option. You can sign up to have your
money transferred directly into your own Kasupe account. That means that when your bales
of tobacco clear the auction ﬂoor, OBM would automatically put the money you have earned
after repaying your loan into your own Kasupe account.
Person 2: How would OBM know which money was mine and which money belongs to
others in my club?
Person 1: You would have to agree that OBM could get a copy of your seller sheet from
Auction Holdings. OBM would use the information on the seller sheet to ﬁgure out how
much money should go into your account.
Person 2: So if I agree to this, what do I have to do?
Person 1: The ﬁrst thing to do is to open a Kasupe account, if you don't already have
one. We can help with ﬁlling out the forms. The next thing to do is to sign a form authorizing
the direct deposit. You can do both of those things today.
Person 2: That's all I have to do?
Person 1: Yes. It is very easy. If you open an account or already have one, and ﬁll
out the form for direct deposit, then your money will be put into your individual account
automatically when your tobacco is sold and your loan has been recovered.
Ask the group if there are any questions about how to sign up for direct deposit.
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Person 2: What if I decide I don't want to try this system and I would rather have my
money go into the club account?
Person 1: You can still open a Kasupe account. Just don't ﬁll out the [BLUE] form.
Then, you will continue to get your money from the club oﬃcers, who will withdraw it from
the club account for you. But if you do choose to have the money sent directly to your
individual account, then ALL of your money for tobacco this season will go to the individual
account. You can't change your mind part way through the season.
Person 2: Ok. I think I want the direct deposit. If I sign up for that, how do I get my
cash?
Person 1: You can withdraw cash from the bank. You can either use your smart-
card, or make the withdrawal by talking to a teller. You can do this at the branch or
kiosk, or when the mobile bank comes to town. The closest place to make a withdrawal is
______________.
Person 2: So I can take money out whenever I want?
Person 1: Yes, you can, but you should remember the commitment you thought about
to save money for a date in the future.
D.2.5 Section 5: Oﬀer of SavePlan (Commitment) Accounts (Commitment
Clubs Only)
Person 2: Is there a way that OBM can help me keep that commitment?
Person 1: Yes. You can open a special " SavePlan" account in addition to your Kasupe
account.
Person 2: How would that work?
Person 1: Opening a SavePlan just tells the bank to follow the plan you made before.
You will ﬁll out a form with the three decisions you made earlier: how much money you
need to have available for immediate use, the amount of money you want to lock away for
the future, and the date you want that money released.
Person 2: That is easy. It's just writing down decisions I've already thought about.
What happens after I ﬁll out the form?
Person 1: Once you ﬁll out the form, OBM will use it to put the money you are saving for
the future in a special, individual, commitment account. You won't be able to take money
out of that account until the date you have chosen, and you can't change your mind about
the date or the amount of money.
Person 2: Do I earn interest on money in this special account?
Person 1: Yes. You earn the same interest on money in the commitment account as
in the ordinary Kasupe account. The only diﬀerence is that the money in the commitment
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account is locked away until the date you have chosen.
Person 2: What if I earn more or less money than I thought I would have?
Person 1: It works just like the bottle caps. After the loan is recovered, money ﬁrst goes
into your ordinary Kasupe account, up to the amount you said you needed to have available
immediately. Then, money goes to the SavePlan to be locked away for the future. When you
have reached your target for saving for the future, extra money earned after that amount
goes back to the ordinary Kasupe account.
Person 2: So if I don't earn as much as I thought, I will still have money available
immediately?
Person 1: Yes. Money goes to the Kasupe account ﬁrst, and you can withdraw from
that whenever you want. It only goes to the special commitment account when you have
reached your target for immediate spending.
Person 2: So this form just tells the bank to stick to the commitment I made to myself
about how much to save for the future, and when I can use that money.
Person 1: That's right. You can choose any amount and date you want, and OBM will
hold it for you so that you stick to the plan. We can help you ﬁll out the form if you would
like to use this special account in addition to the regular Kasupe account.
D.2.6 Section 6: Rae (All Rae Clubs)
As an extra incentive to save money, there will be a rae draw where some farmers in
this project may have a chance to win a prize. You have to save to have a chance to win,
and the more you save, the better your chance to win. There will be two prizes in each
district. The ﬁrst prize will be a new bicycle, and the second prize will be a 50 kg bag of
D-compound.
The rae tickets will be based on the amount of money you save in your bank account.
The prizes will be awarded in November. The rae tickets will be given out at two times
before then. The ﬁrst time will be in August when we will come back and give you tickets
based on the money you have saved between July 1 and August 1. OBM will calculate
the average balance in your savings account for those 30 days and the number of tickets
you will get will be based on this amount. The second time we hand out tickets will be in
October. OBM will calculate your average balance from September 1 to October 1, and give
you additional tickets based on that balance. Each person will get individual tickets based
on their account balance. The prize is for individuals and not for the club.
You can increase your chance of winning by saving more money and saving it for a longer
time. You will get one ticket for every MK 1000 in your average balance. If you put MK
10000 in your account by July 1 and keep it there until at least August 1, then you will get
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10 tickets. If you don't have any money in your account from July 1 to July 14, and then put
MK 10000 into your account on July 15 and keep it there until at least August 1, you will
only get ﬁve tickets. If anyone here has two accounts with OBM, we will add up the balance
in both accounts. Money saved with other banks will not count for the rae, though.
D.2.7 Section 7A: Public Rae (Public Rae Clubs Only)
We will hand out the rae tickets in August and October during group meetings like the
one we are having today. We will give out the tickets in front of others, so your friends will
know how many tickets you are getting.
I will demonstrate how tickets will be handed out. I am going to hand you a piece of
paper with a number on it. Pretend that is your average account balance from July 1 to
August 1. No one but you and OBM knows this number, so don't tell anyone!
(Distribute the papers with fake account balances to 5 volunteers)
Now, I will give you the number of rae tickets you get for that balance. Come up one
at a time and show me your piece of paper, so I can give you your tickets.
(Have the farmers come up one at a time. Look at the paper and hand out tickets. Make
sure to say out loud for every farmer how many tickets he gets. Make sure that the other
farmers are paying attention to this.)
When we hand out tickets in August and October, it will work the same way. You will
each be called up one at a time to receive tickets based on the amount you have saved, and
your club will see how many tickets you receive.
D.2.8 Section 7B: Private Rae (Private Rae Clubs Only)
We will hand out the rae tickets in August and October during group meetings like the
one we are having today. We will give out the tickets one at a time, so no one will know how
many tickets you are getting.
I will demonstrate how tickets will be handed out. I am going to hand you a piece of
paper with a number on it. Pretend that is your average account balance from July 1 to
August 1. No one but you and OBM knows this number, so don't tell anyone!
(Distribute the papers with fake account balances to 5 volunteers)
Now, I will give you the number of rae tickets you get for that balance. Come up one
at a time and show me your piece of paper, so I can give you your tickets.
(Have the farmers come up one at a time. Look at the paper and hand out tickets. Make
sure no one sees how many tickets you hand to each person.)
When we hand out tickets in August and October, it will work the same way. You will
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each be called up one at a time to receive tickets based on the amount you have saved, and
no one will know how many tickets you have received.
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APPENDIX E
Variable deﬁnitions
E.1 Variable deﬁnitions
Data used in this paper come from two surveys as well as from administrative records
of our partner ﬁnancial institution (OBM). We conducted a baseline survey from March to
April 2009 and an endline survey from July to September 2010.
All variables that are created from survey data are top coded at the 99th percentile for
variables with a positive range and bottom and top coded at the 1st and 99th percentile
respectively for variables with a range that spans both negative and positive values. All
ﬁgures in money terms are in Malawi Kwacha (MK).
Baseline characteristics (from baseline survey):
Number of members per club is the number of listed club members per information pro-
vided by the buyer companies (Alliance One and Limbe Leaf). Not all club members were
interviewed.
Female equals 1 for female respondents and 0 for male respondents.
Married equals 1 for married respondents and 0 for respondents who are single, widowed,
or divorced.
Age is respondent's age in years.
Years of education is the respondent's years of completed schooling.
Household size is the number of people counted as members of the respondent's household
at the time of the baseline survey.
Asset index is an index based on the ﬁrst principal component of the number of items
owned of 14 common non-ﬁnancial, non-livestock assets and indicators of presence of 4 major
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types of housing characteristics (iron sheet roof, glass windows, concrete ﬂoor, electricity
connection).
Livestock index is an index based on the ﬁrst principal component of the number of
animals owned of 7 common types of livestock.
Land under cultivation is the total of area of land under cultivation, measured in acres,
for the late-2008 planting season.
Proceeds from crop sales is the sum of sales from the two main cash crops, maize and
tobacco, in the 2008 harvest.
Cash spent on inputs is the total amount of cash spent - excluding the value of input
packages that are part of a loan  on seeds, fertilizer, pesticides, and hired labor for the
2008-2009 planting season
Has bank account is 1 if a household member has an account with a formal ﬁnancial
institution, and 0 if not.
Savings in accounts and cash is the sum of current savings with formal institutions and
in cash at home.
Hyperbolic is 1 if the respondent exhibited strictly more patience in one month, hypo-
thetical monetary trade-oﬀs set 12 months in the future than in the same trade-oﬀs set in
the present, and 0 otherwise. See section 5 above for more details.
Patient now, impatient later is 1 if the respondent exhibited strictly less patience in
one month, hypothetical monetary trade-oﬀs set 12 months in the future than in the same
trade-oﬀs set in the presence and 0 otherwise.
Net transfers made in past 12m is the total of transfers made to the social network minus
the sum of transfers received from the social network, summed across six categories (social
events, health shocks, education of children, agricultural inputs, hired labor and 'other').
Missing value for formal savings and cash is 1 if the variable "Savings in accounts and
cash" is missing and 0 if it has valid values.
Missing value for time preferences is 1 if the respondent has missing values for the time
preferences variables (" Hyperbolic" and "Patient now, impatient later") is missing, and 0
if these variables have valid values.
Transactions with Partner Institution (from internal records of OBM):
Any transfer via direct deposit is 1 if the respondent receives any deposit from his or her
tobacco club's account to his or her individual savings account, and 0 if not.
Deposits into ordinary accounts, pre-planting is the sum of (positive) transactions into
the respondent's OBM ordinary savings accounts during the period of March to October
2009.
Deposits into commitment accounts, pre-planting is the sum of (positive) transactions
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into the respondent's OBM commitment savings accounts during the period of March to
October 2009.
Deposits into other accounts, pre-planting is the sum of (positive) transactions into the
respondent's OBM non-ordinary, non-commitment savings accounts during the period of
March to October 2009.
Total deposits into accounts, pre-planting is the sum of transactions into the respondent's
OBM accounts (sum across all accounts) during the period of March to October 2009.
Total withdrawals from accounts, pre-planting is the sum of transactions out of the re-
spondent's OBM accounts (sum across all accounts) during the period of March to October
2009.
Net deposits, pre-planting is the diﬀerence between all deposits and withdrawals in the
respondent's OBM accounts during the period of March to October 2009.
Net deposits, Nov-Dec is the diﬀerence between all deposits and withdrawals in the re-
spondent's OBM accounts during the period of November and December 2009.
Net deposits, Jan-Apr is the diﬀerence between all deposits and withdrawals in the re-
spondent's OBM accounts during the period of January through April 2010.
Construction of deposit spells used to calculate the share of deposits withdrawn on same
day and the share of initial deposit amount remaining in account after two weeks
For these calculations we only consider deposits into ordinary accounts that are greater
than MK 500 to avoid small positive transactions like interest payments to count as deposits.
A deposit is considered fully withdrawn when the cumulative net transactions are within MK
400 of the initial deposit or 99% has been withdrawn, whichever is greater. This is to avoid
considering deposits not withdrawn for a long time when respondents left a very small amount
in the account (absolute or relative to the initial deposit). However, the calculations of the
share of deposits withdrawn on same day and the average share of initial deposit amount
remaining in accounts after two weeks are robust to decreasing these " buﬀer" amounts. The
deposit and withdrawal " spells" are coded as non-overlapping: as long as the initial deposit
is not withdrawn the spell is considered active. That means when another deposit is made
before the initial deposit was fully withdrawn the second deposits is added to the cumulative
net transactions, i.e. reduces the amount considered withdrawn. Only spells with initial
deposits after March 1, 2009 are considered. Spells with initial deposits that are not counted
as fully withdrawn by August 31, 2010 are set to end on that date.
Agricultural outcomes, household expenditure, and other variables, from endline survey
(all planting and harvest variables refer to the 2009-2010 planting season):
Land under cultivation is the total area of land under cultivation, measured in acres.
Cash spent on inputs is the total amount of cash spent - excluding the value of input
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packages that are part of a loan - on seeds, fertilizer, pesticides, and hired labor for the
2009-2010 planting season.
Total value of inputs is the sum of cash spent on agricultural inputs plus the value of
inputs included in-kind in loan packages for the 2009-2010 planting season. Input categories
include seeds, pesticides, fertilizer, hired labor, transport and ﬁrewood (for curing tobacco).
Proceeds from crop sales is the sum of sales from the two main crops, maize and tobacco
for the 2009-10 planting season.
Value of crop output (sold & not sold) is the sum of revenue from crop sales and the
value of the unsold crop for seven main crops (maize, burley tobacco, dark ﬁre tobacco,
ﬂue-cured tobacco, ground nuts, beans, soya). Value of harvest not sold equals the kilograms
of crops not sold multiplied by the price/kilogram, summed across the seven main crops.
Price/kilogram for each crop is obtained by calculating crop-speciﬁc revenue/kilogram for
each observation in the sample and then taking the sample average.
Farm proﬁt (output - input) is the diﬀerence between "Value of crop output" and "Total
value of inputs" deﬁned above.
Total expenditure in last 30 days is the sum of three categories household expenditures
(food, non-food household items and transport) over the last 30 days prior to the endline
survey.
Household size is the number of people counted as members of the respondent's household
at the time of the endline survey.
Total transfers made is the total of transfers made to the social network over the 12
months prior to the endline interview, summed across six categories (social events, health
shocks, education of children, agricultural inputs, hired labor and 'other').
Total transfers received is the total of transfers received from the social network over the
12 months prior to the endline interview, summed across six categories (social events, health
shocks, education of children, agricultural inputs, hired labor and 'other').
Total net transfers made is the diﬀerence between "Total transfers made" and "Total
transfers received" deﬁned above.
Tobacco club loan is the total amount owed as part of a tobacco club loan for the 2009-2010
planting season.
Not interviewed in endline is 1 if the respondent was not interviewed and is 0 if the
respondent was interviewed during the endline.
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